501.BB Palestine/7–2949
Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)1
As I see it there are three alternative courses concerning the arms embargo for Palestine, which was discussed at a meeting with Department officers this morning.
- 1.
- To lay the draft resolution proposed by Bunche on the Security Council table until say September, possibly later, in any event until after the PCC makes its report.
- 2.
- To propose adoption of the Bunche resolution amended to provide for retention of the arms embargo.
- 3.
- To propose adoption of the Bunche resolution (subject to minor amendments).
The first alternative has the possible advantage of avoiding discussion in the Council at this time of the controversial embargo question. I doubt however if this advantage is real in view of the fact that the Israelis have made public their position in favor of retaining the embargo and in view of the risk that the Russians may bring up the [Page 1270] question This course would have the effect legally of retaining the embargo until we know a little better how the PCC discussions at Lausanne are going to come out.
On the other hand I think this course confuses two phases of the Palestine question which we have in the past weeks and months tried to keep quite separate, namely the armistice phase and the definitive peace making phase. Also, I feel that this course would create a negative reaction psychologically [and] might thereby impair public confidence and impair the work at Lausanne. Bunche would probably oppose this course and we could probably expect fairly strong opposition from the British and the Egyptians, at least.
The second alternative would have the advantage of protecting us against the risk of an arms race in the Near East. To propose this alternative in the Council however would, I feel quite sure, be, controversial and although strongly supported by the Israelis and probably also by the Russians and the Ukrainians, would be strongly opposed by the British and the Egyptians. I think we would have a chance of getting the Council to support us in such proposal but only as a result of very considerable effort.
The disadvantage of this course is that it would be widely interpreted as indicating a lack of confidence on the part of the United States in the relatively early achievement of peace in Palestine. As corollaries I think Arab confidence in our impartiality would be shaken and the peace effort at Lausanne impaired.
Although I orginally strongly favored retention of the embargo for the time being, I have now come to the view and so recommend personally that we should adopt the third alternative, namely to propose adoption of the Bunche proposed resolution subject to such minor amendments as we may think desirable.
In proposing that this course be followed I have in mind two corollaries. First, that we make a statement in the Council (and endeavor to get the British and if possible the Egyptians and the Israelis to make similar statements) of a reassuring character. In such a statement we would call attention to our own control of arms and munitions exports and make clear that we have no intention of permitting so far as we are concerned an arms race to get started.
The second corollary is that through diplomatic channels we endeavor to assure that an arms race will not get started. The diplomatic channels I have in mind are with the British, the French, the Arab States and Israel and possibly also such other states as Sweden.
I should make clear that the foregoing recommendations are personal. I discussed this matter with Ambassador Austin before leaving [Page 1271] New York and he at that time was inclined, as was I, to favor retention of the embargo. I will of course take up my present view of the matter with the Ambassador on my return to New York on Monday and I should like if possible to take up with him at the same time the Department’s view if it has by then been determined. In view of the fact that the Council will probably meet on this subject on Wednesday next, I think it is important that a decision be reached as promptly as possible so that there will be time enough before the meeting for consultations both in Washington and in New York.
- Addressed also to Mr. McGhee.↩