Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/7–2549

Major General John H. Hilldring ¹ to the Secretary of State

Phoenix, Arizona, July 25, 1949.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Before I left Washington last April the President asked me to take a message from him to the appropriate officials of Israel. The message related to his deep concern about the attitude of the Israeli government as to:

1. Arab refugees, and

2. Acceptance by the Israeli government of the UN decision of November 29, 1947, for the future control of Jerusalem.

At noon last Monday I reported to the President on this mission, and on other matters regarding Palestine, and at four o’clock on Monday—a few minutes before I was to depart for Chicago and Arizona—I was informed that the President wanted me to repeat to you the report I had made to him earlier in the day.

As Mr. Battle has probably told you, I immediately called your office. In view of the fact that I do not expect to be back in Washington for some weeks, I suggested, and Mr. Battle concurred, that I send you a brief résumé of my report to the President which I can expand, if you desire more detail, when I return to Washington.

On my second day in Israel I called on the foreign minister and delivered the President’s message to him. I later discussed it with the Prime Minister and several other Israeli officials. I made it clear, as the President wanted, that he was personally concerned and disturbed about these matters.

Mr. Sharett stated that he was distressed to hear that the President felt as he did, and took some time to explain to me the domestic threat which any Israeli government would face if it agreed to the return of any Arab refugees. He asked me to examine the refugee and Jerusalem problems on the ground while I was in Israel, and to discuss these matters with him again before I left.

During my seventeen days in Israel I gave considerable time and thought to this project. At the end of my visit Mr. Sharett was at Lake Success. Therefore, I related my impressions and views to one of his assistants. Here in brief is what I said:

1. The President is right. The refugee problem should be separated from the other issues, and a settlement of the refugee problem effected promptly. As a beginning Israel should make a generous and bold proposal as to what it was willing to contribute to the settlement.

2. The Jerusalem problem was complicated. I wanted to give more thought to it. Anyway it could wait, in my judgment, until the refugee problem was well under way toward settlement.

The officials expressed regret that I did not agree with their proposals and attitudes about Arab refugees, but promised to communicate my views to the foreign minister.

Subsequently, two Israeli officials came to Paris to discuss this issue with me, and on a later visit to Paris Ambassador Elath conferred with me again about it. Finally, in London during my last week in Europe I had several talks with two officials from Tel Aviv. At the conclusion of each of these European discussions the Israeli officials expressed the conviction or the hope that their government would accept in some considerable part the President’s proposal as to refugees.

Last Saturday the Israeli Consul General in New York came to Washington to see me. He informed me that his government was willing:

1. To discuss the Arab refugee problem separately, and

2. To agree to admit 100,000 Arab refugees, including the 20,000 who have already entered Israel illegally, but not including any that might be admitted under any future negotiation or settlement in regard to the Gaza strip.

Mr. Lurie made it quite clear:

1. That this proposal would be offered, however, only if it were satisfactory to the President and to the United States government, and

2. That this was their final figure, not a starting point from which to bargain. He based this conclusion on the judgment that the quarter of a million Arabs who would then be in Israel would be as many Arabs as his country could absorb without creating either a threat to the security of the country or an inordinately great economic problem.

I informed Mr. Lurie that I would give his message to the President. I have not, of course, given Mr. Lurie any indication of the President’s reaction to this proposal.

As to Jerusalem, I informed the President that it was my judgment that the UN decision of November 29th would never be applied because:

1. Neither Israel nor Transjordan wants it.

2. After the experience of the 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem during the siege of 1948, no government in Israel which agreed to it would last five minutes, and

3. There is much difference of opinion among the so-called Christian countries as to the wisdom of insisting of the 1947 UN decision instead of some other, and perhaps better, scheme of UN control of Holy places not only in Jerusalem but also in Bethlehem, Nazareth and elsewhere.

I also gave the President several personal observations at random:

1. The Israeli government and most Israelis are disturbed and worried about recruitment and rearmament in Arab league countries, which in my opinion accounts in large measure for their super-sensitiveness in regard to security.

2. Neither the UN nor the US is ever going to bring about peace in the Near East. This will be accomplished, if it is ever accomplished, only by the Jews and the Arabs themselves with the help and guidance of the UN and the US, or both. I am certain that the indifferent results which have come out of the Lausanne Conference are traceable to the fact that the UN commissioners have been keeping the principals to the settlement apart—deliberately, instead of encouraging them to discuss the issues together.

3. One reason why America hasn’t been more effective in the Palestine affair is because of the kind of Americans who are involved in it. They belong in too many cases to one of two groups:

a. Those who feel that the Jews of Palestine are always wrong, and

b. Those who feel that they are always right.

Both groups are wrong, of course, and it seems quite clear to me that a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem cannot be expected to be brought about, or to be influenced, by people from either group. Dr. Bunche is a notable exception to the rule.

4. Another observation that worried me considerably was the difference in attitude toward Israel between British officials and our own. The British officials I talked to were without exception completely realistic and unemotional about Palestine. Their attitude can be summed up in a few words. If there is going to be a Jewish State in the Near East, then we must find a way to get along with it. Invariably I was then asked, “Do you believe we, British, will have much trouble making friends with Israel?” I never encountered in any Britisher the attitude of one U.S. official observer who said to me, “I am hot anti-Jewish; I am simply pro-British. I am going along with the British.”

5. I am convinced that Israel wishes to be oriented to the west. Its officials and its people want the friendship of the United States, want to pattern Israel largely after the American way.

6. The President has great prestige and influence with Israeli officials. Once they are convinced that expressions of U.S. policy represent the views of the President, they carry great weight.

I believe that this is a complete outline of my report to the President. Of course, it is not as full a statement as I was able to give the President in nearly forty minutes. As I said in the beginning of my letter, I shall be very happy to fill in the details, if you feel that they would be useful to you, when I get back to Washington.

I am very much impressed with the splendid job you are doing, which doesn’t surprise me in the least. Congratulations, and my very best wishes for your continued success and health.²

Sincerely,

John Hilldring

1. Formerly a member of the United States Delegation at the United Nations and Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.
2. Messrs. Wilkins, Rusk, and Aaron S. Brown, Assistant to Mr. Humelsine, prepared a draft reply on August 11, which contained substantive informal comments. Secretary Acheson discarded the draft and prepared his own reply, which withheld “questions and comments until we have a chance to talk together.” Neither the draft nor the actual reply, dated August 16, is printed. They are filed with the letter of July 25. Ambassador McDonald has given a brief account of Major General Hilldring’s visit to Israel in My Mission to Israel, p. 170.