501.BB Palestine/7–1349
The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State
No. 180
Subject: Comment on the Jerusalem Consulate General A–94, July 6, of Mr. Burdett, re “Current Situation in Palestine”.
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following comments on Mr. Burdett’s “general observations” which I have read and reread with closest attention.
[Page 1222]Regretfully, I must record that I can agree unqualifiedly with only four (paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 10) of Mr. Burdett’s fifteen theses. From all the other eleven theses, I find myself forced by my understanding of the facts to dissent.
Here are some examples of my dissent:
- 1.
- Mr. Burdett’s categoric statement that “the turning point and one of the principle [principal] causes” of the “hardening of the attitude” of the Arabs was the “harsh terms exacted by Israel in the Triangle” (paragraph 1) is not supported by any evidence. In fact, the attitude of the Arab states other than Trans-Jordan on the issue of peace with Israel was intransigent before as well as after the Israel armistice with Trans-Jordan.
- 2.
- Admittedly “the movement (among the Arabs) is towards a day in the future when a successful war will be possible.” (Paragraph 2.) But Mr. Burdett’s implication that these Arab plans for resumption of war are solely the fault of Israel is manifestly unjust unless the very existence of Israel be deemed justification for Arab plans to destroy the new State by war.
- 3.
- I cannot share Mr. Burdett’s certainty that “Israel has no intention of allowing the return of any appreciable number of refugees except, perhaps, in return for additional territory.” (Paragraph 6.) On the contrary, at the time his despatch was filed, intensive consideration was being, and continues to be, given by Israeli authorities in Tel-Aviv to the repatriation of a large number of Arab refugees without involving additional territory for Israel.
- 4.
- Mr. Burdett’s charge that the UN failure “to protect the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs by forcing Israel to comply with the various UN resolutions” has been “largely responsible for the present situation” (paragraph 9) would be more persuasive if anywhere in his despatch he took account of the Arab states’ violation of vital UN decisions, notably the basic partition decision of November 29th.
- 5.
- Mr. Burdett’s related charge that Israel “eventually hopes to obtain all of Palestine” (paragraph 12) is consistent with his central thesis that this State alone is the devil of the piece, but he cites no proof of Israel’s alleged expansionist program.
- 6.
- Similarly, it would be interesting to have the evidence on which Mr. Burdett bases his statement that “Israel is convinced of its ability to ‘induce’ the United States to abandon its present insistence on refugees and territorial changes.” He gives no proof of this flat declaration. (Paragraph 13.)
- 7.
- Unsound and defeatist is Mr. Burdett’s statement that “the UN and the US are confronted with only two broad choices: (1) Employ the necessary punitive measure against Israel. … or, (2) Admit that the US or the UN are unable or unwilling to take the required measures.”
The United States is not limited to two such absolute and mutually exclusive choices.
[Page 1223]The task of statesmanship is precisely to avoid the easy way of adopting either of two such extreme measures as Mr. Burdett contends are the only alternatives. I have no fear that the State Department or the President will be tempted to impale themselves on either horn of this destructive dilemma.
On the contrary, the United States has consistently—except when special circumstances have seemed to dictate otherwise—sought to use its influence in equal measure with both Israel and the Arab states. Why should not our Government continue to influence both sides equally in the direction of moderation and conciliation, merely varying the nature and amount of its persuasion according to its judgment on the particular issue involved?
Success in the achievement of President Truman’s high ideals for the Near East require policies not based on prejudgments either pro-Arab or pro-Israel, but on a combination of extraordinary discernment, flexibility and realism.
Respectfully yours,