Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/7–749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare)¹

secret

[Washington,] July 7, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. Aubrey Eban, Israeli Representative to the U.N.
	Mr. Uriel Heyd, Israeli Chargé D’Affaires a.i.
	Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA1
	Mr. Raymond Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

In the course of a luncheon conversation on July 7 Mr. Eban inquired whether the Department had heard anything from the Egyptians regarding the possibility of conversations in New York on the Gaza strip question. He said that he had intended leaving this weekend for a short trip to Tel Aviv but that he would naturally defer his departure in case there was a prospect of the holding of conversations at an early date. Mr. McGhee said that we had not heard from the Egyptians as yet but that we expected to do so any time now and that we would, of course, inform the Israeli Embassy as soon as we received word.

Discussing the substantive side of the Gaza strip proposal, Mr. Eban said that from the economic standpoint this area was of little interest to Israel; its acquisition would merely result in Israel obtaining several miles of additional coastline. The situation was quite different, however, when viewed from the standpoint of security. Gaza was only a short distance from Tel Aviv itself and as long as it remained in the hands of a country with the military potential of Egypt it could not but constitute a perpetual threat to Israel. It was true that the return of any sizeable number of Arab refugees would also constitute a threat to Israeli security but in the case of the Gaza strip it seemed abundantly clear that the risk of accepting responsibility for the refugees there was far overshadowed by the danger of that area remaining in Egyptian possession.

Mr. McGhee observed that, as Mr. Eban doubtless knew, we had seen promising possibilities in the Gaza strip idea as a step toward Palestine settlement² but that unfortunately the proposal had been made in such a way as to produce the effect of being a straight barter of refugees against territory. Mr. Eban said that he too felt that the presentation of this matter may have left something to be desired. In further discussion on this subject Mr. McGhee observed that although direct discussion on the Gaza proposal was favored as a practical measure he assumed that such negotiations would have to be integrated in due course into other negotiations, particularly with reference to Transjordan. Mr. Eban indicated that such would doubtless be the case.

Turning to the general question of refugees Mr. Eban said that he was concerned lest Israel should make a gesture in that direction only to have it refused by the Arabs on the basis of inadequacy and thus leave Israel “out on a limb”. He expressed doubt in the circumstances whether it was advisable for Israel to make such a move. Mr. McGhee said that he viewed the matter from an entirely different point of view. Presuming that the gesture made by Israel was indeed serious, it would constitute a positive and much needed step in the direction of peace. It could, for example, be made contingent on acceptance of the remainder by the Arab States. It was, of course, obvious that Israel would not be able to take back all of the refugees but a move which would indicate that it was willing to make a real effort to contribute to a solution would create an entirely different and more promising atmosphere. Mr. McGhee went on to emphasize the gravity of the situation which would arise as a result of failure to take constructive action on the refugee question in the very near future. He said that as a result of consultations with officials of the United Nations and of his own personal knowledge of Congressional attitude he was certain that little could be done by way of obtaining further funds on a straight relief basis. Relief could only be obtained if promise were given of some constructive program for the liquidation of the problem. It would be an extremely serious matter for both Israel and the Arab States if it should become apparent that failure to take action on this important question was the direct result of a lack of their willingness to assume responsibilities which they jointly shared. Mr. Eban appeared to be particularly impressed by this argument and said that he would make a point of stressing it on his return to Tel Aviv.

1. Messrs. McGhee and Hare become Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Assistant Secretary on June 24 and July 6, respectively.
1. Messrs. McGhee and Hare become Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Assistant Secretary on June 24 and July 6, respectively.
2. The Department, on July 8, instructed the American Delegation at Lausanne to inform the French and Turkish Delegations of the Gaza strip proposals made by the United States (telegram Unpal 181, 501.BB Palestine/7–849).