Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/6–2249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] June 17, 1949.

Participants:	The Acting Secretary—Mr. Webb
	G—Mr. Rusk
	Mr. Mark Ethridge
	NE—Mr. Rockwell
	Mr. Aubrey Eban—Israeli Representative in United Nations
	Mr. Reuven Shiloah—Special Assistant to Prime Minister Ben Gurion
	Mr. Uriel Heyd—Chargé d’Affaires a.i., Embassy of Israel

The meeting, which had been arranged at the request of Messrs. Heyd, Shiloah and Eban, began at 11:45 and lasted until 1:45.

Mr. Eban opened the conversation by stating that he and Mr. Shiloah had been instructed by the Israeli Government to offer certain verbal comment in connection with the Israeli reply¹ to the note which the President directed be delivered in Tel Aviv on the basic aspects of a final settlement in Palestine.

Mr. Eban stated that he first wished to assure me of the deep feeling of friendship which Israel felt for the United States and of the profound Israeli gratitude for all that the United States had done for Israel. I said that this friendly feeling was reciprocated and that the United States desired its friendship for Israel to continue as strong in the future as in the past. It was because of friendly interest in the welfare of Israel that the President’s note had been despatched.

Mr. Eban then said that the President’s note dealt with two main subjects: territorial compensation and the refugees.

Territorial Compensation

With regard to the first, the Israeli Government had the following objections.

Moral Objection—

Israel felt that it was immoral that anyone should think of rewarding the Arabs for the aggression which they launched against Israel. There had been extremely heavy loss of life among the population of Israel as a result, and Israel believed that rather than receiving compensation, the Arabs owed reparations to Israel.

Territorial Compensation Rejected by the General Assembly—

Israel understood that the United States is attempting to implement the December 11 resolution of the General Assembly. However, this resolution made no mention of territorial compensation but rather called upon the parties to reach agreement among themselves without any predetermined territorial formula being involved. As a matter of fact, the General Assembly had specifically rejected such a territorial formula. In the debate in the General Assembly Mr. Dulles² had stated that the boundary settlement should be left entirely to the parties. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, while invoking the principle contained in the December 11 resolution concerning refugees, should also approach the territorial question in the manner envisaged by the resolution.

Effect on Armistice Agreements—

The territorial compensation formula prejudges the issues decided in the various armistice agreements which have been concluded. While, of course, these agreements are dependent upon the final settlement, no one can say that the decisions arrived at in the agreements will not have a very important effect upon the form of the final settlement. It is thus undesirable to undermine what has already been accomplished by the agreements. Eban maintained that Israel holds no territory wrongfully, since her occupation of the areas now held has been sanctioned by the armistice agreements, as has the occupation of the territory in Palestine now held by the Arab states.

Psychological Effect on Arab World—

It is most undesirable, by means of the territorial compensation formula, to raise in the Arab world hopes which are impossible of fulfillment. The Israelis have noted a definite change in the Arab attitude. Arab representatives who formerly alleged they wanted no part of Palestine are now making demands for large slices of the Negev.

Refugees

Eban maintained that Israel had not adopted a negative attitude concerning the refugees. He said Israeli representatives had made the following concrete proposals.

1. The proposal to take over the Gaza strip with all its occupants.

2. An offer to repatriate members of broken families, after a census of such members had been taken. He thought that maybe 50,000 persons might come back to Israel if this were done.

3. Israel has accepted the responsibility for refugees who have managed to filter back into Israel. All in all, Eban thought these Israeli proposals would mean the eventual repatriation of some 300,000 refugees. Accordingly, it could not be said that Israel had adopted a negative attitude or rejected the principle of repatriation.

In this connection, Mr. Eban said that Mr. Acheson, during a conversation with Mr. Eban and Mr. Sharett in New York,³ had agreed that the security question was an important deterrent to the beginning of repatriation. Mr. Rusk interjected that this was not exactly so since what the Secretary had said was that Israel should begin the repatriation of refugees into areas where there was no security problem.

4. Mr. Eban maintained that Israel had agreed to unfreeze Arab bank accounts and to accept the responsibility for abandoned Arab lands in Israeli territory.

Mr. Eban then stated that the Israelis felt that their initiative at Lausanne had been unilateral and that although they were ready to make peace at Lausanne, there was no reciprocity. As further indications of the initiative taken by Israel, Mr. Eban cited the Israeli agreement to the internationalization of the Holy Places and the creation of a free-zone for Jordan at Haifa. There had been no response to any of these concessions by the Arab representatives.

Mr. Eban continued by stating that despite the provision in this sense contained in the December 11 resolution, there had been no direct meetings at Lausanne between Arabs and Israelis. This had not been the case with the negotiations conducted by Dr. Bunche. The Conciliation Commission should bring the two parties together and this was one reason why Israel had made its proposal for the creation of separate committees to discuss the various items upon which there were differences. Mr. Ethridge replied that the Conciliation Commission had always encouraged direct negotiation. Israel bore the main responsibility for the failure of such negotiations to materialize, because on the few occasions when Israeli and Arab representatives had met together the results of their meetings had immediately appeared in the Palestine Post. This procedure put the Arab representatives in an awkward position and discouraged further meetings.

Mr. Shiloah said that he felt the Beirut meeting between representatives of the Arab states was primarily responsible for the fact that the Arabs did not meet with the Israelis at Lausanne, because the Arabs were mutually suspicious of each other and having adopted a common attitude at Beirut they did not dare depart from this. Mr. Ethridge said that without the Beirut meeting the Arabs would never have agreed even to go to Lausanne.

Mr. Eban then stated that the duty of the United States Government and the Palestine Conciliation Commission was to call upon the Arabs to meet in separate negotiations with the Israelis according to the terms of the December 11 resolution.

Mr. Eban then took up the Israeli territorial proposals, stating that with Lebanon Israel had proposed the political frontier as the final boundary, the same with Egypt, and the present armistice line with Jordan.

At this point I said that so far I had seen no indication that the Israeli Government had any realization of the United States attitude in this matter. As far as I could see, Mr. Eban had had nothing new to add to what had been said so many times before. How, I asked, could we reconcile the reports of Israeli troop movements⁴ with the stated reasonable attitude of Israel toward a final settlement?

Mr. Eban said that Israel had no intention of undertaking military activity. If there were any troop movements, it was because of concern regarding the possible intentions of Colonel Zaim, who was known to be an ambitious militarist. All of Syria’s neighbors, including Israel, were fearful of a possible Syrian attack.

At this point the United States efforts to get Syria to agree to the Bunche proposal for an armistice with Israel were outlined to Mr. Eban.⁵

I then stated that with regard to the recent note to Israel, the Department had of course scrupulously observed Ambassador Elath’s special plea that the utmost secrecy be maintained. Under these circumstances, we thought it most unusual that so much of the contents of the note had been made known in various parts of the world.

I said that it seemed to me essential that both sides should subordinate their special desires to the overall necessity for a real peace, and that I had the feeling that the desire to accomplish such a peace was not yet strong enough in Israel.

Mr. Ethridge then reviewed the course of action taken by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He explained how after considerable difficulty the Commission had succeeded in getting the Arabs to abandon their attitude that the refugee question was the only point which should be considered and to come to Lausanne for general peace talks. The United States delegation had told the Arabs that their position on the refugees was totally fantastic. The United States delegation had also taken the main responsibility in drafting the proposals on Jerusalem, which were very favorable to the Israeli point of view.

The Arabs regarded the United Nations and the United States as responsible for the refugee problem and maintained that the United States must obtain evidence of the good faith of Israel concerning the refugees. Some temporary concession by Israel on this point, which could have been surrounded by provisos, would have satisfied the Arabs and provided the key to the opening of final peace negotiations. Despite all the efforts of Mr. Ethridge and the State Department, Israel made no such concession and the Conciliation Commission went to Lausanne with nothing to offer the Arabs.

Mr. Ethridge said that he noted that the Israelis were attributing the Gaza proposal to him, but the record was clear that Prime Minister Ben Gurion first broached the Gaza plan at Tiberias on April 18 in a conversation with Mr. Ethridge. Mr. Eytan later took up the subject again at Lausanne.

Mr. Ethridge said that the Arab representatives had never stated that they were not willing to talk peace at Lausanne.

Mr. Eban admitted “within these four walls” that it was true that Israel had refused to make the commitment which Mr. Ethridge had urged concerning the refugees.

He asked whether in view of the steps concerning the refugees which Israel had subsequently taken and which he had previously outlined it would still not be possible to go to the Arabs and ask them to begin serious talks. Mr. Ethridge said that if Israel would make a concrete numerical commitment concerning the refugees the stalemate at Lausanne could be resolved.

Mr. Ethridge then stated that Mr. Shiloah had been wrong in previous statements in this country that Israel had demanded no territory in central Palestine. Although Israeli representatives had not made such demands to the Palestine Conciliation Commission they had stated them in the General Committee of the Commission, and had discussed the necessity for more land in central Palestine in connection with the Israeli development scheme.

Mr. Ethridge stated his opinion that if Israel would assume the burden of taking back a portion of the Arab refugees, the world would rally to Israel for having taken such a step based on ethics and humanity.

Mr. Eban inquired whether Mr. Ethridge could refute the observation that the Arabs want to get the refugees back into Israel but do not wish to make peace. In reply, Mr. Ethridge said that at Lausanne the Egyptian representative had told him that if Israel would take back more than a token number of refugees, Egypt would be willing to talk about a territorial settlement and to lift the economic blockade.

Mr. Shiloah said that the security question could not be disregarded. Israel had not seen the McGhee plan and was not sure that an overall scheme existed for resettlement of the refugees. All that was happening was that pressure was being put upon Israel to take back a definite number of refugees. Egypt, Syria and Jordan were rearming.⁶

1. Dated June 8, p. 1102.
2. John Foster Dulles, member of the United States Delegation at the Second Part of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly.
3. See Mr. Acheson’s memorandum of April 5, p. 890.
4. Tel Aviv, on June 13, reported the cancellation on June 9 and 10 of all leave from the Israeli Army, with the apparent intention of “preparing for action if as result of Zaim’s reported refusal discuss Bunche proposal Syrian armistice negotiations fail.” (telegram 448) The Department replied the following day, giving its assumption that “you are doing everything possible prevent new Israeli mil venture.” (telegram 365) Both telegrams are filed under 867N.20/6–1349. Tel Aviv advised, on June 17, that Miss “Herlitz categorically denied that army leaves had been cancelled” (telegram 465, 867N.20/6–1749).
5. Tel Aviv advised, in telegram 465 cited in footnote 4 above, of further information from Miss Herlitz that Israeli-Syrian negotiations resumed on June 16 “ ‘in spirit of friendly cordiality,’ that ‘some actual progress’ was made, and that next meeting called for June 21. Not expected any definite conclusion will be reached for ‘some weeks’ as it is anticipated Syrian elections will tend slow up proceedings, but Israeli officials appear optimistic of eventual outcome.”
6. The Department, the same day, summarized for the U.S. Delegation at Lausanne the meeting with the Israeli officials. The Department noted that the “Israelis reiterated at length familiar arguments why Israel unable take affirmative action re refugees and territorial settlement as set forth US note. US reps maintained firm line refuting number of allegations made by Israelis.” The summary concluded as follows: “US reps reiterated belief that if Israel wld make firm commitment to PCC repatriation specific and substantial number refugees, deadlock at Lausanne wld be resolved and way to negotiations with Arab states for overall settlements would be opened. Pointed out no possibility US assistance re refugees unless Israelis and Arabs definitely accept their responsibilities re repatriation and resettlement.

   “Israelis were told US believes fair final settlement cld not be achieved on basis Israel retaining all 1947 territory plus all territory under mil occupation.” (Unpal 154 to Bern, 501.BB Palestine/6–1749)