867N.00/6–1149: Telegram
The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State
409. Present tense situation Jerusalem attributable in large part to failure reach agreement in Special Committee on questions both Jews and Arabs consider essential. Break in deadlock likely to result in quick relaxation and barring complete failure Lausanne eliminate in immediate future present danger resumption hostilities Jerusalem. Essential element is speedy solution through simplified procedure.
Consulate General considers not advisable refer question to Lausanne. Would thus become involved in whole peace treaty procedure with consequent long delays, personnel at Lausanne not familiar with details of problem and would have start all over again, extent of disagreement would not be diminished by simple reference to Lausanne. Same issues must be resolved regardless locale. Arbitration procedure would also involve delay, arbitrator would not be familiar with question, and Israel at least could be expected refuse accept principle arbitral award.
Consulate General therefore, suggests following approach combining certain features Department and Amman proposals. Settlement Government House matter necessary prerequisite. Bequest by Special Committee to MAC to hold series extraordinary sessions under direct [Page 1118] chairmanship General Riley. Section 3, Article 12 of Armistice permits changes in agreement by mutual consent. Both sides to present concrete plans for settlement along lines outlined below and under terms of reference specifically providing for territorial exchange. Riley would be able give publicity to proceedings and also use his prestige to facilitate agreement on terms he considered equitable.1 At same time PCC and/or US Government should point out to respective governments (or if preferred to local authorities) in friendly manner necessity reaching agreement swiftly thus eliminating this great cause possible trouble. Israel again should be specifically admonished against use force or threats and ill effect present series incidents pointed out. Also could be told that because concessions made in past by Arabs and as measure of assistance in refugee problem, PCC and US hope will be able adopt generous attitude on quarters. In note to Transjordan, disadvantages of stalling should be forcibly brought out (although this may avoid causing Transjordan trouble with other states or Palestine Arabs delay certainly does not contribute towards peaceful settlement which is prime US objective). Transjordan also should be cautioned against excessive demands and inclination lure single issue of Scopus to recoup past losses of disproportionate nature. In this case Transjordan has shown tendency expand demands as Israel showed willingness make concessions. For example willing at one time trade access to Scopus for access to Arab College (Amman telegram 208, May 18 to Department) which Jews perfectly willing grant.
Consulate General believes best chances of success offered by final settlement on following basis: Israel to obtain free access to Scopus by new road from Sanhedriya in direction of “French Hill” plus territory vicinity Sanhedriya might also be given but need not constitute “land bridge.” Arabs to receive in addition to Bethelehem road and electricity return certain Arab quarters and certain Jewish areas in South. Arabs must recognize not possible obtain wall their old quarters and area likely regain steadily diminishing. Baqa quarter now opened to new immigrants and once such persons settled down extremely difficult dislodge. Crucial point of course is amount area in North to be exchanged for quarters in South but Consulate General feels that with constant pressure by PCC, Riley and perhaps interested governments possible reach solution.
Above procedure advanced in interest speed, to avoid further stalling and to provide for use present UN machinery avoiding complications [Page 1119] of setting up new committee. Consulate General considers lines settlement mentioned will meet to maximum extent possible in limited agreement of nature under consideration desires of both parties.
Sent Department, repeated Amman 36, Geneva 27, Tel Aviv 52.
- Chargé Stabler, on June 17, gave his support to the suggestion regarding the Special Committee as set forth in telegram 409 (telegram 250 from Amman, 867N.01/6–1749).↩