867N.01/5–2749
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President
Subject: Representation to Israeli Government on Territorial Settlement in Palestine and Question of Palestinian Refugees.
1. Israeli Position toward Final Settlement
Mr. Mark Ethridge, United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, reports in a telegram dated May 20 (Tab A)1 that Israel has now put forth its full territorial demands upon the Arab States. Under authorization from the Israeli Foreign Minister, the Israeli representative at Lausanne has stated as follows: (1) While Israel makes no demands upon Lebanon at present, it would later like a portion of southeastern Lebanon considered necessary to Israeli development plans. The Israeli delegate said Israel would be willing to compensate Lebanon for this territory, but he did not specify in what way this would be done; (2) Israel desires to acquire from Egypt the Egyptian occupied Gaza strip, allotted to the Arabs under the partition resolution of November 29, 1947; (3) Israel makes no demands upon Syria at present, but will accept the international frontier with the proviso, also to be applied to Lebanon, that if either state desires to open negotiations in the future for border rectification, this may be done; (4) Israel will make further demands upon Transjordan for territory in Arab Palestine considered necessary to Israeli development plans. Israel has in mind giving Abdullah a few villages in return; (5) Israel will retain occupied areas such as Western Galilee and Jaffa, Lydda and Ramie allotted to the Arabs under the partition plan; (6) Israel will relinquish none of the Negev. The Israeli delegate subsequently, however, indicated to Mr. Ethridge the possibility that Israel might make some compensation in the Negev in return for the Gaza strip.
The Israeli delegate further stated that Israel will do nothing more concerning the Arab refugees at the present time.
2. United States Position
In the interest of achieving an equitable territorial settlement for Palestine, this Government has consistently supported the position that Israel should offer territorial compensation for any territorial acquisition which it expects to obtain beyond the boundaries allotted to Israel in the resolution of November 29, 1947. Moreover, since the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948 calls for the repatriation [Page 1061] of those refugees desiring to return to their homes and live at peace, and in view of the impossibility of resettling the total number of refugees in the Arab States within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable cost, this Government has recently made representations to the Israeli Government urging its agreement to repatriation of a subtsantial number of refugees and the immediate commencement of repatriation of some portion thereof. Despite the emphasis upon repatriation in the resolution of December 11, we have urged upon the Arabs the necessity for their agreement to the resettlement in the Arab States of a substantial portion of the refugees, in view of the fact that the return to their homes of all the refugees desiring to go back would be difficult because of the continuing arrival in Israel of large numbers of European displaced persons.
Our representations on these two questions have thus far met with no success with the Israeli Government. Israeli officials have in fact informed our representatives in Palestine that they intend to bring about a change in the position of the United States Government on the above points, through means available to them in the United States. There are also indications that the Israelis are prepared to use the implied threat of force to obtain the additional territory which they desire in Palestine.
3. Efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission
The Conciliation Commission has vigorously endeavored to persuade the Israelis and the Arabs to withdraw from their extreme positions concerning a final Palestine settlement. With respect to refugees, the Commission has succeeded in persuading the Arabs to give up their previous insistence upon repatriation as a prerequisite to negotiations on other outstanding issues, and in persuading certain of the Arab States to give favorable consideration to resettlement of a portion of the refugees. The Commission has failed to obtain any concessions from the Israelis on a territorial settlement or the refugee question. It is now the considered opinion of Mr. Ethridge that the conference at Lausanne is likely to break up when the Arabs learn of the present Israeli position toward a final settlement and that there will exist no possibility of peace on any basis heretofore envisioned by the United States Government unless Israel modifies its demands. Mr. Ethridge believes that such modification is unlikely.
4. United States Interest
The United States interest in the security and stability of the Near East has been a principal motivation of our efforts, both in the United Nations and on the diplomatic level, to urge both parties to the Palestine dispute to take measures leading to a sound and equitable peace. The strategic interests of the United States demand early termination [Page 1062] of the present conditions of instability and mutual suspicion, which provide such a favorable atmosphere for Soviet penetration and exploitation of the Near East. The present instability will certainly continue if the Lausanne talks break down as a result of the new Israeli position, which is susceptible of interpretation by the Arabs as confirming their constant fears of Israeli territorial expansionism. Failure of the Israelis to modify their present demands will inevitably aggravate Arab distrust of Israel and bring about renewed Arab charges that the United States remains passive no matter how unreasonable the demands of Israel. The Department of State is firmly convinced that the Israelis as well as the Arabs must therefore be prepared to make some concessions, and that, if Israel will modify its present demands, a solution can be achieved which will be both advantageous to Israel and acceptable to the Arabs.
5. Recommendations
(a) The Department believes that the time has come to make a basic decision concerning our attitude toward Israel. The United States has given generous support to the foundation of the Jewish State, since we believed in the justice of this aspiration. We are convinced that there is no reason why the Jews and the Arabs cannot live together in peace in the Near East, providing they each adopt a reasonable attitude toward the other.
In the light of all the foregoing, the Department considers that it is now essential to inform the Israeli Government forcefully that, if it continues to reject the friendly advice which this Government has offered solely in the interest of a genuine peace in the Near East, this Government will be forced with regret to revise its attitude toward Israel. There is attached a draft note to the Israeli Government for your consideration (Tab B).2 This note has been discussed with Mr. Ethridge, who believes that it would strengthen his hand at Lausanne and strongly recommends that it be sent.
(b) If the Israeli Government does not respond favorably to this proposed representation, it will be necessary to take measures designed to convince Israel of the importance to this Government of a revision of Israel’s present policy. Such measures, in addition to a generally negative attitude in the future toward Israel, might include (1) refusing the request of the Israeli Government for United States technical advisers and for the training of Israeli officials in the United States; (2) withholding approval of the $49,000,000 as yet unallocated of the $100,000,000 earmarked by the Export-Import Bank for loan to Israel.
[Page 1063](c) Although the Department of State is convinced of the necessity of carrying out this plan of action in the light of our national interest in the field of foreign policy and strongly recommends that you approve this suggested course, the matter involves other important considerations, since the proposed course of action would arouse strong opposition in American Jewish circles. It is therefore suggested that you may wish to ask your advisers to give careful consideration to the possible implications of the above procedure.
The Department hopes that it will receive your reply on a most urgent basis if this Government is to achieve a modification of the Israeli attitude in time to save the Lausanne meeting. Mr. Ethridge informed the Department by telephone on May 23 that he does not believe the meeting can last much longer than a week under the present circumstances. Dr. Bunche and General Riley concur.