Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/5–1249: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

priority

Washington, May 12, 1949—6 p. m.

268. Following is text of memorandum on Syrian-Israeli armistice talks left in Dept by Israeli Amb May 12.

1. During the fighting in northern Palestine Israeli troops occupied fourteen villages in Lebanese territory adjoining Eastern Galilee. Syrian troops occupied Israeli territory in two sectors, the first in the Huleh Region and the second between the Sea of Galilee and the Syrio-Palestinian frontier.

2. During the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations Lebanon demanded the restoration of the international frontier. The Mediator and his staff insisted on this point with the utmost vigor. Israel accepted this position, and the Lebanese-Israeli armistice was concluded through a unilateral withdrawal by Jewish forces from Lebanese soil.

3. In the Syrio-Israeli armistice discussions Israel has asked for the application of the same principle, namely, the restoration of the international frontier. Throughout the armistice negotiations With other states, while demarcation lines within Palestine have been fluid and subject to negotiation, the utmost concern has been expressed by United Nations representatives for the preservation of established international frontiers. Thus, a temporary Jewish encroachment into Egyptian territory was most speedily corrected and the utmost concern was devoted to maintaining the integrity of the Palestine–Transjordan frontier during any troop movements or armistice delineations. It may be said that whenever a truce line has been in the vicinity of an international frontier, the armistice line has been based upon the frontier and not upon the truce positions.

4. The Syrian delegation has persistently refused to base the armistice demarcation line on the international frontier and has openly asserted that Syria has claims for frontier revision in the final political settlement.

5. This Syrian position, inadmissible in itself under Article II, paragraph 4, of the Charter and under the precedents established in other phases of the truce and the armistice negotiations, is aggravated by the fact that the Syrian position on Israeli territory at Mishmar Hayarden is held in violation of truce. This is the only instance remaining in Palestine where any troops are in a position not authorized either under the truce or the armistice agreements.

6. Israel maintains its right to carry out the principle advocated in the Lebanese negotiations, namely, the withdrawal of Syrian troops to the frontier with Israel taking over control on its own territory previously occupied. Nevertheless in an effort to compromise, Israel has been willing to give consideration to a proposal whereby Syrian troops on withdrawing to the frontier would not be replaced by Israeli troops. The proposal is that the vacuum thus created should remain a demilitarized zone containing no forces of either side. This device has successfully solved deadlocks in other armistice discussions. For example, the disputed area at El Auja occupied by Israel troops and claimed by Egyptian forces was made a demilitarized zone. This compromise led to the successful Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement.

7. This principle applied to the Syrian front would not prejudice the claims of either party in the final political settlement. If Syria has a territorial claim, that claim would not be prejudiced since no Israeli troops would be in occupation of the area. Similarly, Israel’s claim to maintain the present frontier would not be prejudiced by the fact of Syrian occupation. The matter, therefore, becomes very grave if Syria declines to accept this compromise and insists on maintaining its present positions intact. In conversations between the Acting Mediator and the Israeli delegation at Lake Success, the former has expressed sympathy for the compromise of the demilitarized zone. This may indeed by the only method of securing the main desires of each party. This Syrians could regard the armistice line as being where it is at the moment, while Israel’s main principle would be vindicated by the fact that no Syrian troops were on Israeli soil. It should be added that whereas Transjordanian, Egyptian and Israeli troops are at present in areas not allotted to them by the November 29th Resolution, none of them is on the territory of any existing state. Thus Article II, paragraph 4, of the Charter is nowhere infringed upon.

8. The new Syrian regime has recently been recognized by the United States, Great Britain, and France. These three governments should therefore be in a position to influence the Syrian government in favor of complying with the principles and precedents established before. These principles should not be applied when they redound, as in the Lebanese agreement, to Israel’s disadvantage and relinquished when they require an effort on the part of an Arab state.

9. The Syrian position at the moment is so difficult to defend within the principles of the Charter and of previous armistice practice that Israel would not hesitate to make a complaint to the Security Council. It would, however, be infinitely preferable for this matter to be settled by negotiation and agreement. It is clear, therefore, that all available international influence should be brought to bear in order to persuade the Syrian government to give the same weight to an established international frontier as has been given in all similar circumstances before.¹

Acheson

1. The Department, on May 12, directed New York to bring telegram 268 to the attention of Mr. Bunche as soon as possible and to seek his attitude concerning “US approach Syrian Govt in effort persuade latter accept compromise proposal would be helpful,” in view of the apparent Israeli acceptance of the main principle of that proposal (telegram 265, 501.BB Palestine/5–1249).