Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/5–449: Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

secret

Bern, May 4, 1949—11 a. m.

676. Palun 140. On May 3, Dr. Walter Eytan as head of Israeli delegation Lausanne, made first formal appearance before PCC for purpose presenting “latest” views of Israeli Government re such outstanding matters as refugees, Jerusalem, boundaries and procedure. Substance of Eytan’s remarks, particularly re refugees, again indicated Israel had not modified its position as stated by Ben Gurion (Palun 13)¹ or Comay (Palun 126).² Intransigence of Israeli position re refugees came as considerable surprise to PCC in view of more lenient line hinted by Eytan and other Israelis during past week (Palun 139).³ It was indicative to me that Secretary’s conversation with Sharett, McDonald’s instructions (Deptel 208)⁴ and Secretary’s conversation with Elath and Eban (Unpal 85)⁵ have apparently fallen on deaf ears. This is particularly disheartening because Arab representatives are increasingly indicating disposition to come to grips with situation. Fawzi Mulki of Transjordan delegation, for example, indicated in no uncertain terms last evening that Transjordan Government considered primary objective to be quick peace. Such matters as refugees and Jerusalem, although important, were secondary and would almost solve themselves as peace was achieved. Israelis apparently fail to appreciate importance of conciliatory approach toward outstanding problems. Arab fears re public opinion at home are deprecated. Maximum concessions from Arabs appear to be more important to Israelis than constructive conclusion to recent conflict which would represent some meetings of minds. Eytan put Israeli case as follows: (a) Refugees: In order remove any possible doubt in minds of public or individual PCC members, Israel reiterates it accepts no responsibility for fact refugees are refugees. War in Palestine is real and only cause for present situation. Israel had nothing to do with flight of Arabs and sought to avoid creation refugee problem. Eytan said he had duty to emphasize Israeli view that Arabs and Arab states were responsible for war. Israel realizes, however, situation exists in Middle East in which 550,000 people, not 800,000 or more as reported, are homeless and views with concern for humanitarian and political reasons. As Israel is part of Middle East it is interested in contributing to solution of refugee problem. Israel alone could not handle problem; nor could Transjordan. Physical return to Israel is impossible socially and practically. On November 29, 1947, Israel was prepared for large Arab minority. If there had been no war matters would have developed differently both politically and economically. Flight of Arabs has made Israel Jewish territory which returning Arabs would not recognize. Partial exchange of population which has thus resulted is healthier in long run. Experience shows large minorities are troublesome and lead to instability. To return Arabs would be backward step socially and politically and would make matters worse.

Israel would be prepared to contribute to refugee assistance in 3 ways, providing some plan for large-scale international action re refugees were undertaken: (1) Return of presently separated families; (2) Compensation; (3) Technical assistance. Eytan analyzed Israeli contribution as follows:

General: Unless resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees with international assistance were to be considered further discussion with PCC would be fruitless. Israel believes Arab refugees should be resettled under Arab rule for social, political, economic and religious reasons. Israel doubts whether returning Arabs would be content under Israeli rule. Eytan doubted Israel would issue conciliatory statement indicating possibility of repatriation and if it did that Arabs would come back. Eytan cited fact that Arabs from Arab villages transferred to Israel under Israeli-Transjordan armistice were moving out of own free will and in complete absence of force or persuasion which had been strictly enjoined. Eytan doubted whether returning Arabs would be willing to accept obligations such as service in Israeli army.

(1) Return of Presently Separated Families: Israelis prepared to study whether scheme can be arranged with Arab states under which Israel would take part of refugees. Time for declaration in terms of numbers has not arrived as figure depends on scheme. Large-scale international help will be required. Israeli delegation is authorized to go into question on this basis. Israelis prepared to reunite separated families based on formula of close relationship.

(2) Compensation: Israelis prepared to pay compensation for loss of land owned and cultivated by Arab farmers. Lands owned but not cultivated would not be compensable. Israel believes compensation should be handled in reasonable way by payment into common fund for refugee use and to avoid squandering by individuals.

(3) Technical Assistance:

(a) Israelis willing to place its experts at disposition of management of overall resettlement scheme. Arabs have few technicians and Israelis can help. Israel cannot, however, give technical assistance to isolated efforts but only to some general Near East scheme.

(b) Jerusalem: Israeli delegation will talk with Jerusalem Committee re Jerusalem and holy places. Otherwise, Israeli views were well known to PCC.

(c) Territorial settlement: Israel prepared to discuss frontiers with legitimately interested countries. Gaza strip would be of interest to Egypt and Transjordan but not Syria. Israel did not consider it necessary to settle all details or some political boundaries at Lausanne. Some boundary questions could be discussed in normal fashion between individual states later.

(d) Arab declarations: Israel feels PCC has exerted strong pressure on it as though Israel were “in dock”. Israel is not responsible for situation in Palestine. Israel considers major concession is due from Arab states with whom real guilt for war lies. Arab states lack courage to state they are seeking peace. Arab states are not interested in peace but in ridding themselves of refugee problem. PCC could ask Arab delegations to issue declaration re peace aims which would clear atmosphere. Thus far Arab states have been pampered. Israel would welcome Arab statement and believes Arabs would respond to PCC request.

Ethridge

1. Presumably Palun 133, identified also as telegram 312, April 20, from Jerusalem, p. 925.
2. Identified also as telegram 291, April 13, from Jerusalem, p. 911.
3. Identified also as telegram 661, May 3, from Bern, p. 968. In a press conference held at Lausanne on April 30, Mr. Eytan made a statement on the matter which was released by the Israeli Office of Information in New York on May 2. Mr. Eytan was said to have recognized “that the refugee problem is one of the main problems confronting this conference. The Israeli delegation has come prepared to tackle it with sincerity, and above all, in the spirit of realism. We believe it to be soluble. We are prepared to help in finding a solution and to cooperate with the UN and the Arab states in its implementation, on the assumption that cooperation with the Arab states will extend to other spheres too. The solution, however, is inseparable from the general peace settlement with the Arab states.” (telegram Delga 70, May 2, 7:25 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5–249)
4. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 894.
5. Identified also as telegram 544, April 28, to Bern, p. 956.