867N.48/5–449
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to Secretary For restal’s letter dated September 23, 1948, in which he transmitted a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff1 concerning the relief of the Arab refugees from the Palestine hostilities, who numbered at that time approximately 300,000.
As you will recall, on November 19, 1948, the General Assembly approved a resolution calling for a $32,000,000 program for the relief of Palestine refugees, to be raised by voluntary contributions from the member states of the United Nations. The resolution recognized that “the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land”. The enabling legislation for a United States appropriation of $16,000,000 as our contribution to such a program was signed by the President on March 24, 1949.
The United Nations relief program is expected to terminate by the end of 1949, when the funds at its disposal will be exhausted. No provision now exists for continuing assistance to the refugees from international sources after termination of the present program. It is recognized, however, that the need for assistance will continue beyond 1949, and that the administrative and material resources of the Arab states and of voluntary relief organizations are wholly inadequate to support an assistance program of this magnitude.
For some time the Department has been studying the question of the long range disposition of the refugees, who now number at least 700,000. The consistent refusal of Israel and the Arab states to agree in principle to the repatriation and resettlement, respectively, of the refugees, has rendered it impossible for the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which is charged by the General Assembly with facilitating settlement of the problem, to initiate any measures looking towards its progressive liquidation. A concerted diplomatic approach to both Israel and the Arab states is being undertaken by the Department, in concert with the United Kingdom, in an effort to secure the agreement of both sides to repatriation and resettlement on the scale required.
[Page 972]Assuming that these political obstacles can be overcome, however, there is no possibility under present conditions of any appreciable absorption of the refugees into the economies of the Arab states, already seriously weakened by internal economic difficulties, without increasing unemployment and depressing the already low standard of living. Absorption of the refugees on a self-supporting basis can only be achieved by raising the economic potential of the countries involved, through increase in the amount or productivity of arable land and creation of new employment opportunities.
In the Department’s opinion, any continuing program of assistance would have to be based on three primary considerations. First, it should be formulated on a work relief basis rather than on the basis of direct relief. Such a program would raise the morale of the refugees, would result in the accomplishment of useful work directed towards their resettlement, towards raising the economic potential of the states involved and towards a progressive reduction and eventual elimination of the need for external assistance. Second, in order to secure the cooperation of the Arab states, any solution of the problem should be formulated within the broader framework of the interests of the countries concerned, with special reference to their economic development. Third, any outside assistance should be made available under the auspices of the United Nations.
On the basis of the preceding considerations, it is apparent that considerable financing from external sources, both in the form of direct grants for work relief projects and loans for economic development purposes, are required for solution of the problem. The financial requirements for such a program, which will require a minimum period of three years, are tentatively estimated at $250,000,000–$300,000,000 from all sources. These funds should be provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and/or the United States Export-Import Bank, in the case of projects meeting their requirements; by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and related international organizations; and the remainder by grants and loans from the governments of interested United Nations member states.
From the political point of view, the Department considers that failure to resolve the refugee problem would serve to perpetuate conditions of insecurity and unrest in the Near East, and that the refugees would serve as a focal point for the breeding of political extremism of both a leftist and a rightist character. From an economic standpoint, transfer of full responsibility for custodianship of the refugees to the Governments of the Arab states, even if they agreed to accept it, would constitute an insupportable strain upon the local economies, and thereby further aggravate political unrest and instability.
[Page 973]In order to formulate more precisely the nature and extent of this Government’s interest in the refugee problem, and the degree to which we should participate in effecting a solution, an appreciation of the probable effects of the refugee problem upon our military and strategic interests in the Near East would be of considerable value to the Department.
It would be appreciated if you would transmit the foregoing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the request that such an estimate be prepared for the Department’s guidance.
Sincerely yours,
- A partial quotation from the letter of then Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the full text of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of September 22, 1948, are included in telegram Telmar 19, September 28, 1948, to Paris, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1427.↩