Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.AA/4–2649

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] April 26, 1949.

Subject: Israel’s Desire for Admission to the U.N.

Participants:	The Secretary, Mr. Acheson
	Mr. Elath, Ambassador of Israel
	Mr. Eban, Israeli Representative at Lake Success
	Mr. Satterthwaite, Director, NEA

Ambassador Elath opened the conversation by reviewing the position of Israel’s application for admission to the UN. He said that his Government attached such importance to this matter that he wished to introduce Mr. Eban, who was in charge of the problem at Lake Success and have him discuss the situation with me.

Mr. Eban then spoke at some length along the lines of a conversation he and Mr. Elath had had with Senator Austin in New York a few days ago. He emphasized the great disadvantage under which in his opinion the Israeli Government was working by not being a member of the U.N. The six Arab States, on the other hand, had the great advantage of not only being able to express their views to the GA, but they also, by virtue of their six votes, could have considerable influence on the votes of other members.

Mr. Eban remarked that the questions of Jerusalem, the Arab refugees and the boundaries seemed to be those causing the greatest difficulty. He then went on to discuss these three problems, devoting the greater part of the exposition to the Jerusalem situation.

He said that the Israelis had not only supported the plan for Jerusalem set forth in the resolution of November 29, 1947 but had participated in its drafting. Subsequently, however, the Arab States themselves had violently opposed the implementation of this plan by engaging in hostilities. He felt that insufficient importance had been attached internationally to the fact that whereas one year ago the conditions in Jerusalem had been those of utter destruction and chaotic warfare, peace and order had subsequently been restored, thanks to the efforts of the Israeli Government, to a remarkable degree. The problem was one of integrating the necessities of the State of Israel with the desires of the other states to maintain and protect the Holy Places. In this connection he asserted that 95% of the Holy Places are controlled by the Arabs. He thought, however, that considerable progress had been made and that a solution satisfactory to the U.N. was possible. In this connection he cited the address of President Weizmann of April 23 which, he said, had the full support and authority of the Israeli Government.

With reference to the refugees Mr. Eban thought that emphasis should be on resettlement rather than repatriation, although the Israeli Government had never rejected the idea of repatriation.

He felt that there should be less difficulty in reaching a settlement regarding boundaries and hoped that by negotiation this could be worked out at Lausanne.

Toward the conclusion of his rather lengthy exposition, the intent of which was to present as strong a case as possible for Israel’s early admission to the U.N., Mr. Eban said that his Government planned, at an early stage of the Lausanne talks, to make a statement of a conciliatory nature which he hoped would be of assistance in expediting Israel’s admission.

When Mr. Eban had finished I said that I felt that the Israeli Government itself was in a much better position to facilitate its entrance into the U.N. than we were. I recalled that I had suggested to President Weizmann at the White House luncheon yesterday that if Israel would only make some conciliatory gesture or statement along the lines that we have suggested, we would then have some basis on which to talk to the other nations in the General Asssembly.

Frankly, I continued, I had been very disappointed in my failure to obtain any results from the two long talks I had with Mr. Sharett. Not only had my suggestions not been acted upon but in some ways it seemed that we were farther away from a solution than when I had talked with Mr. Sharett. The three questions, in order of importance, which appeared to call for some explanation by the Israeli Government were the refugees, Jerusalem and the boundaries.

With reference to the refugees, I had never suggested that Israel accept a specified number now. I had only suggested to Mr. Sharett that Israel first announce that it would accept the principle of repatriation. Next, at least half of the refugees had come from areas outside the Israeli boundaries fixed by the UN Resolution which were under Israeli military occupation. Surely it should be possible to allow a good number of such refugees to return to non-strategic areas. Then, later on, when the final peace settlement had been reached, or shortly before, it should be possible to determine the exact number which could be repatriated. Mr. Sharett, in spite of my two talks with him, had flatly rejected this thesis and had even gone so far, when I had suggested the emotional and moral values that my proposals might have, as to suggest that such values should not be taken into consideration in international settlements. I had therefore been pleased to read President Weizmann’s statements. I could only wish that he had been present when Mr. Sharett had been making his views known to me.

With reference to Jerusalem, I was glad to note that progress was apparently being made and mentioned in this connection the arrangements which were under way for Dr. Weizmann to discuss that problem with Cardinal Spellman.

As to the boundaries, I was disappointed to learn from Mr. Ethridge’s telegrams that Mr. Ben-Gurion was apparently adamant in clinging to the view that Israel was entitled not only to the territory allowed it by the UNGA resolution but to all the rest of the territory it occupied militarily. Since, in writing at least, I understood the Government of Israel to accept the position that it was willing to negotiate on the basis of the November 29, 1947 resolution, it seemed to me that this was a very unwise position to take.

We were fully in accord with Israel’s making the best bargain it could but did not want this bargaining to be on the basis of threats. This was particularly important in view of the fact that a bad bargain would not lead to permanent peace. As they knew, the Arab Governments were already under heavy attack from their public and press for having been too hasty in signing armistice agreements. If the final boundary settlements were such as to lead the Arab peoples to believe they had been imposed by force, Israel would, in my view, be acting contrary to its own best interests.

Again I pointed out that I was not trying to tell the Israeli Government what it should do. The U.S. had supported Israel’s application for membership and would continue to do so. Unless, however, the Israeli Government were willing to make its position known on these important issues, it would be difficult for the U.S. Delegation to go to the other nations at Lake Success and endeavor to persuade them that they should also vote for Israel’s admission at this session.¹

Both Ambassador Elath and Mr. Eban replied briefly to my remarks. They felt that perhaps Mr. Sharett’s real views had not been fully understood. Mr. Eban expressed himself as optimistic regarding the possibility of reaching an agreement on the boundaries and Ambassador Elath felt that the question of the refugees could also be worked out, once the question of the danger to Israel’s vital interests had been eliminated. They said they would, of course, make my views known to their Government and seek clarification of their Government’s views on the points I had raised.²

1. The Department, on April 27, informed New York that the “US not in position join in sponsoring resolution for admission Israel pending further info re possibility Israeli reps Lausanne giving assurances concerning status Jerusalem, Palestine refugees, and territorial settlement which would create favorable atmosphere for admission Israel.

   “Such res unnecessary for action on application and would, if presented in manner suggested, be attempt influence other dels. Our position of support for application when actually considered remains unchanged.” (telegram Gadel 23, 501.AA/4–2749)

2. The Department summarized this memorandum for Tel Aviv on April 28 in telegram 250 (501.AA/4–2849). The telegram also noted that “Elath called Apr 28 once more to urge speedy action re Israeli membership UN. Expressed conviction Lausanne talks would not be real success as long as Israel not member, since Arab states would see no reason take speedy action toward final peace as long as world community apparently did not regard Israel as worthy of membership. Dept reiterated necessity Israel’s making conciliatory gesture on three above points in order create atmosphere favorable admission Israel. Elath said he realized Israel would have to make some compromise re refugees, but that naturally Israeli Govt did not wish give away this valuable trump card before final peace negotiations.”

   Telegram 250 concluded with the instruction to Tel Aviv to “Pls seek earliest appropriate opportunity convey PrimMin and FonMin substance Secy’s conversations with Eban and Elath, emphasizing in strongest terms points made by Secy.”