501.BB Palestine/4–2049: Telegram
The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Jerusalem, April
20, 1949—9 a. m.
311. Palun 132. From Ethridge to Acheson. Comment Amman telegram 1661 [, repeated] to Jerusalem as 89.
- (1)
- From what I learn Abdullah is so anxious to make peace that it is probably too late to give him any advice that would do him any good.
- (2)
- Reported to us yesterday unofficially that Transjordan Delegation at Lausanne would be headed by Transjordan chief but most of delegates would be Palestinian Arabs. In that case they would offer stronger resistance to Israel’s further demands than Abdullah would and therefore advice probably unnecessary.
- (3)
- Even if foregoing were not true, I believe that any assurance given him should go no further than reaffirmation of previous US position as contained in President’s recent message to Abdullah and our promise that if in course of negotiations there was threat of force or duress and facts warranted it we would be prepared to make unilateral representation at Tel Aviv.
- (4)
- As I have interpreted both US and UN policy it has been to encourage direct negotiations toward an honest and fair agreement. Therefore heavy responsibility involved in intervening in Transjordan affairs by attempting to persuade her to adopt different negotiating [Page 925] tactics than she would otherwise do. Wisdom such course appears highly doubtful unless US frankly prepared to sponsor effective measures to prevent further Israeli incursions an Arab Palestine and Transjordan territory. Our understanding current Arab opinion UN and US re Palestine leads us to think any advice from US would be misinterpreted perhaps too optimistically and that its acceptance would proceed from ulterior motives.
- [(5)]
- Territorial question appears really important on this connection. Re Jerusalem, we are not at all sure Transjordan would prefer international to bilateral division city. While they would accept international they have shown no enthusiasm for it. Furthermore parties cannot control Jerusalem solution in same way as boundaries. Even if they made agreement it would still be possible superimpose international regime of only kind that now seems possible, namely one which will recognize respective sovereignties adjacent states. In view actual situation, preliminary agreement between parties might be more helpful our objectives than otherwise. [Ethridge.]
Burdett