890.0145/10–2049: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1
priority
414. Reurtel [Dhahran’s] 302 Oct 202 BAPCO informing ARAMCO and Sheikh, Bahrein, that they have ordered immediate termination operations plus removal of equipment on Fasht Abu Saafa without prejudice Bahrein claims. BAPCO states Arabi installation temporary, no claim involved, permission for temporary use granted by Brit polit Agent. BAPCO admits issue must be settled between Bahrein and Saudi Arab authorities and will abide by their decision. BAPCO fears, however, Sheikh Bahrein may possibly insist on operations continuing.3
Dept contacting Brit on advisability earliest discussion Bahrein Saudi Arab boundaries. Does Emb consider issue cld be added to current boundary negots? If so, suggest informal approach SAG and Brit Emb urging this procedure. Dept has already informed BAPCO and ARAMCO such incidents between cos with same parents shld not arise, that Dept shld be adequately forewarned of co plans for disputed areas and that cos use this opportunity to urge respective Govts to earliest discussions possible.
- This telegram was repeated to Dhahran.↩
- Not printed. Dhahran, on October 7, had reported that the Bahrein Petroleum Company (BAPCO) was operating temporarily a triangulation station on Arabi and that for the past three weeks the company had undertaken structural drilling on and around Fasht Abu Saafa shoals, an area claimed by the Sheikh of Bahrein (telegrams 292 and 293, 890F.6363/10–749 and 890.0145/10–749, respectively). Dhahran’s 302 advised of the landing of a party of armed Saudi Arabians on Arabi on October 17. The “Behavior visitors entirely cordial and no threat of violence made”, although their leader “pointedly asked whether BAPCO personnel aware this Saudi territory. Evasive answer given.… Landing party left after one hour making no further comment.” (890.0145/10–2049)↩
- Much of the information contained in this paragraph was based on a memorandum of October 20 by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, covering his separate conversations with ARAMCO and BAPCO officials. The ARAMCO official at one point had expressed the hope that the State Department would supply “a restraining hand”, i.e., have a United States naval vessel on duty in the Persian Gulf visit the sensitive area. Mr. Funkhouser records that “Dispatching a U.S. Navy vessel to the area of dispute for the purpose of exhibiting ‘a restraining hand’ would not be considered by the U.S. Government. The British dispatched units of the British fleet to the Persian Gulf when their AIOC concession was cancelled in 1933, but for settling oil company arguments such tactics were, if not outdated, certain to compound the difficulty.” (890.0145/10–2049)↩