Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/3–2549

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

secret

[Washington,] March 25, 1949.

Subject: Negotiations in and concerning Palestine.

Mr. Power telephoned this morning to say that Dr. Bunche had reported surprising progress between the Israeli and Transjordan Delegations on Rhodes in reaching the bases for an armistice agreement. He said, however, that the Israelis were complaining about alleged reinforcement of the British garrison at Aqaba and suggested to Secretary General Lie that he approach the United Kingdom Delegation with the thought that it would be helpful if the UK could reduce the number of troops at Aqaba. Bunche thought that the UK might also issue a public statement to this effect and indicate that it would not resort to military action unless Transjordan should be threatened with open aggression. As usual, Dr. Bunche added the suggestion that it would be nice if the State Department also put pressure on the British.

I told Mr. Power that the British were as well aware as we of the secret negotiations being undertaken by the Israelis and Transjordians supplementary to the armistice talks on Rhodes. The Israelis had very recently threatened King Abdullah that they might resume hostilities against the Iraqis in Samaria. Under these circumstances the British would certainly not feel disposed to reduce their garrison in Transjordan and I did not think the Department of State would be warranted in asking them to do so.

Mr. Power telephoned later this afternoon to pass on Mr. Ross’ suggestion that it might be helpful to Dr. Bunche to inform him of the secret negotiations going on behind his back between Israel and Transjordan. I said it was, no doubt, a very human temptation to wish to tell our friend, the Mediator, of what was happening but that I did not think we had any warrant to do so or that we could possibly take the risk with Israel, which had not informed the US of what was going on, using our action with Bunche as a pretext to denounce the agreement now reached secretly with Abdullah. I told Mr. Power that under no circumstances should USUN divulge to the Secretariat or to Bunche its knowledge of the secret negotiations between Abdullah and the government at Tel Aviv. Mr. Power seemed somewhat unconvinced. I later confirmed my position with Mr. Rusk and have informed Mr. Power.

Messrs. Ross and Power had comments on the proposed draft SC resolution sent in Beirut’s telegram 132,¹ similar on the whole to our own. We agreed that the Mediator’s office, as well as his functions, should be terminated; that the Truce Commission should be liquidated; and that the court of first instance in cases of alleged violations of the armistice agreements should be the Palestine Commission and not the Security Council itself. In general, the resolution should tie up all the loose ends and supplant completely the previous resolutions of the Assembly and the Council dealing with the functions of the Mediator and the Truce Commission. We also agreed that there should be some complimentary reference to the work of Bernadotte and Bunche.

1. Identified also as Palun 95, March 24; it gave the text of a draft of a proposed resolution to be submitted to the Security Council. In telegram 131, identified also as Palun 94, the same day, Beirut advised that “Bunche–Wilkins conversation resulted in first draft of proposed SC resolution … which Bunche plans to transmit to SYG about March 24 for discussion with interested SC delegates on means terminating Mediator’s SO functions following conclusion armistice talks under SC resolution November 16.” Telegrams 131 and 132 are filed under 501.BB Palestine/3–2449.