Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/9–949: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, September 9, 1949—7 p. m.

3648. Embtel 3607 September 8.¹ Sheringham² said today Foreign Officer has decided approach King Farouk in advance regarding passage tankers through Suez. Decision pursue matter this high level occasioned by fact it was King who decided against admission Israeli member WHO³ and who might, therefore, be deciding factor this case.

Approach will stress following factors:

1. West Europe requires products Haifa refinery to hasten recovery.

2. Future of Haifa refinery is important to long term strategic plans for NE.

3. If dispute arises as result Egypt’s unwillingness permit passage tankers through Canal, it might be necessary in accordance Suez Canal convention to convene meeting of signatories, which would include USSR, but not US.

4. Egypt refusal permit passage tankers would be contrary spirit Egypt armistice agreement on which SC based its action in lifting arms embargo. Under these circumstances HMG could hardly furnish Egypt arms if Egypt refuses permit Israel obtain oil.

5. If Egypt refuses permit passage tankers, Israel might raise question before SC. In these circumstances UK could not support Egypt. Moreover, Egypt’s action would have adverse effect on British public opinion, due to effect it would have on supplies of petrol for British motorist.

6. In any event, HMG can not discourage company from attempt to send tankers through Canal.

Sheringham said approach to King will probably be made in next day or two. Meanwhile, departure of tanker from Persian Gulf has been postponed for approximately one week and is now scheduled arrive around September 25. If no answer received within reasonable time, tanker will be started on its way, since, without threat of imminent arrival, Egyptians may procrastinate.

Sheringham also said HMG has now asked Nuri Pasha not to make any public statements pipeline without consulting UK. At same time, they suggested Nuri begin preparing public opinion in Iraq, pointing out to him that Iraq is chief sufferer in present situation, with West Europe next and Israel hardly affected at all. Effort is to convince Nuri that continued intransigence his part will not materially harm Israel but will harm Iraq which badly requires royalties.⁴

Sent Department 3648, repeated Baghdad 90, Cairo 130, Paris 688, Tel Aviv 55, Haifa 7.

Holmes

1. Not printed.
2. J. G. T. Sheringham, desk officer in the British Foreign Office for Israel and Arab refugee matters.
3. Telegram 3607 noted that the Egyptian cabinet had divided on the question of visas for the Israeli Delegation to a regional conference of the World Health Organization (501.BB Palestine/9–849).
4. Cairo advised, on September 15, of information from British Embassy sources that “the Egyptians insisted on banning munitions of war destined for Israel and that among these articles of absolute contraband were ‘combustibles’.” It also advised that the British Embassy had requested an audience with King Farouk to discuss passage through the Suez Canal of tankers bound for Haifa and that the British approach was to place the “petroleum problem as an element in the over-all strategy of military cooperation in which His Majesty had shown an interest in connection with the top secret military talks which had been intermittently carried on from some months past. It seemed to the British important to alert the King to the possibility of the situation before the first British tanker, now en route, attempted to proceed through the Canal, since otherwise the King might be placed on the spot in the absence of time for personal reflection and preparation of both government and public.” Should this approach be unavailing, “the question of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal before the Security Council might be raised as a means of encouraging the King to adopt a view of international commerce more in accord with the prescriptions of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 than the Egyptian authorities, civil and military, had hitherto been disposed to accept following the outbreak of Palestinian hostilities.” (airgram 976, 501.BB Palestine/9–1549)