Office of the Historian

867N.01/3–1949: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

secret
Washington, March 19, 1949—2 p. m.

us urgent

173. Dept welcomes report that Israel–Lebanon armistice to be signed March 19 or 20 and that Syria will enter armistice negotiations. Principal point of concern now becomes problem of Iraqi front Samaria. Obviously prospect of peaceful settlement on entire Palestine question would be greatly set back if fighting broke out over that point. Dept believes Israel and Transjordan should proceed promptly to armistice agreement, that this armistice agreement should be extended to the Iraqi front and that Israel should interpose no objection if Iraqi troops turn over Samaria front to Transjordan. As preliminary step it would seem desirable for existing cease fire to be extended automatically to Iraqi front on assumption by Transjordan of responsibility for that area.

This matter will probably be discussed with Sharett here Tuesday. Request you follow situation closely and do everything possible to bring about rapid conclusion Israel–Transjordan armistice.1

Acheson
  1. Concerning the latter point, Thomas F. Power, Deputy Secretary-General of the United States Mission at the United Nations, notified Mr. McClintock on March 18 of a telegram received by Secretary-General Lie from Mr. Bunche stating that “the Syrian Government had indicated its readiness to undertake armistice negotiations with Israel.” (memorandum of telephone conversation by Mr. McClintock, 501.BB Palestine/3–1849) Minister Keeley reported similar information from Damascus on March 20, expressing his belief that Prime Minister Azm’s decision to negotiate was “motivated primarily by desire to avoid giving Israeli possibility of using Syria’s refusal to enter armistice negotiations as pretext for refusing to comply with refugee repatriation clause of December 11 resolution but also to leave no stone unturned to speed final solution Palestine conflict.” The Prime Minister also sought the Minister’s friendly advice whether any useful purpose would be served by sending special emissary … to US to endeavor to enlist US support of some reasonable solution. I replied that while I felt sure my government would appreciate being kept informed of progress in Syrian thinking, it would not welcome any démarche that seemed to by-pass PCC” (telegram 151, 501.BB Palestine/3–2049).↩