867N.01/3–1749

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

secret

Subject: Israel–Transjordan Situation.

Discussion:

In response to your request, there are submitted hereunder pertinent excerpts from information we have received concerning the situation between Transjordan and Israel subsequent to my memorandum to you of March 14.1

Dr. Bunche on March 11 cabled the Security Council that he had directed United Nations observers to make a thorough and prompt investigation of all complaints, to verify military positions and their date of establishment and to apply fully the conditions of the truce. He added that at the time the cable was sent he had had no reports from observers which verified that there had been any fighting in the area.

On March 13 Dr. Bunche cabled the Security Council that United Nations observers were in the field and were making on the spot investigations, but that owing to poor transportation and communications facilities he did not yet have their detailed reports and could not therefore submit to the Council a definite report on this matter. He added that the only incident of fighting thus far reported involved an exchange of fire between Arab Legion and Israeli elements in the vicinity of Ghamr (just over the border in Transjordan) prior to the signing of the cease-fire on March 11. In this engagement one Arab Legion armored car was disabled. Dr. Bunche also stated that he had formally requested the Israeli and Transjordan delegates at Rhodes to inform their Governments that military activity of this kind, regardless of whether actual fighting eventuated, must be regarded as contrary to the conditions of the truce imposed by the Security Council.

On March 16 our Legation in Amman cabled that according to the [Page 845] Arab Legion Israeli soldiers are crossing the Transjordan frontier in the area of Gharandal to steal sheep. The Legion has been ordered to take no action until United Nations observers have been able to reach the area. If after that forays continue the Legion may have to open fire.

The Department has thus not yet received a definite answer as to whether the Israelis actually did cross the Transjordan frontier. The report from United Nations observers, which apparently will be as authoritative as any we shall receive, has not yet come in.2

Meanwhile, we have been receiving disturbing reports concerning the situation on the Israeli-Iraqi frontier. Information has come in to the effect that the Israelis are moving troops into that area, and the Iraqis, the Trans Jordanians, and the British are fearful that the Israelis may be about to commence hostilities against the Iraqi-held area of Arab Palestine. In response to our inquiry, the Israelis have admitted that they are moving troops into the area but have stated that they are doing so in order to afford Israeli farmers protection against cattle and food stealing raids allegedly being made from the Iraqi area. This is going on at a time when preparations are being made for the withdrawal of the 20,000 Iraqi troops in the area and their replacement by 2,000 men of the badly over-extended Arab Legion. The Israeli object to this, and state that it is a violation of the truce because the substitution of the Army of one sovereign power for another is not a normal troop replacement.

In our opinion, there is a real and disturbing possibility that Israel may be about to undertake hostilities in this area, in order to occupy more of the Palestine territory allotted to the Arabs by the November 29 General Assembly Resolution and to present the world with another fait accompli. Our Mission in Tel Aviv cabled today that the Israeli Chief of Staff has sent a warning to the United Nations that Israel may have to take military action to stop the Arab raids (telegram No. 211 of March 16)3 (Tab A). The Mission adds that there is no tangible evidence that Israel contemplates military action but suggests that you may care to point out to Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett, during his call upon you tomorrow, the desirability of taking no action which would lead to hostilities. In this the Mission in Tel Aviv concurs with a conclusion which we had reached. A memorandum [Page 846] discussing the points which might be taken up with Mr. Sharett during his call upon you tomorrow is being sent to you today.4

  1. Not printed; it summarized reports alleging or denying Israeli incursion into Transjordan (767N.90i/3–1449).
  2. Mr. Stabler advised, on March 18, that General Riley the same morning had “Confirmed that Israelis did cross frontiers and that four or five Israeli jeeps were cut off in Transjordan territory at point northern Gharandal.” The General also stated that he had received the assurances of the Israeli commander that his troops had been removed to the Palestine side (telegram 117, 867N.01/3–1849).
  3. Not printed.
  4. Baghdad, on March 17, reported that the Iraqi Foreign Minister had requested urgently to see Ambassador Crocker to express the hope that “US either through Tel Aviv or USDel, PCC would take effective measures to guarantee that Israel will not take advantage transfer Iraqi troops by sending Jewish troops and people into vacated area [i.e., the Nablus–Jenin–Tulkarm triangle] which Transjordanians and local Arabs plan populate.” The Foreign Minister also stated that “Iraq wants find peaceful solution Palestine problem and authorizes Transjordan discuss armistice with Israel for areas now in Iraqi hands.” (Telegram 115, 501.BB Palestine/3–1749)

    Ambassador Crocker, on March 21, informed the Department of his first conversation with newly appointed Foreign Minister Jamali, who “asked again for US assurances that Israel would not take advantage Iraq–Transjordan switch.” The Ambassador “reiterated our position re inability act unilaterally and emphasized US will do everything possible to help adjust Palestine problem through UN. Further, I expressed as main hope for Arabs necessity their coming to grips with realities and taking advantage UN machinery which offers best hope for quick adjustment matter, … Jamali expressed keenest disappointment re our unwillingness go along with Iraqi viewpoint and pull Iraq’s chestnuts out of the fire.” (Telegram 128 from Baghdad, 501.BB Palestine/3–2149)