501.BB Palestine/3–949: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
293. Following “memorandum on armistice negotiations at Ras el Naqura and at Rhodes” received from Eban today:
“Israeli-Lebanese armistice talks:
1. The main military problems affecting northern Palestine are:
- (a)
- Question of Israeli forces in occupation of Lebanese border villages.
- (b)
- Presence of Syrian forces on Israeli territory at Mishmar Hayarden.
- (c)
- Presence in Lebanon of Syrian forces which took part in the invasion of Israel and whose presence is related directly to the Arab-Israeli war.
2. Problem (a) does not in itself constitute any insuperable difficulty and could be adjusted in any general settlement of the northern frontier. Indeed, some of these villages have already been evacuated unconditionally. Problems (b) and (c), however, cannot be settled so long as the Syrian Government refuses to enter armistice negotiations.
3. It is obviously impossible for Israel to conclude agreements for the withdrawal and reduction of its forces with the Lebanese authorities, while Syrian forces are allowed to maintain themselves in full strength in positions threatening Israel’s security. The principle of withdrawal and reduction laid down in the November 16 resolution must be applied to the whole area; otherwise any government can secure the prospect of military dominance simply by refusing to com ply with the November 16th resolution.
4. The November 16th resolution applies to Syria just as much as to any other of the states concerned. Syrian refusal to comply with that resolution is not only inadmissible in itself, but also has a disrupting effect on the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, who are both clearly anxious to conclude an armistice.
5. The conclusion is that all available international influence should be brought to bear to induce Syria to enter negotiations in order that the dispositions of Syrian forces, like those of Israel and the Lebanon, should be governed by the principles of the November 16th resolution. It appears from his communication to the SC this morning that the Acting Mediator is making efforts in this direction.
Negotiations at Rhodes:
6. A similar position prevails in the Israeli-Transjordan armistice negotiations. The central sector contains a large body of Iraqi troops. If Israel and Transjordan were each to accept the withdrawal and reduction required by the November 16th resolution, while Iraq[is] were not bound by any such principle, the result would be to leave Iraqi forces in a dominant position at the very heart of Israel. No [Page 810] action agreed to by the Government of Transjordan could remove the threat to Israel security so long as Iraqi troops remain on Israeli territory a few miles distant from the coast and from the most densely populated centres of Jewish population.
7. There are contradictory reports of Iraq’s intention to abide by any agreement signed by Transjordan. Reports of Iraq’s willingness to this effect were published, later denied by General Riley, given renewed currency and later denied by the Iraqi Premier. The Transjordan delegation has now informed Dr. Bunche that they are now empowered to represent Iraq. It is obviously necessary, however, to have this undertaking from the Iraqi Government itself. Dr. Bunche has now invited the Iraqi Government to confirm officially that it will consider itself bound by any agreement signed by the Transjordan delegation. In the meantime, a discussion is proceeding on the armistice lines on other fronts.
8. The conclusion here is that unless Iraq, as well as Syria, complies directly, or through an accredited intermediary with the November 16th resolution, the prospects of an armistice with the Lebanon and Transjordan will be gravely impaired. Should it become necessary, Israel may have to ask the SC whether Syria or Iraq are justified in refusing to comply with the November 16th resolution.”