Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/8–1549: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, August 15, 1949—7 p. m.

3224. Embtel 3074, August 5.¹ At request Foreign Office, meeting held today in Burrows² office re Haifa refinery and pipeline. Present were Burrows and Sheringham, Foreign Office; Boudet, French Embassy; Willoughby, ECA; and Palmer, Embassy.

Burrows apologized for long delay in giving Foreign Office’s reactions suggestion US-UK-French approach Israel and Iraqi Governments. He attributed delay to (A) question of lifting arms embargo, and (B) prior conversations with IPC and Iraqi Government.

Burrows stated Consolidated Refineries has now indicated it wishes resume operations at Haifa at earliest possible date, and that it feels best way to break ice is to start refineries with tanker oil. Burrows stated Foreign Office agrees this point of view. New Foreign Office proposals contemplate following steps:

(A) One tanker of Western Hemisphere crude would be sent to Haifa to get refinery going. At about same time one or more tankers would be sent from Persian Gulf via Suez. British hope Egyptian Government would permit passage tankers, but if not, appropriate pressure would be brought upon Egypt.

(B) Simultaneously with foregoing, US, UK, and French would urge Iraqi Government not to discourage Egypt from permitting passage tankers through Canal. At same time Nuri would be reminded of his statement that if tankers could be put through Canal, it would provide excuse he required and that he could then reopen pipeline. (This is more positive statement Nuri’s attitude than that given by Chadwick:³ see Paragraph 4 Embtel 3180 August 12.⁴

(C) US, UK and French would meanwhile approach Israel Government and urge it make statement re its intention establish free port at Haifa. If Israeli Government concurred, this statement would be timed to coincide with arrival tankers Suez and would, Foreign Office believes, make it easier for Egyptians permit passage. Burrows said if Israelis refuse make statement, Foreign Office would still wish go ahead with steps (A) and (B), paragraph 2.

Burrows gave following additional amplifying details:

(a) It would be possible operate Haifa refineries indefinitely on Western Hemisphere oil which is expensive and of wrong type, but “pump-priming” with crude from this source would demonstrate to Egypt and Iraq that refineries can be operated without Iraqi and Persian Gulf crude.

(b) With regard prospect getting tanker through Canal, Burrows stated there has been some loosening by Egypt on restrictions some goods passing through Canal en route Israel. Foreign Office had thought at one time of discussing question of passage of tankers with Egypt in advance, but had dropped this idea since it was afraid that it might constitute tacit recognition of Egypt’s right stop tankers which British do not admit.

(c) Nuri has stopped insisting on complete internationalization Haifa and has told Foreign Office that if refineries reopen he would not ask what was happening to oil.⁵

(d) Foreign Office believes details re free port at Haifa should be left for negotiations between Israel and Arab States, perhaps through PCC. Foreign Office does not suggest details should be worked out at present time in connection approach to Israel which, as previously stated, would merely be asked to make statement of its preparedness set up free port. Re timing Burrows stated it would take three or four weeks to get tanker from Western Hemisphere to Haifa, and approaches would be made to governments of Israel and Iraq before that time. He suggested approaches be made verbally with aides-mémoire and that they be made as concerted démarches rather than as joint démarche.

Both US and French representatives said they would pass foregoing on to their governments with request for urgent reply thereto.

Sent Department 3224, repeated Baghdad 71, Cairo 111, Paris 628, pouched Haifa unnumbered.

Douglas

1. Not printed.
2. Bernard A. Burrows, Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office.
3. John E. Chadwick of the British Foreign Office.
4. Not printed.
5. Baghdad, on August 24, reported the belief of the British Chargé that the Foreign Office must have misunderstood the position of Prime Minister Nuri. The Chargé was said to feel that “supplying Iraqi crude to Haifa refinery is such explosive issue that Nuri’s presently weak government would hesitate considerable time before taking risk agreeing this. Nuri might prefer resign rather than risk consequences such as befell Saleh Jabr in January, 1948 when Portsmouth Treaty, like Haifa refinery question now, was ready-made issue around which most Iraqis united.” (telegram 508, 501.BB Palestine/8–2449) For documentation on the proposed treaty to revise the British-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, pp. 202 ff.

   London reported, on September 14, that an Iraqi spokesman had “argued that for ten million dollars, Haifa refineries could be moved Syria and pipeline diverted. Foreign Office told him figure ridiculous and that it would be very much more expensive proposition.” (telegram 3702, 501.BB Palestine/9–1449)