501.BB Palestine/3–549: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria
us urgent
75. PriMin in conversation reported your 109 Mch 51 seems completely to have overlooked fact that SC on Nov. 16 decided that “In [Page 800] order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine.
Calls upon the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine us a further provisional measure under art. 40 of the charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice.”
In our view therefore Syrian Govt is under unescapable responsibility to undertake armistice negots. Furthermore it might be useful to Azm Govt to plead force majeure as excuse to public opinion for entering into the inevitable agreement with Israel, pointing to SC res. Nov. 16 and making much of fact that Syria defers to UN judgment.
Rptd to Jerusalem 135 for Ethridge as Unpal 50.
- Not printed; it
reported advice from the Syrian Prime Minister that “he had
received another invitation from Bunche to open armistice talks
with Israeli [officials] at Rhodes.… Might accept but did not
like Rhodes as locale because of its connotations. Moreover as
armistice is only formalization of cessation hostilities and as
both parties already pledged to UN to observe truce during which
hostilities forbidden under threat sanctions he sees no need for
armistice discussions.”
Minister Keeley expressed his agreement with this view, stating that “as Syrian and Israeli forces both occupying part of Galilee and presumably neither prepared short of reciprocal concessions in final peace settlement to withdraw, armistice talks between them unlikely to serve any useful purpose and might well have unfortunate repercussions. It is Legation opinion that if Syria now enters armistice negotiations with Israeli, Azm Government may be compromised if not forced out by hostile public opinion thus endangering success peace negotiations as well as ratification important measures such as French monetary accord and tapline. It would seem more in interest all concerned tacitly to accept status quo between Syrian and Israeli forces as virtual armistice or at least as no impediment to peace talks through PCC, with which Prime Minister is willing proceed, thus giving well disposed Azm Government more time to prepare public opinion and reinforce its position by hoped-for Parliamentary approval contriversial measures important to country’s economy and government’s stability. Any government that may succeed present one likely to be less amenable to peaceful Palestine settlement, less disposed to ratify pending agreements and less wedded to orientation westward.” (501.BB Palestine/3–549)
President Kuwatly, on March 6, expressed to Minister Keeley his opposition to armistice talks; and on March 8, Prime Minister Azm showed the Minister a draft of a “conciliatory if negative reply to Bunche” (telegram 113, March 8, noon, from Damascus). The Department, in reply on March 11, instructed the Minister to “explain to President and PriMin Dept’s point of view as stated Deptel 75.” It concluded by stating “we feel that Syrian Govt would be wise to undertake armistice talks and desire you make this point explicitly clear to Syrian Govt.” (Telegram 85 to Damascus) Nos. 113 and 85 are both filed under 501.BB Palestine/3–849.
The formal Syrian reply to Mr. Bunche, an “evasively-worded reply amounting to negative” was handed to René F. Servoise, Mr. Bundle’s political representative in Syria and Lebanon. After further discussion with Mr. Servoise, the Syrians withdrew their written reply and “instead took position Syria would only reply after conclusion current Israeli-Transjordan and Israeli-Lebanese talks.” (telegram 121, March 10, 6 p. m., from Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/3–1049)
Minister Keeley delivered the sense of Department’s telegrams 75 and 85 to Prime Minister Azm. The latter “patiently explained difficulties of Syrian position emphasizing that difference with Bunche seemed only one of procedure as Syria agreeable to armistice but saw too many dangers in direct negotiations with Jews.” (telegram 142, March 16, from Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/3–1649)
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