Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

890E.00/3–449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] March 4, 1949.

Subject: Proposals for strengthening Lebanese-American Relations

Participants:	The Secretary—Mr. Acheson
	Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon
	NE—Mr. Clark

The Minister said that on behalf of his Government and on his own behalf he wished to congratulate me on my appointment and to wish me much success. I thanked him for his kind remarks and Dr. Malik proceeded to a discussion of the points he wished to present for our consideration.

Dr. Malik stated that during the past two years he had been in frequent contact with the State Department on United Nations problems of world-wide interest. While these problems had also been of importance to Lebanon he now wished to discuss Lebanese-American relations in a more specific sense, since it was his conviction that it was in the long-range interest of both our countries for such relations to be strengthened. He said that a draft treaty of Commerce and Friendship had been drawn up several years ago but that it had never been signed. What he wished to propose would go far beyond the terms of that treaty.

Dr. Malik said that Lebanon remembered with gratitude the active interest that the United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, had manifested in the achievement of Lebanon’s independence, especially during the Free French crisis of 1943.² Moreover, it looked back upon nearly a century of friendly assistance by American philanthropic and religious organizations which have contributed much to the educational and cultural advancement of Lebanon and the entire Near East. He declared that Lebanon was unique throughout the whole of Asia and perhaps Africa as well as an oriental country which identified itself with Western Christian civilization. By virtue of this unique position, however, it was exposed to certain threats by more powerful forces stemming from the Islamic Arab hinterland to the east and the State of Israel to the south. He felt that the threat from these sources was real and dangerous and that it was not to the long-range interest of the United States to see Lebanon swallowed up by one or the other of them, whether it was from an Arab state such as Syria or Transjordan, as was sometimes heard discussed in these times, or from the Jewish State to the south. Lebanon required protection by the Western Christian states with which it had identified itself in culture and religion.

I inquired as to whether the Lebanese considered that the State of Israel constituted a genuine threat and if so in what manner and degree. Was it the pressure of continued Jewish immigration into Palestine that was feared, or was it something more? He replied that the Lebanese do in fact greatly fear Israel and that this fear was shared by all other Arab countries in the Near East. Continued Jewish immigration would, of course, increase the potential of Israel, but Israel already constituted a vast new factor in Middle Eastern affairs. For one thing, the Jews had powerful friends everywhere in the world, including the major countries. Zionism was a dynamic force and the people of Israel were energetic and possessed industrial and other potentials to a far greater degree than the Arabs now have.

He went on to say that, since I had asked this question, he would like to state his firm conviction that until the fears of the Arab world he had just described were relieved by some positive guarantee on the part of the great powers and particularly the United States, the peace and well-being of the Near East would continue to be in doubt. He suggested that it would be most helpful if the United States Government should issue, preferably in a statement by the President, a declaration that the status quo in the Near East must be maintained and that no further expansion on the part of Israel would be permitted. In this regard, he would like to express further his belief that the most important prerequisite to the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in the Near East would be for the United States, Great Britain and France jointly to agree on a common policy with respect to the political settlement of outstanding problems and on plans for the economic and cultural development of the entire area. I thanked him for this suggestion regarding consultation with Great Britain and France and said that it would receive our full consideration.

Returning to his proposals for closer relations between Lebanon and the United States, Dr. Malik said that Lebanon, by virtue of its unique position of Western orientation in the Arab world, would continue to need strong support from some Western power and hoped that such support would be forthcoming from the United States. Should it be disappointed in this hope, it was Dr. Malik’s personal opinion that Lebanon should in that event turn to some other source of active assistance such as, for example, France or the United Kingdom. I replied that I believed that Dr. Malik had correctly stated the interest of the United States in Lebanon and that we would continue to explore ways for strengthening our economic and other relations with both Lebanon and other countries of the Near East. I pointed out that the concept of our associating ourselves with other powers for defense purposes was a radical departure from our traditional policies and one with which I was sure the Minister would appreciate we must proceed slowly. I said that, for example, we had not yet completed our discussions with respect to the proposed North Atlantic Pact and that this question would continue to occupy our attention for some time. Nevertheless, we would be glad to explore with Dr. Malik the source of the Lebanese fears he had outlined, and the measures by which he might propose to relieve these fears. With reference to his statement that such proposals would go far beyond the provisions of our proposed treaty of Commerce and Navigation I inquired whether he envisaged taking them up in advance of the treaty or to discuss them along with preparations for concluding this treaty. Dr. Malik replied that he envisaged following both lines of approach and in fact all possible lines. I said that I thought he might wish to discuss the specific proposals he had in mind with Mr. Satterthwaite and at an appropriate stage I would be glad to renew our personal discussion of the proposals.

Dr. Malik said there was one other matter he would also like to discuss and that was the financial assistance of which the Lebanese had great need. A request had been made some time ago by Lebanon for an International Bank loan and he hoped Lebanon could count on the support of the United States for this request. I replied that, as Dr. Malik was aware, it has been our policy to put foremost the question of reestablishing peace in the Near East. As soon as that had been done we would be in a position to consider a program of technical assistance to the entire area, as envisaged in Point IV of the President’s inaugural address. In parting, Dr. Malik stated that, in accordance with my suggestion, he would get in touch with Mr. Satterthwaite and discuss the specific proposals he had in mind for strengthening Lebanese-American relations.³

1. Drafted by Harlan B. Clark of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
2. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 953 ff.
3. The conversation between Messrs. Satterthwaite and Malik took place on March 8. The latter raised the question of Lebanese security, remarking that “the Arab League had proven ineffective as a means of protecting the Arab world against the dynamic force of Zionism and at least some of the Arab states and especially Lebanon believed that only one or more of the Great Powers could afford it the degree of protection it required.” The Arab League, he said, “had never been effective at all in economic and cultural matters and had shown itself a failure in military affairs.” He continued that “His Arab friends kept appealing for some form of public assurance by the United States which had shown itself to be so friendly to Israel that expansion of Israel at the expense of neighboring states would not be permitted.”

   Mr. Satterthwaite replied that “it would not be in accordance with the tradditional policy of this Government to issue a unilateral statement of the sort envisaged by Dr. Malik. In any event, the fact was that a peace settlement in Palestine had not yet been reached and that the delineation of Israel’s frontiers and related questions were now terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission in which the United States was represented. It would undoubtedly prejudice the working of that Commission for the United States to intervene unilaterally at the present time in the manner suggested. More basic, however, was the United States’ conviction that the Charter of the United Nations provided guarantees to meet a contingency such as feared by Lebanon, and the United States believed that its good faith in upholding the Charter had already amply been demonstrated in the Azerbaijan dispute and elsewhere. Certainly it would be premature to make an announcement concerning the frontiers of Israel prior to their determination by the peace settlement and any statement which this Government might issue would, of course, have to be carefully phrased so as not to impugn the integrity of any single state.”

   The Minister then suggested that “if some public announcement could not be made at this time, the United States would be prepared to reassure the various Arab Governments in confidence that the status quo in the Near East would be maintained.” Mr. Clark’s memorandum recording the conversation gives no indication of a reply by Mr. Satterthwaite (890.00/3–849).