501.BB Palestine/2–2549: Telegram
The Secretary of State to Ambassador Stanton Griffis, at Beirut
89. Eyes only for Griffis. Greatly appreciate views expressed your personal telegram Feb. 13 from Cairo. We have been following negotiations at Rhodes with closest possible attention and will pay similar attention to negotiation phase PCC. Experience thus far has not convinced us that final solution Palestine lies primarily in strong joint US–UK position which we would attempt to impose by pressure upon parties. Joint US–UK effort in last GA to support Bernadotte Plan failed completely because Arabs and Jews would have none of it and united their votes against US–UK. Arabs even rejected those elements of plan which were specifically directed to Arab advantage rather than recognize Bernadotte solution. This despite earlier assurances we had been given that Arabs would “acquiesce” in Bernadotte plan if supported by US–UK and might even vote for it. Parties have had ample opportunities in past to accept diplomatic force majeure as explanation to their own peoples but have shown no inclination to do so. Result has been that we have been victimized by choice between accepting rebuffs (which we have done) or exerting pressures beyond limits imposed by maintenance friendly relations as well as by obligations under Charter. Despite tortuous course of Palestine problem we have consistently maintained position that solution must be (1) by peaceful means, (2) through the UN, and (3) without acceptance of unilateral responsibilities by US. If Rhodes armistice negotiations continue to produce successful results, new possibilities for settlement through normal processes may open up. Recent news on that is encouraging. In any event, we shall keep in close touch with Ethridge and British and do everything we can to bring about settlement by peaceful processes. We do not exclude line of approach you suggest [Page 772] but are inclined to view that for time being: processes of conciliation should develop much more precisely the positions of the parties.1
- This telegram was repeated
to Jerusalem for Mr. Ethridge and to London. Additionally, the
Department informed Mr. Ethridge that “Our thought has been that
PCC should initially
endeavor to find common ground for agreement among parties
without regard to preconceived ideas of our own about final
settlement. Only if impasse is reached would we, as PCC member, wish to put forward
terms of settlement, in which event we would consult with other
members PCC as well as British.
Emphasis in US position has been upon any settlement which would
be agreeable to parties or in which they would at least
acquiesce without further fighting. UK position is inclined to
be more precise as to specific territorial arrangements.
“We note from Griffis’ telegram that you concur in his suggestion. Please feel free at any time to make recommendations on such joint US–UK action as you believe required by situation. Altho we are not sanguine about such approach at this time, you are closest to the problem and we would wish to give your views very great weight.” (Telegram 111, February 25, 8 p. m., to Jerusalem, also identified as Unpal 36, 501.BB Palestine/2–2549)
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