501.BB Palestine/2–749: Telegram
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State
urgent
109. ReEmbtel 101, February 6. Shiloah invited Knox confer this morning stating Foreign Minister and Prime Minister had studied our memo last night and he wished inform as follows:
- 1.
- Israeli delegate Rhodes had just advised that Egypt had
introduced new highly disturbing conditions negotiations as
follows:
- a.
- Egypt now insists Israel withdraw forces from Negev except defense forces in settlements (where there are no settlements now Israeli forces shall be retained) while, at same time, reserving complete freedom disposal Egypt forces in area (for example, Egypt insisting seven outposts in continuous line in Gaza-Rafah strip); this attitude based on November 4 resolution.
- b.
- Egypt now claims Israel should not be allowed have even defensive forces in southern part Negev (south of Ein Hasb MR 173025) even though area not adjacent Egypt.
In comment Shiloah stated that tone Bunche draft proposal all in favor Egypt and that Israel (despite victory) willing ignore tone to help Egypt save face but that Israel position was as follows:
- 1.
- Egypt must in practice approach armistice on basis that there is equality of status between two armies.
- 2.
- Israel cannot admit that treatment of Negev area is different than any other area of Israel.
- 3.
- Israel will agree to tone of draft Bunche proposal (even though tone and formulation make it appear that Israel is the offending party) in order help Egypt Government save face.
- 4.
- Israel will not agree to any terms which jeopardize her security during this parlous period or which attempt to create a new military balance thus setting precedent which will make negotiations with Transjordan and Syria even more difficult.
At conclusion conference Shiloah commented on intervention of US and its adverse effect of forcing Israeli withdrawal at moment when decisive military victory was within sight; Knox pointed out, however, [Page 735] that Israeli position could conceivably be worse had Israel found itself in conflict with Great Britain. Shiloah then rather insistently offered mission copy Bunche draft proposal and all relevant papers so that mission could “properly advise the Department”. Knox demurred and doubted that mission was in position accept this responsibility. Probably Shiloah, speaking for both Prime Minister (who is ill) and Foreign Minister (who is absent in Jerus) would welcome US as super-arbitrator though he stressed that documents were for our information only.
Comment: I believe Knox acted correctly in avoiding acceptance documents because:
- 1.
- In view PGI feeling re US intervention, acceptance documents might be further step involving US in unilateral action;
- 2.
- Acceptance might give impression that US disposed bypass UN and PCC;
- 3.
- Acceptance might give PGI feeling of relieved responsibility;
- 4.
- Documents could not give mission all pertinent data and none from Egypt.
Would appreciate Department’s instructions.1
- The Department, on February 8, expressed its agreement with the comment in No. 109 (telegram 78 to Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/2–749).↩