501.BB Palestine/2–649: Telegram
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State
urgent
101. Re Deptel 75 February 5. At 3:45 p. m. February 6 I left memo with Foreign Minister as per instructions. In conversation with Foreign Minister he stated as follows re memo:
- 1.
- Deeply appreciative US efforts vis-à-vis Egypt.
- 2.
- Deeply deplored Bunche’s January 31 proposal as being far out of line Israel’s position, and hopes it has not had fatal effect negotiations. Shertok had distinct impression Egypt had been willing be more conciliatory, but that Egypt now standing firm on Bunche’s proposal re thorny problem of El Auja.
- 3.
- Israel has in course negotiations already compromised as
follows:
- (a)
- Agreed to reduce Israeli Military forces in El Auja area to a few purely defensive units.
- (b)
- Agreed completely evacuate town El Auja and place it under United Nations supervision.
- (c)
- Agreed to having armistice commission sit on Israeli side line which for the “victor” is considered quite a concession.
- (d)
- Agreed that if Egypt fears Israeli retention small units in neighborhood surrounding El Auja, Egypt free to build new defensives [defenses?] on Egypt frontier facing El Auja, this unusual concession in that while Israel binds herself not increase defenses during armistice Egypt may do so.
- (e)
- While first Israeli position was insist complete Egypt evacuation Rafah-Gaza strip, Israel now has made major political and military concession allowing continuance light Egypt forces in strip area.
Bunche’s proposal, while admitting in writing that area is “gateway of invasion” and that El Auja controls crossroads, nevertheless insists that whole area comprising approximately 150 square kilometers must be evacuated by Israeli. From viewpoint military defense this apparently means Israel must abandon the most vital strong points in whole area and back up to indefensible positions leaving themselves wide open if Egypt should change mind and resume war.
Shertok’s viewpoint is that, while Egypt is the invader it is Israel who must, according to Bunche, withdraw her forces from wide area [Page 732] and this not fair or acceptable. The area which Bunche delineates and to which the Egyptians quite understandably agree is as follows:
“From a point on the Egypt–Palestine border 5 kilometers north of the Rafah-El Auja road (MR087–047), southeast to Khashm, El Memdud (MR096–041), thence southeast to El Beha (MR108–039), thence southwest intersecting the Egypt–Palestine border at a point 5 kilometers southeast of the intersection of the old railway track and the Egypt–Palestine border (MR099.5–014.5), thence returning north west along the Egypt–Palestine border to the border to the point of origin.”
Shertok, after receiving my memo departed attend regular Cabinet meeting and I presume our representations now being considered by Cabinet. However, I am not at all sure, in view Shertok’s viewpoint and concessions already made by Israel, what result will be. Shiloah told Knox after Shertok left room that Rhodes negotiations, although difficult, were by no means terminated and he still appeared hopeful.
In order appreciate Israeli position Knox, Military Attaché and I feel that consideration must be given to Israel’s basic fear of Egypt’s relative strength. While public feared Arab Legion, General Staff knew real threat was large Egyptian Army which moved methodically up coast within almost striking distance Tel Aviv attacking settlements en route. United Nations could not stop Egyptians and only Israeli Army, at grievous cost, managed stop and defeat them. British action and our intervention has left both armies “hanging in air” with Israel forces not in the best of defense positions owing sudden forced termination action. Egyptian forces, while defeated in field and in part disarmed, are largely intact and, according other armistice provisions, will be able return Egypt. Israeli intention destroy large arms depots at El Arish and Rafah frustrated by US-British intervention and thus Egyptian forces could, when safely across border, regroup, rearm and strike again. Israel, being unsure that UN can restrain Egypt in future any more effectively than in past, may be unwilling abandon its present defense positions in wide area demanded by Bunche.