501.BB Palestine/1–2649: Telegram
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State
urgent
57. ReDeptel 42, January 24. At 9 p. m., I had conference with Shertok, Knox and Shiloah (latter returned January 25 from Rhodes) present. Shertok reviewed in detail the negotiations and contemplated procedures re Faluja evacuation as follows:
- 1.
- In discussions with Bunche and Riley it was made abundantly clear that evaluation of Faluja must be part of the whole armistice negotiation and not a separate operation; accordingly, Israeli delegation had it placed on the agenda as sub-item in “topic four”. Bunche argued strongly that it would be impossible because of face for Egyptians accept a document which specified in writing that evacuation of Faluja was contingent on armistice but that he and Riley would ex plain to Egyptians verbally that evacuation was conditional and warn Egyptians agree or be accused in SC of non-cooperation. Israel then agreed proceed on Bunche’s verbal promise which, according Shiloah, was fully understood by more than ten top UN and Israeli negotiators in round-table discussion. In effect Israelis compromised even further in agreeing that evacuation would begin on completion armistice or when armistice appeared very near to conclusion. Bunche finally countered, perhaps with undue optimism, by insistence on specific date of 24 January to start evacuation contingent, however, on armistice negotiations [Page 701] progress before that date. When on January 22 it became apparent armistice could not be concluded, nor was very near conclusion, Israelis asked him inform Egyptians of delay in evacuation and, for window dressing, provided in agreement with Bunche the “technical reason”: i.e., confusion re Egyptian request simultaneous evacuation of 2500 civilians from Faluja.
- 2.
- Shertok and Shiloah state Bunche fully admits the verbal understanding that implementation of evacuation must be contingent on, and considered in context of, whole armistice negotiations. Unfortunately, only the news of the written agreement is known to world press owing to text of operational memorandum to UN personnel in Tel Aviv which text was leaked to press.
The Egyptians have sent a note to Bunche accusing bad faith on part Israel for postponing evacuation. Israel replied January 25 in “stiff note” to Bunche, with copy for Egyptian delegates explaining exactly the verbal agreement in order avoid Egyptian accusation.
Shertok went on to say that for Israel agree evacuation Faluja with no armistice concluded or very near would be a farce; it is a misapprehension, as Bunche knows, to state that evacuation plan was unconditional.
In reply inquiry re expectations, Shertok stated he did not feel negotiations would break down over Faluja problem which is readily solvable as part of general settlement. He is most apprehensive, however, over following much more fundamental points:
- 1.
- Israel made Egypt proposal that it would guarantee stay out of Egypt if Egypt would get armies out of Israel partition area and guarantee not return. Israel furthermore guaranteed that if Egypt would take army out of GazA–Rafah strip Israel would not move forces in, thus allowing Egyptian civil administrators to stay there along with any arrangement that could be worked out with UN supervisors. This, in Shertok viewpoint, was maximum conciliatory position possible.
- 2.
- Now it appears that Egypt, while wanting Israel guarantee not enter Egypt again, is insisting that Egyptian forces be allowed re-enter Negev and occupy El Auja. Shertok says this is serious and Israel cannot agree.
- 3.
- While disturbed over Egyptian attitude on El Auja, Shertok states that with chief negotiators still in Rhodes parley begins again Thursday and he still has hope success.
Shertok says evidence desire continue negotiations Israel signed Rhodes January 24 firm agreement with Egyptian delegates allow another food and medical convoy to Faluja brigade, and a “sincere cease-fire” arrangement similar to the Jerusalem one.
Shertok reiterated instructions sent Epstein with hope that US Government could use good offices persuade Egyptians Government [Page 702] not insist (1) unconditional evacuation Faluja and (2) return Egypt forces to El Auja.1
Pass copy to Army CSGID.
- Mr. Rusk, on January 27, summarized telegram 57 in an unnumbered, eyes only telegram to Acting Mediator Bunche, at Rhodes. He concluded the message as follows: “We have been very much encouraged with your masterly direction of the Rhodes talks and even though auspices may not now seem bright we do hope you will stick by job until it is finished. While fully conversant your desire to return we feel that no one but yourself should shepherd these delicate negotiations at this time. Conciliation Commission can then build on foundations you have established.” (501.BB Palestine/1–2749)↩