867N.01/1–1549: Telegram
Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State
niact
urgent
20. Israeli peace offer re Jerusalem as contained in Jerusalem’s 35, January 13 and 36, January 141 appears to coincide in general terms with King’s views as outlined in mytel 16, January 11 and feel he would be willing discuss Jerusalem question with Jews in near future apart from more general problem of Transjordan–Israel peace, particularly since Jews seem ready grant number concessions.
Believe King would insist on complete sovereignty and control of Jewish quarter Old City and also of Katamon, upper and lower Bakaa, Mt. Zion, Deir Abu Tor, Maliha, Talpioth, Ramatrahel and Mekorhaim. He would probably also desire exchange of populations between Arab and Jewish pockets. However it is thought that he would be open to reasonable suggestions and negotiations on any or all of these points provided he could be sure of good faith of Israelis.
King’s present dilemma is due in large measure to lack of active and functioning government. Prime Minister is still ill and Acting Prime Minister appears unwilling take any responsibility on matters which he prefers should be handled by Prime Minister. Therefore King is impatiently awaiting return of Samir Rifai Pasha from US to appoint him as Prime Minister.
[Page 668]While preliminary discussions re Jerusalem could be held before formation new government, no definitive talks could take place now nor could Abdullah El Tel be issued with credentials more valid than ones he now holds. Unsatisfactory progress of Tel–Dayan talks resulting from absurd situation re government has been pointed out to King by certain advisers but he apparently feels himself unable remedy matters at moment.
As have regular weekly dinner engagement with King at Shuneh Sunday evening would Department consider it useful for plan in Jerusalem’s 35 and 36 to be outlined to King, as personal thoughts and without revealing source, in order obtain his reactions. While French Consulate General may have obtained some reaction through Abdullah El Tel and Musa Husseini (reports of whose interview will probably shortly reach British Foreign Office), it might be desirable to explore matter directly with King.2
Sent Department 20, repeated London 1, Jerusalem 15.
- Latter not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 663.↩
- The
Department, in reply on January 15, authorized Mr. Stabler to
outline to the King the plan set forth in telegrams 35 and 36
from Jerusalem to obtain his reactions. It also cautioned him to
“make absolutely clear you not acting in any way as mediator or
extending good offices. You will of course recall that US
remains on record as favoring internationalization of
Jerusalem.” (telegram 9 to Amman, 867N.01/1–1449)
Mr. Stabler replied, on January 17, that he had seen King Abdullah and the Transjordanian Defense Minister the previous evening and had advised them of the substance of telegram 9. The King stated that “if it did not seem possible to obtain internationalization of all Jerusalem, then autonomy of Arab and Jewish areas would be best solution to problem.” He also advanced the view that a “separate settlement Jerusalem ‘not a bad idea’” and that “he wanted to reach settlement with Jews which would be firm and durable and which would be based on mutual interests. Toward that end he always prepared adopt reasonable attitude on specific points under discussion. He hoped Jews would do same.” (telegram 22 from Amman, 867N.01/1–1749)
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