501.BB Palestine/1–1349

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

secret
Participants: Mr. Bromley, First Secretary of British Embassy
Mr. McClintock, UNA

Mr. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy, telephoned me at 12:15 p. m. today to say that I might be interested in the substance of a telegram just received from the British Embassy in Cairo. The British Ambassador on January 11 had seen the Secretary General of the Egyptian Foreign Office, who said that the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Shertok, on the 10th had said that he planned to go to Rhodes for the present peace conversations. The Egyptian Secretary General expressed the fear that this was a trap to entice the Egyptian Government into over-all talks for a final settlement, whereas the Egyptian Government felt that military issues should first be worked out between the two governments.

The British Ambassador reported that he told the Egyptian Secretary General that it was of the highest importance for Egypt to maintain its decision to enter into direct conversations with the Jews. Even though the latter might wish more far-reaching discussions, the Egyptian Representatives at Rhodes could always refer these points back to their Government and need not enter into commitments.

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I thanked Mr. Bromley for this information and said that I was sure Mr. Lovett would be glad to see this confirmation of his statement yesterday to the Israeli Representative that there could be no basis of fact for the rumor that the British were actually dissuading the Egyptians from going to Rhodes.

Mr. Bromley made several private and personal comments. He said he hoped we understood that Mr. Bevin was under a severe domestic pressure on the Palestine issue. In particular, he was under attack from Churchill and Eden.1

Mr. Bromley added the personal comment in response to my expression of hope that the British Ambassador’s conversations yesterday with Mr. Lovett and today with the President2 would serve to ease Mr. Bevin’s mind, that the Embassy in Washington was under a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis the Foreign Office. The British Embassy here had always been regarded in London as being “too weak” toward Zionist influences in the United States. In fact, Lord Inverchapel, when Ambassador, had been completely disregarded in his reports of the Zionist attitude. I gained the impression that Mr. Bromley was hopeful that his Chief would speak with greater authority, but that he was not entirely assured on this point.

Mr. Bromley said he wished me to know that he personally felt that the views expressed by Mr. Lovett yesterday were completely right, particularly with regard to how our real strategic advantage could be maintained in the Near East. He had in fact addressed a Minute along the same lines to his Ambassador not long ago.

Mr. Bromley said, in response to my question, that his Ambassador’s interview this morning with the President had been more general in character than the conversations last evening with the Acting Secretary. The President, said Mr. Bromley, had responded in terms almost identical with those used by Mr. Lovett, although not in such detail.

Mr. Bromley told me that orders had been issued to the RAF in Egypt to discontinue further reconnaissance. He said the recommendation for this order had come from British authorities in Egypt. I commented that this seemed useful since reconnaissance of the type recently attempted appeared to have reached the point of diminishing returns.

  1. Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, British Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, respectively, from 1940 to 1945.
  2. The editors have been unable to find in the records of the Department of State any memoranda detailing the conversations of Ambassador Franks with Mr. Lovett and with President Truman. The conversation with Mr. Lovett is summarized in telegram 149, January 13, to London, p. 658. Mr. McDonald’s version of the conversation with President Truman is presented in his book, My Mission in Israel, 1948–1951 (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 126.