Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

8901.01/1–1249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] January 12, 1949.

Subject: Transjordan

Participants:	Mr. Lovett—Acting Secretary
	Samir Rifai Pasha—Former Prime Minister of Transjordan and Special Emissary of King Abdullah
	Haidar Bey Shukri1
	Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
	Mr. Wilkins—NE

Samir Pasha and Haidar Bey called on me today at their request following their recent arrival to the United States as special emissaries of King Abdullah of Transjordan.

Samir Pasha conveyed to me the greetings of King Abdullah and expressed the hope that the friendly relations which existed between Transjordan and the United States would grow stronger and stronger in the future.

I thanked Samir Pasha for the King’s greetings and told him that we appreciated the hospitality and confidence which the King and his Government had extended to the American representative in Amman. I also said that we admired the dignity and restraint with which the King and his Government had conducted themselves during the troublest [sic] times resulting from developments in Palestine.

Samir Pasha remarked that the King and his Government had long hoped the presently existing friendly relations between Transjordan and the United States might be formalized by recognition and expressed the view that Transjordan’s conduct would seem to justify American recognition.

Samir Pasha said he understood the United States might be in a position to extend recognition simultaneously or after the de jure recognition of Israel and argued that it would be of benefit not only to the United States but also to Transjordan if such recognition could precede action relating to Israel.

Samir Pasha pointed out that when Great Britain had stood alone in 1940 following the defeat of France, King Abdullah and his Government had stood by the British. Mr. Satterthwaite recalled that at this time King Abdullah’s Arab Legion had assisted in the relief of Baghdad in 1941 following the Rashid Ali Rebellion.²

I replied no one could deny that the attitude of King Abdullah and his Government during the war and, more particularly, during the past year in Palestine would justify the recognition of Transjordan by the United States. I said it was logical and long overdue. Recent developments had, however, affected this situation. I pointed out on a confidential and personal basis that I had recently appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had there been questioned on Great Britain’s activities in the Near East. I said that I had been queried regarding the movement of British troops at Akaba and in Transjordan, on the incident of the RAF planes over the Palestine-Egyptian frontier and on British troop movements in the Mediterranean. I said it was unfortunate, that these activities—whatever their purpose—had cast a cloud over such favorable developments as the Transjordan-Israeli talks regarding Jerusalem and the scheduled Egyptian-Israeli talks at Rhodes. I added I hoped these peaceful developments would prevail.

Samir Pasha seemed to appreciate the problem which confronted this Government at this particular time and did not further press the question of immediate recognition.

Samir Pasha said planned personally to deliver a letter from King Abdullah to the President when he called on him on Friday, January 14 and asked if it would be possible for him personally to carry the President’s reply to King Abdullah when he returned to Amman in about a week or ten days. Mr. Satterthwaite said he would endeavor to make arrangements to this effect and that if the President’s reply was not ready prior to Samir Pasha’s departure from Washington he would see that it reached him in New York before he left the United States.³

1. Brother-in-law of the former Transjordanian Prime Minister.
2. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 486 ff.
3. One of the subjects discussed at the conversation (but not recorded in this memorandum) was King Abdullah’s aspiration for a Greater Syria; but see instruction 3, March 29, to Amman, p. 882. Previous documentation on the interest of Transjordan in a Greater Syria is printed in Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.