Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.01/1–1049

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[Washington,] January 10, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
	NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
	NE—Mr. Wilkins
	Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Epstein called at his own request. During the course of the conversation he covered the following points.

1. He stated that he had just received a cable from Mr. Shertok to the effect that any Israeli soldiers who might have reentered Egyptian territory had now been withdrawn from Egypt. The Provisional Government of Israel desired to enter the negotiations with Egyptians at Rhodes with a completely clean slate.¹

2. Although the military situation had been the primary factor inducing the Egyptians to agree to armistice negotiations, the Provisional Government of Israel realized that the representations made in Tel Aviv and Cairo by the United States had been of immense help. The representations had been made at just the right psychological moment and the Provisional Government of Israel was very grateful to the United States.

3. At a time when things seemed to be moving along so well between Egypt and Israel, it was extremely unfortunate that the British should have become involved. It was pure folly to send reconnaissance planes over a delicate military area where a battle was raging and where it was extremely difficult to determine the boundary line between Egyptian territory and Palestine. Israel sincerely hoped that the incident of the five airplanes shot down could be confined to Israel and Great Britain but foresaw that this incident had very serious implications as regards a general peace settlement. Mr. Epstein declared that he personally did not share the point of view of some Israeli pessimists that the British, by sending a force to Akaba, were preparing to invade Palestine and obtain what they had not been able to achieve through the Bernadotte report.² However, the British action in connection with the airplane incident and in sending troops to Akaba certainly indicated that the British intended to carry on a war of nerves against Israel. Israel had no intention whatsoever of invading any of the Arab states and had only taken action against the Egyptians because the Provisional Government of Israel could no longer tolerate the menace of a large Egyptian force only thirty five miles from Tel Aviv. Not only did the British activities threaten a final peace settlement by encouraging the Arabs to intransigence, but they also would have an unfavorable effect on the Israeli elections in that they would induce people to believe that cooperation with the west was a wrong course to follow. Mr. Epstein pointed out that while, of course, the United States was not involved in this British attitude, there would be many people in Israel who would not distinguish between the United States and Great Britain when they went to the polls. Under the circumstances, Mr. Epstein very much hoped that just as the United States had made representations in Egypt and Israel, so it would undertake to point out to the British that the course of action they were following could only lead to further trouble. Later on in the conversation it developed that in making this suggestion Mr. Epstein was not acting under instructions from Tel Aviv but was expressing his own personal desire which he was confident would be supported by Tel Aviv.

4. Mr. Epstein took up the question of peace negotiations with the Arab states other than Egypt. He said that if the Israelis received a guarantee from the Lebanese that they were sincerely prepared to sit down to serious armistice and peace negotiations Israel would with draw its forces from the Lebanon. However, the Lebanese should not believe that they could get the Jewish troops out of their country by agreeing to peace negotiations but then stalling once the Israelis had left. Mr. Epstein did not appear to think there would be much difficulty in coming to an agreement with the Lebanese once the other Arab states started on the road to negotiations with Israel. As regards the Iraqi, Mr. Epstein said that Nuri es-Said Pasha³ was a moderate man but that he probably did not represent the attitude of the Iraqi Government. He had come to power through Force Majeure and his moderation would probably not have much influence as far as negotiations with Israel were concerned. Mr. Epstein did not think there would be difficulties with the Iraqi troops, who were further removed from Tel Aviv than the Egyptians. As regards Transjordan, Mr. Epstein believed that it would be entirely possible to enter peace negotiations with King Abdullah if the British would allow the latter to do so. He thought that the Transjordan Government, if left to its own devices, would not have requested the British to send troops to Akaba.

Mr. Epstein said that when he saw Mr. Lovett tomorrow⁴ at 2:30 he would develop the some trend of thought unless he had before that time received new instructions from Tel Aviv.

Mr. Satterthwaite told Mr. Epstein that the United States sincerely hoped that the incident of the five airplanes could be confined to the Israelis and the British and would not be permitted to hamper the course of peace negotiations. He said that naturally he understood the exuberance of military commanders, particularly when victorious, but pointed out that the Provisional Government of Israel should be careful not to permit a situation to develop which would force the United States to choose between Great Britain and Israel. Mr. Epstein said that he thoroughly agreed with Mr. Satterthwaite.

1. The Department instructed Cairo on January 11 to “informally state to FonOff that Israeli Rep here yesterday officially told Dept all Israeli troops had withdrawn from Egyptian territory. Very much hope therefore that Egyptian Govt will send top level officials to Rhodes conversations.” (telegram 38, repeated to Tel Aviv as 17, 501.BB Palestine/1–1049)
2. Dated September 16, 1948; see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1401. Count Bernadotte was the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.
3. Iraqi Prime Minister.
4. The meeting seems to have taken place on January 12; see Mr. Lovett’s memorandum of conversation, p. 645.