501.BB Palestine/1–549: Telegram
The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
12. ReDeptels 2, January 3 and 4 January 4.1 As communicated to Department by Embtel 7, January 4,2 I was granted audience by His Majesty at 4 p. m., Wednesday, fifth. I opened conversation by mentioning [Page 618] Ambassador Griffis3 appreciation of his recent reception by King (Embtel 1782, January 24) mentioning likewise former Ambassador Tuck’s5 presence in Cairo. His Majesty remarked that he had questioned Ambassador Griffis re somewhat anomalous situation Chargé of this Embassy which had not previously, to his knowledge, arisen in Cairo adding an expression of surprise that Ambassador Griffis had not elected to mention to him subject matter on which I was calling and of which he was ignorant. I responded stating that Mr. Griffis had not been informed prior to his departure which accounted for my soliciting an audience so soon after Ambassador meeting HM. On my mentioning that Ambassador Griffis had called to explain his plans for alleviating ravages of war and that I too came on a mission of peace, King remarked that he had guessed as much. I immediately thereafter emphasized that I had called by express instruction of my government on a matter of urgency. HM replied that he would have received me yesterday (that is, the very day of my application for audience) had that been possible. After thanking King for his helpful promptitude I orally developed points of Deptel 2 above-mentioned. King inquired very particularly as to whether American Government had already indicated its concern to Israelis (I purposely avoided reference to PGI by name) and appeared content on my assuring him to that effect.
Re content numbered paragraph four, HM stated that Egyptian Government desirous of concluding armistice recommended by Security Council November 16, but that implementation resolution November 4 must concurrently take place. On my inquiring if implementation of both SC resolutions might not be effected simultaneously, King supposed this might be the case. HM remarked emphatically, [Page 619] however, that he had no faith in Jews or the slightest confidence that they would keep their word in any agreement. At same time HM pointed out that Egypt was in the current hostilities the attacked and not the attacker. Said hostilities, which he stated were now continuing, were of the utmost intensity and carried on by all weapons available to the Israelis, including tear and irritant gases. HM hesitated to describe such gases as being actually poisonous, but stated that Egyptians, who had not yet used them, would do so if the Israelis continued their employment. HM, while not as jovial as described by Ambassador Griffis in Embtel 1782, seemed in good spirits and manifested confidence in outcome of current struggle which he stated was probably the hardest fought engagement in Middle East since El Alamein. HM repeated, as in his January 2 talk with Ambassador Griffis, that the Egyptians had captured Russians. On my inquiring if these were not Russian Jews he stated that some were, but that pure Russians had been taken and likewise Poles, Hungarians, Dutch, and even South Africans. He had had this last-named fact brought to the attention of the South African Chargé d’Affaires even though he had not been able to produce the South Africans alive.
On my suggesting restraint recommended in numbered paragraph five giving reported bombing Jerusalem as example, HM quickly replied that his military informants had assured him that bombing had been effected by unmarked Jewish planes flying high over city with intent to place blame on Egyptians. On my subsequently mentioned reported attack on Tel Aviv by Egyptian vessels, HM stated that this combat had been a running naval engagement wherein Egyptian warships pursued Jewish ditto which endeavored to find refuge Tel Aviv, with resultant cannonading of coast. King remarked that Tel Aviv was not the objective adding that if Egyptians wished to bomb Tel Aviv they could do so anytime from air. He asked from what source American Government credits information, to which I replied that insofar as I was aware the reports had not necessarily been verified. On my mentioning that journalists seemed to have better access to the front from Israeli than from Egyptian side, King remarked that he and his officers did not like journalists about so that their exclusion from the Egyptian lines represented conscious policy. HM added that he believed allied military commanders during last war had found journalists uncomfortable persons.
Nevertheless I stressed the probability of reprisals should Egyptian attacks on Zionist-held territory be made, emphasizing that in such case it would be difficult for US or any other government to persuade Israelis not to attack. Again the King indicated that Israelis were the attackers. In conclusion I reiterated the influence attributed by my government to King Farouk, who is regarded as a leader in [Page 620] the Arab world, pointing out that as a sovereign and statesman he had exceptional authority and opportunity to bring peace to Middle East.
To this King replied that while indeed he exercised authority his powers were not as great as my government might imagine. He appeared definitely pleased, however, with this tribute to his position but did not refrain from iterating the observation made to Ambassador Griffis on January 2 to effect that US had brought trouble to Middle East and should use its best endeavors to solve the problems it had created. To this I responded by remarking that US Government was basically interested in restoring peace as its efforts near Israeli authorities and its instruction to me evidenced.
On conclusion of audience I handed King memorandum based on Deptel of which a copy will be forwarded by despatch.6 In so doing I remarked that while the memorandum which was designed for his convenience did not contain allusions to his person my government, as I had already informed him, had in its instruction to me repeatedly emphasized the vitally important responsibility which HM in his position as sovereign of Egypt and leader in Arab world possessed to bring about a lasting peace.
- Latter not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Stanton Griffis, Ambassador in Egypt.↩
- Not printed; it advised that Ambassador Griffis, on January 2, held a long discussion with King Farouk on the Palestine problem. The King advised him that “he must represent the will of his people and that his people want this war to go on if it takes ten years to finish it.” He also stated that “in view of fact that Russian participations in Israel attack had become so obvious, he was constantly astounded at attitude of US in matter; that Palestine was rapidly becoming another Greece and that Russians, despite all American efforts in, and aid to, Turkey, were rapidly becoming entrenched in strategic positions in Palestine back of Turkish center frontier.” The Ambassador noted that the King “Certainly indirectly confirmed my constantly stated belief that little progress can be made in Palestine settlement without completely approved blueprint, by US and UK.” He concluded that the “Department should consider possibilities even if unilateral, of bringing strong pressure on Israel to stop aggression and respect toothless UN orders. While I have in past tended to minimize Egyptian cry of ‘Russian, Russian,’ I am not now so confident. One thing is certain here, British are becoming extremely jittery re dangers of their own position and involvements which might ensue under their treaties with Egypt and Transjordan.” (867N.01/1–249)↩
- S. Pinkney Tuck, Minister in Egypt from 1944 to 1946 and Ambassador in Egypt from 1946 to 1948.↩
- The memorandum was dated January 5; a copy was transmitted to the Department by Cairo on January 7 in despatch 25 (501.BB Palestine/1–749).↩