501.BB Palestine/1–549: Telegram
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
9. Attention President and Acting Secretary. Part Two.1 Following is unanimous consensus Mission staff including Service Attaches. While Deptel 3 of January 3 is most helpful and explanatory and is being communicated Foreign Office soonest, the representations made Israel under instructions Deptel 281 of December 302 gave the effect of putting US in new role with relation to conflict between Israel and Egypt. Thus, irrespective of what the precise intent was in instructing me to make those representations in the form indicated, the deduction, of the PGI that, by forcing Israel abandon an obviously successful military action (which would have, in mind army and public here, neutralized a forward Egyptian base from which Egypt has during six months repeatedly launched destructive air and other attacks against Israel without occasioning any recorded direct complaint by US or GB), the US is now directly involved in results of action it has taken. If Egyptian attacks should continue, or if misunderstanding our action encourages Iraqi attack in north, the US position will be compared here to Britain as power whose repeated maneuvers are having effect of letting Israel bleed to death by forcing her into position where she is neither free to end the war militarily nor obtain peace by negotiation [as called for by?] Security Council UN.
The military facts as Mission now understands them are that, owing our representations, Israel forces have abruptly retreated from Egyptian territory, abandoning control roads. The tactics of Israel Army apparently were to have raided El Arish and attack Rafah and neutralize them, then withdraw to open path for estimated 18,000 Egyptian troops to escape home to Egypt. Now situation very confused but it appears that the new position of Israeli forces has blocked escape route of Egyptians while leaving Rafah as yet untouched but completely cut off from northeast and southeast. This is what Mission meant when it ascribed “serious responsibility” arising out of US representations.
The public here has only today become aware of US representations and as implications become clearer, I anticipate unfavorable reaction. Mission troubled by possible internal political effect our move particularly as affecting January 25 elections. During last six months, I believe owing intensive efforts this Mission cultivate friendship and to the changed policy of delegation in Paris, the domestic political [Page 615] tide was definitely swinging toward West. These latest developments have given extreme left and extreme right powerful political campaign issue to use against what now appears here to be new and definite Anglo-American alignment. If we cannot now stop Egypt’s attack or persuade British to change its consistently antagonistic attitude toward Israel, these reactions will weigh against us.
All evidence here of PGI plans and Israel’s self-interest negates existence any intention seize or hold Egyptian territory. Mission sees no inconsistency between US support independent strong Israel and all legitimate British interests in Egypt.
Mission hopes that US action already taken (Deptel 1, January 23 and Deptel 2, January 34) will be helpful restraining Egypt. Unfortunately substance US representations Israel (Deptel 281, December 305) have come through London and are already widely publicized press here thus giving impression marked US partiality.
In view foregoing and in light of danger reaction with reference election, Mission urgently reiterates its recommendations contained Mistel 323, December 206 that US immediately grant de jure recognition or at least ExIm Bank loan.
Mission has taken into account appointment Conciliation Committee and its terms of reference. Mission considers that situation now created does not permit postponement of actions suggested, and that such actions would facilitate work Conciliation Committee. (Part one sent as Mistel 7, January 3.)
- For part one, see telegram 7, January 3, p. 605.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.↩
- Not printed; it advised of the Department’s request to the British Embassy to inform the Foreign Office that “in view PGI order withdraw all Israeli forces from Egyptian territory as result our representations … Dept strongly believes Brit should impress on Egyptians necessity of their refraining from further attacks similar that on Tel Aviv. Otherwise chain of reprisals set off may well jeopardize progress toward final settlement so far made.” (867N.2383/1–249)↩
- This was a repeat of No. 2 to Cairo, p. 602.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.↩
- Ibid., p. 1674.↩