Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/1–449: Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross ¹ to the Secretary of State

secret

New York, January 4, 1949—11:25 p. m.

3. For Rusk² and Satterthwaite.³ Bunche informs that Azcarate⁴ phoned from Cairo this evening that Egyptians have confidentially notified him that they are ready to enter into talks with Israel on all outstanding questions under UN auspices provided Israelis will obey SC cease-fire order by 1400 GMT January 5.

Bunche describes this development as most encouraging in long time for there apparently are no strings attached. He has instructed Vigier⁵ to take up matter urgently in Tel Aviv pressing strongly in Bundle’s name for acceptance. Bunche has received no word from Tel Aviv regarding observance of SC cease-fire order to date. He has instructed Vigier to sound out Israelis on holding a high level conference on Rhodes with civil and military authorities of both Israel and Egypt under UN chairmanship. He thinks Transjordan could relatively easily be persuaded to join such a conference.

Bunche feels strongly that Israel should grab this opportunity at once if they want a peaceful settlement. He feels certain that it is a bona fide offer.

Bunche requests us to find opportunities tomorrow to impress on Israelis urgent importance of accepting this offer by deadline. He feels that advice from appropriate US officials would tip the scales at this critical juncture. However, he emphasized that matter should be treated with the utmost secrecy during next twenty-four hours.⁶

Bunche commented in same conversation this evening that until above development he was seriously contemplating requesting withdrawal of UN observers on Israeli side of lines at SO Negev committee⁷ meeting Friday, January 7, since observers are bottled up in Haifa and Tel Aviv. He feels that unless the SC can make its cease-fire order stick with the Israelis he will have no course but to pull out the military observers which now give only a false sense of security.

Ross

1. Deputy to Senator Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative at the United Nations.
2. Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.
3. Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
4. Pablo Azcarate, Acting Mediator Bunche’s Representative at Cairo.
5. Henri Vigier, Mr. Bunche’s representative at Tel Aviv.
6. After consulting with Messrs. Rusk and Satterthwaite, Robert M. McClintock, Special Assistant to Mr. Rusk, telephoned Mr. Ross at 10 a. m., January 5 regarding telegram 3. He observed to Mr. Ross that “the Egyptian deadline for entering into talks with Israel on all outstanding questions, provided the Israelis would obey the Security Council cease fire order by 1400 GMT today, had already passed, since this hour was 9 a. m., EST. Since the suggested representations which Dr. Bunche thought would be useful if made by the United States to the Provisional Government of Israel would have to be cleared with the President and the deadline was already expired, it seemed impossible for us to act on Dr. Bunche’s suggestion. I said, however, that I thought it would be entirely appropriate for the Acting Mediator to telephone Mr. Shertok in Tel Aviv and give him the information which Mr. Azcarate had telephoned from Cairo, together with Dr. Bunche’s own estimate of the situation.” (memorandum of conversation by Mr. McClintock, 501.BB Palestine/1–549)
7. A loose usage for the Committee on the Palestinian Question of the Security Council. Messrs. Rusk and Satterthwaite, in a joint memorandum of January 5 to Mr. Lovett, began preparation of instructions to the United States representative on the Committee. The memorandum noted that the Committee “was appointed pursuant to the Security Council’s resolution of November 4, which required Israel and Egypt to stop fighting in the Negev and to withdraw their forces to the positions occupied as of October 14. The purpose of the Committee was to study the situation in the light of this resolution and to determine whether it should recommend to the Security Council possible action under Chapter VII in the event that the resolution had not been complied with.” (501.BB Palestine/1–549)