891.20/12–1449
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance (Ohly) to Major General L. L. Lemnitzer
Reference is made to your memorandum of November 17, 1949,1 subject, Iranian Military Assistance Program, in which you state that the Department of Defense cannot approve giving medium tanks to Iran, as these tanks will not serve to increase the military potential of Iran.
An officer of the Department of State who was present at the conference between the Shah and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has prepared a memorandum of conversation2 thereon, copy of which is attached. That officer is unable to state the extent to which General Bradley’s remarks with respect to the Shah’s plan, and with respect to late model medium tanks, were dictated by the amenities of the situation, and to what extent they represented basic conclusions.3 As a most important factor in pursuing the Iranian program will be detailed discussions with the Shah and his advisers concerning the type of equipment to be offered, clarification of this question is requested in order that the most convincing display of sincerity and sound logic on the part of the U.S. can be established.
The Department of State considers the development of the morale of the Shah, as Commander in Chief as well as Monarch of Iran, of primary importance. Iran’s will to resist Soviet pressures short of war, and her spirit to engage in delaying action in case of invasion, will depend almost conclusively on the Shah’s point of view. It is believed that every effort must therefore be made to include, if appropriate, medium tanks or other items desired by the Shah, in the program, for mixed political and military reasons which, in this case, appear inseparable.
It is therefore requested that the Department of Defense review the Iranian matter, and advise the Department of State with respect to the following:
- (1)
- Has the view that medium tanks would not add to the Iranian military potential changed in light of the meeting of the Shah with the JCS and the expressed views at that time of General Bradley; or in view of the military desirability of creating high morale on the part of the Commander in Chief?
- (2)
- What are the availability, cost per tank, delivery date
and relative advantages and disadvantages of
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- (a)
- Medium tank with 75 mm. gun
- (b)
- Medium tank with 76 mm. gun
- (1)
- from new procurement
- (2)
- by modification of older models
- (3)
- What supply of spare parts can be provided now and in the future for the above types? What cost and procurement problems are involved?
- (4)
- If a battalion or less of either of the above is to be considered, what support equipment, such as heavy repair items and recovery vehicles, should also be contemplated, to obviate collapse of equipment or loss intact in enemy action? What cost and delivery problems exist with respect thereto?
- (5)
- Are further tank destroyers or light tanks more appropriate for Iran, rather than medium tanks? If so, please supply cost and procurement data.
- (6)
- Subsequent to the Shah’s visit the Iranian Embassy urged the Department of State to provide $5,000,000 worth of small arms ammunition (7.9); and the Department is confidentially advised by Remington that Iran is proposing to purchase 50,000,000 rounds of Canadian manufacture from them. Remington has requested the Department’s advice. In telegram 1651 of December 12, 1949, the Embassy at Teheran states its belief that a 59,000,000 round level is adequate for Iran, that there are 50,000,000 rounds on hand, and that the remainder should come from local production. Iran, of course, disagrees with this view. The comments of Defense are requested on this problem, particularly with respect to the desirability of pushing the local manufacture of small arms ammunition, the possible desirability of developing the Canadian-owned industry, and thus indirectly giving aid to Canada, and the question whether the funds proposed to be spent by Iran for this project should be spent otherwise in view of our contemplated program of aid for Iran. If some items not deemed militarily essential need to be given to Iran for politico-military purposes, should ammunition be considered as one of these items rather than to be dealt with by purchase? On the other hand, does the United States contemplate standardizing small arms weapons in Iran with U.S. weapons? This particular item is a matter of some urgency as it is reported that the Canadian factory may soon go out of production if a contract is not placed.
- (7)
- The Ambassador and General Evans have strongly recommended including 6 recoilless 75 mm. rifles. Can this type weapon, of great psychological value, be released, and does Defense consider it practical?
- (8)
- As the Department of State considers that some items be
included, if possible, which will convince the Shah of our
appreciation of his role, and so strengthen his morale,
which of the above items, or other similar items, would
Defense recommend, considering also
- (a)
- the desirability of obtaining the most psychological value for the least expenditure either within or, if imperative, beyond present program ceilings.
- (b)
- the necessity of not entering upon projects which would constitute, over years to come, inescapable responsibilities to maintain, replace or augment items offered.
As this factor is of major importance, factual data concerning future projections of each of the items above listed is required.
After the development of this data, I am confident that we will both be in a far better position to consider the extent to which, and manner in which the Shah’s desires could and should be met, having due regard for present and projected cost and the utility of the items concerned, and consistent with paramount military and political considerations.