891.00/3–2949
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Wiley)
informal
official
Dear John: Thank you for your letter of March 29. I have, indeed, realized from your telegrams that you are concerned about Iran’s position vis-à-vis its great northern neighbor. I need hardly tell you that we in the Department share your concern and had it very much in mind when we inserted the paragraph on Greece, Turkey and Iran in my talk of March 18 as well as in the special statement I made to the press a few days later.1 It was our hope, which seems so far to have been fulfilled, that these statements and the President’s reference to the Near East in his speech of April 42 would sound enough of a warning note to deter the Russians from embarking on any new major adventures in the direction of Iran.
The evidence which we can assemble here points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union does not want to risk war in the near future and that its activities in the Fear East, including Iran, will therefore not go beyond the sort of pressures and subversive attempts to which it has resorted during the past two years. The evidence also seems to lend itself to the interpretation that the Kremlin fears open aggression against Iran would involve it in grave risk of conflict with the United States. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain why Soviet forces have so far refrained from entering Iran despite the obvious Russian designs on that country and the equally obvious physical weakness of Iran.
[Page 520]The essential thing, therefore, is to keep the Iranians firm in their resistance to Soviet pressures short of war. This is undeniably difficult, but we have been successful so far and I think we are justified in having good hope of success in the future. From where I sit, it looks as though the first requisite has been achieved, namely, that the Iranian Government itself should realize its danger. I do not think we need to impress that on the Iranians any more strongly; in fact, I am sometimes afraid that we may go too far in this direction and so frighten them that they will resort to appeasement of the Russians out of sheer terror. They have, unfortunately, too many examples before them of small countries overrun despite the best efforts to preserve their independence. We must endeavor to steer Iran on a middle course between undue complacency and undue fear.3
The question of what concrete support, diplomatic and material, we can give to Iran remains a knotty one. In the diplomatic field, the Department continues to believe it desirable that the Iranians should make some non-provocative report to the Security Council regarding the various threats and pressures Russia has employed in the past year and a quarter. We would expect to follow up such a report with a statement of our own regarding American activities in Iran and our view as to the duty of the USSR to complain to the Security Council if she genuinely feels threatened. However, we have become somewhat concerned lest our repeated indications of this view to the Iranian Government should be construed as pressure exerted on our part and lest the Iranians, if they do take action, should do so un willingly, merely out of a desire to avoid offending the United States. Apart from the fact that the Iranian Government could not be relied upon to back up a démarche made under such circumstances (you will [Page 521] recall Qavam’s vacillations in 1946),4 I am afraid such a situation would impose upon us a tremendous moral responsibility to stand behind Iran whatever the consequences of her action. I do not want to be in the position of egging on a small country to do something it is reluctant to do in its own interest. Now that we have made our views abundantly clear and that the Iranian Government has received concrete and well-drafted proposals for action from its representatives and legal counsel in the United States, I am inclined to feel that we should let the matter rest for the time being, leaving the initiative entirely to the Iranians.
In the field of material aid, we have succeeded so far in keeping an amount of approximately 12 million dollars allocated to Iran in the draft Military Aid Program. Whether this will stay in the bill is, of course, for Congress to decide. It is not politically feasible to increase this amount, although we hope the bill will also include a “contingency fund” of perhaps 50 million dollars from which some small additional sum might conceivably be drawn to assist Iran if it seemed necessary. I realize that this would seem very small to the Iranians as compared with 75 or 100 million dollars for Turkey. We shall strive to minimize this difficulty by avoiding any revelation of the amounts allocated. Perhaps we can also diminish Iranian disappointment or resentment by continuing to emphasize, as you have done, the inability of the Iranian forces to absorb large quantities of additional equipment in the coming year and the need for extensive training before highly technical modern weapons and equipment could profitably be provided. A further argument which occurs to me, and on which I would like your opinion, is the economic one. Even though we might supply all of the foreign exchange costs of an enlarged and modernized Iranian Army, I should think the internal costs would be an extremely severe drain on the Iranian budget and would handicap the implementation of the economic development program. As you know, in the European arms program we are emphasizing that economic recovery is the first objective and all military programs must be subordinated to that. In our view, this applies equally to Iran.
On the economic side itself, we place great reliance on the working out of the Seven Year Program, with the assistance of Overseas Consultants and International Bank financing. Mr. Sa’ed’s recent letter to you5 seems to raise new aspects, and we are restudying the problem in its light. I shall not try to comment here, because you will [Page 522] probably receive a telegram on the subject before this letter reaches you.
[Here follows a brief paragraph on personal matters.]
Sincerely yours,
- See telegram 272, March 23, to Tehran, p. 494.↩
- See footnote 2, p. 502.↩
- Ambassador
Wiley’s reply of June 2 invited attention to the Secretary’s
stress on “the importance of keeping the Iranians firm in their
resistance to Soviet pressures and to the possible danger of
their appeasing the Russians out of ‘sheer terror’.” The
Ambassador stated his belief that “if anything, the Iranian
attitude, which has not been soft, is stiffening. Curiously
enough, I do not think the Iranian leaders are easily scared or
susceptible to panic.… I am not disturbed at all about
appeasement, capitulation, or fright on the part of the dominant
figures in the Iranian setup, Too, the Iranian frontier guards
have shown very good morale in resisting repeated Red Army
incursions.”
The Ambassador did express concern, however, “about the two great northern provinces of Azerbaijan and Mazanderin, containing not far from 30% of the entire population of the country, where one-half of the food is produced and many of the essential raw commodities of the country, such as, for example, wool. Economic conditions there are bad; little or nothing is being done either by the Government or by absentee landlords. There is discontent to an extent which makes this area, so vital to Iran, very vulnerable indeed. I fear that a not inconsequential part of the population would not be particularly averse to seeing the Russians return. Something should be done and done immediately to improve conditions in this area.”
The copy of Ambassador Wiley’s letter here cited was found attached to his letter of June 27 to Mr. Jernegan, not printed (761.91/6–2749).
↩ - For documentation on the administration of Prime Minister Qavam, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 289 ff.↩
- See telegram 558, April 26, from Tehran, p. 510.↩