1. To re-examine U.S. national and strategic interests in the
countries of South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India,3
Burma, Nepal and
[Page 9]
Ceylon), and
to determine the measures which should be undertaken in the
implementation of established U.S. foreign policy for cooperating
with these countries.
2. See Appendix “A”.
3. See Appendix “B”.
4. See Appendix “C”.
(The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed general agreement with the
following conclusions which have military implications, i.e. 5.a, c and d (2).
Paragraph 6. adopts essentially the JCS statement of our basic strategic objectives in
South Asia. See Appendix “C”.)
5. The political, economic and strategic importance of the emerging
South Asian countries to the U.S. is such that our national
interests require:
6. The basic strategic objectives of the U.S., with respect to the
South Asian countries are:
7. It is recommended that SANACC
approve the foregoing conclusions and transmit them to the National
Security Council for consideration.
8. It is further recommended that the conclusions of this study be
considered in conjunction with similar appraisals of U.S. national
[Page 11]
interests in other areas
related to South Asia, particularly Southeast Asia.4
Appendix “B”
Discussion
1. effects of the british withdrawal
The deep-rooted political uncertainties which effected the
British withdrawal of power from the South Asian countries have
led to an over-all situation of near-chaos in many parts of the
area. Burma is presently embroiled in civil strife. India and
Pakistan have just passed through unparalleled communal
disorders and are still engaged in undeclared warfare in
Kashmir. Pakistan has inherited responsibility for the defense
of the strategic North West (Afghan and Iranian) Frontier, but
is without the military means of providing an adequate defense.
Afghanistan, whose position has always rested on the balance of
Russian and British power, has been left isolated on the Soviet
frontier without the counterbalance of British power behind it;
while at the same time Afghan leaders have raised issues
regarding the status of the North West Frontier tribes which
have adversely affected relations with Pakistan.
In the process of this political upheaval the economies of these
countries have been seriously set back, recovery is handicapped
by the resulting trade dislocations, and the need for outside
assistance in many fields has become strikingly apparent.
Concurrently with this political and economic deterioration the
nationalist movements in the South Asian countries have grown
strong enough to make it clear that the British will probably
never again attempt to impose their will by force. In a negative
sense, therefore, these nationalist movements must be considered
the military equals of British power within this area, since
they can deny access to their territory and resources. Whether
the present membership of Pakistan and, more particularly,
India, in the Commonwealth will continue remains to be seen; but
in any event this new balance of power is leading to new
political and economic patterns and possibly to tacit military
alliances outside the Commonwealth. Old values are being changed
and new ones sought. New friendships are being formed. The new
political leaders are seeking assistance and support, and it is
[Page 14]
largely on the basis
of the responses which they receive that friendship is being
measured, and that new alliances will come into being. Some of
the leaders of the South Asian countries have assumed,
unrealistically, that their power to force the British to
negotiate with them was proof they could stand alone as
independent states and discharge all their national and
international obligations. The past year has shown, however,
that they must of necessity either turn for assistance to the
Western powers, of which they now accept the U.S. as leader, or
that eventually they might be drawn into the Soviet orbit. Even
if they were to create the regional bloc for which there is some
popular demand in South Asia, and attempt to adhere to a neutral
course between the U.S. and the USSR, such a regional
organization would probably in time be drawn into the orbit of
either the Western or the Soviet power groups. As in other areas
of the world, therefore, whether we will or not, we are here
becoming engaged in a competition with the USSR for the favor
and resources of South Asia. The leaders of the South Asian
countries are presently looking in both directions. It is in the
light of these developments, and of the very considerable
economic and military importance of South Asia, that U.S.
national and strategic interests in, and policy towards these
countries should be critically re-examined. The concentration of
power in the hands of inexperienced leaders in these countries
demands of us the greatest wisdom and forbearance in dealing
with them. The great danger to us is in not taking and
implementing positions that will enable us to achieve our
objectives and will assure us of their friendship and
support.
2. soviet interests in south asia
In telegram No. 3304 of December 1, 1947 the Embassy in Moscow,
in discussing a lengthy lead article in the important Soviet
publication “World Economics and World Politics”, highlighted
the possibilities with respect to Soviet interests in India and
South Asia as follows:
“This authoritative restatement of Communist doctrine may
well portend a shift in major Kremlin efforts towards the
East. It seems to reflect loss of confidence in imminence of
an economic crisis in USA and in possibilities of further
Soviet gain in Europe in the face of Marshall Plan
developments and growing European antagonism to Soviet
aggressive tactics. If Europe can indeed be held firm and if
we become deeply committed on the continent in the process,
we may then see the Kremlin turn to direct development and
exploitation of what Stalin termed the ‘great reserves of
the revolution in the colonies and dependent
countries’.”6
[Page 15]
More recent developments indicate that the Kremlin is at least
preparing the way for greater Communist activity in South Asia.
Within the past year the USSR has established an Embassy in New
Delhi which is reported to have become a focal point of contact
with subversive Communist elements in India. The Soviets have
entered into agreements to establish diplomatic missions in
Pakistan and Burma, and continue to maintain an active Embassy
in Afghanistan. Soviet provocateurs have been intermittently
active in northern Afghanistan, and agents of the Soviet Embassy
in Kabul reportedly have been in contact with the Afghan tribes
of the North West Frontier.
In recent years Soviet trade with South Asian countries has been
confined to imports of such products as jute and jute
manufactures, shellac, graphite, wool, tea and peanuts. Two
trade agreements have been concluded between the USSR and
Afghanistan since the war, and India and Pakistan have entered
into commodity barter arrangements with the Soviets. The USSR
has attempted, thus far without success, to make an agreement
with Ceylon for the bulk purchase of that country’s rubber
production. A Czechoslovakian technical commission has visited
India, Pakistan and Afghanistan to arrange for the setting up of
Czechoslovak industries; a number of Czech nationals have
recently been employed in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and there
are indications that the South Asian countries have been
encouraged to think that arms, ammunition and the machinery for
their manufacture might be available from Czechoslovakia.
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania are other satellite
countries which have shown an interest in developing diplomatic
and trade relations with South Asia.
In various organizations of the United Nations, Soviet
representatives have attempted, often with a degree of success,
to create an alignment between the USSR and the South Asian
countries on various UN questions pertaining to racial
discrimination, imperialism, trusteeship, etc.
Through its instruments, the various Communist Parties in the
South Asian countries, the USSR has concentrated its efforts in
South Asia on a campaign of virulent anti-Western propaganda
aimed particularly against the U.S. and Great Britain. This
propaganda is widely circulated in South Asia and appears in
various expressions of public opinion, ranging from the extreme
left to considerably right of center. All possible means have
been utilized to build up popular support among workers,
peasants, and communal refugees to achieve Communist objectives
and discredit political leaders not amenable to Soviet aims. In
India, industrial strikes and unrest, coupled with increasingly
hostile attacks on the Nehru Government, have been
manifestations of Communist activity; while in Burma the
Communists
[Page 16]
are engaged
in open insurrection against the Government of Burma.
The Soviets have advantages over us in this developing struggle
for South Asia. The political foment and economic distress
obtaining in most of the South Asian countries, combined with
their weak military defenses, make this area particularly
susceptible to Communist penetration. Soviet authorities are
keenly aware of the issues involved and of the anti-foreign and
anti-imperialist temper of the people which predisposes them to
suspect the motives and objectives of the Western powers. Since
there was no direct Soviet contact with any of these countries,
except Afghanistan, prior to the withdrawal of the British, no
disillusion or suspicion of Communist doctrine has matured among
the people. To most of these people, therefore, Communist
propaganda still glitters untarnished and attractive.
We also have advantages over the Soviets. Among the more
enlightened of these peoples our traditional sympathy for
dependent countries has left a legacy of trust and good will,
though the positions we have until very recently taken with
respect to national movements in Indochina and Indonesia have
weakened the effectiveness of this legacy. Among the educated
classes, particularly in India, many of the younger leaders were
educated in the U.S. and have retained an affection for this
country. The U.S. is at present the outstanding or only source
of the capital goods, technical know-how and financial support
which these countries desire for their economic development. In
the military sphere the principal armies of South Asia are now
equipped largely with British and U.S. material, thus having
effected military standardization with the Western democracies;
and so long as they remain dependent upon us for their
continuing requirements it is unlikely that they would or could
turn against us. Due to their traditional religious-social
order, which is the antithesis of Communism, many of the peoples
of South Asia are naturally resistant to the Communist doctrine.
This influence is being revealed in India where some of the
provincial governments have declared the Communist Party illegal
and arrested Party leaders.
3. importance of south asia to u.s.
national interest
While it is beyond the scope of this paper comprehensively to
estimate the economic and military potentials of the South Asian
countries, we believe that their magnitude is such that the loss
to the U.S. of access to the raw materials and present and
possible productive capacity, manpower and military bases of
this area, or Communist control of the area and its vast
population, would gravely affect the security of the U.S. Such
an eventuality would prevent the development in these countries
of political and economic principles compatible
[Page 17]
with our own and would thus
adversely affect our future trade and investment relationships
with these countries. Moreover, any substantial decrease in
South Asian exports to Europe might also have an adverse effect
on the European Recovery Program. The following facts appear to
support this generalization.
a. Strategic importance
The geographical position of South Asia is such that, if the
economic and military potentials of the area were more fully
developed, it could dominate the region of the Indian Ocean arid
exert a strong influence also on the Middle East, Central Asia
and the Far East. The Indian subcontinent, with its several good
ports in India and Pakistan, is readily accessible to us by sea.
The sea lanes leading to these ports are through waters which
are presumed to be fairly safe to us from attack by Soviet air
or naval forces. The best rail, motor and air transport system
in Asia leads from these ports and serves the zone of the
interior. The defensive position of the interior, against ground
movement of Soviet forces from Central Asia, is favored by
mountain ranges which form one of the most formidable natural
barriers on earth. The strategic passes through these mountains,
most of which occur in Afghanistan, are presently controlled by
an armed population which alone is capable of Creating some
delay against Soviet military penetration. During the recent war
the air bases of eastern India and Burma proved of importance in
carrying the war to the enemy in the Far East; and so long as
the defense of the Afghan frontier remains secure to us the air
bases at Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar might prove
equally important in conducting air operations against the
industrial areas of the Soviet Heartland, or in defending Middle
East oil.
[Here follow subparagraphs b and c, dealing with “Military (Manpower)
Potential” and “Economic Potential”, respectively.]
4. present economic and financial
requirements of south asia
The hope of economic progress in the countries of South Asia is
generally related to their ability to maintain, or in the case
of Burma restore, law and order, and to mobilize their own
resources, and to their further needs for capital goods,
technical skills and dollars. These needs cannot yet be
described in detail in terms of the volume of imports or of the
outside financing required. The hopes and plans of these
countries appear greatly to exceed the realities of early
accomplishment. More investigation and evaluation would be
necessary before the economic desires prevalent in South Asia
could be formulated in terms of individual need and projects
arranged in accordance with practically conceived plans. Some
assistance in this task may be provided by various working
parties of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, of
which the U.S. is a member. Until this and related work is
completed, there are inadequate bases for appraising the
magnitude of the economic and financial requirements
[Page 18]
of the area in realistic
terms. Furthermore, such an appraisal must include consideration
of the practical bases on which economic cooperation can be
carried forward, as the fear of foreign economic “domination” is
widespread in this area, where U.S. private capital has found
few favorable conditions for entry.
In the case of India, in addition to the primary need for capital
goods, the most serious problem impinging directly upon economic
relations with the U.S. is the deficit which the Indian economy
is experiencing in its transactions with the dollar area.
Although historically India has exported more to the U.S. than
it has imported from the U.S., the post-war demand for consumer
and capital goods has reversed the pre-war trade pattern to the
point where India suffered an adverse balance of payments with
the U.S. in 1947 amounting to approximately $200,000,000. India
has attempted to meet this problem by restricting imports, by
drawing on the central dollar reserves of the sterling area, and
by drawing against its International Monetary Fund quota of
$400,000,000. Of these practices a severely restricted import
policy is counter to our concept of expanding multilateral
trade, and substantial drawings on the central dollar reserves
of the sterling area are opposed to our desire to maintain the
financial stability of the U.K.
In Pakistan, as in India, dollar requirements are met out of
earnings plus drafts on the sterling dollar pool. In its trade
with the U.S., Pakistan is presently earning a small dollar
surplus; but this is due to import restrictions on all
non-essential goods, and this surplus would soon turn into a
serious deficit should Pakistan purchase more of the capital
goods so badly needed for essential development. As in the case
of India, the practice of restricting imports and substantial
drawing on the sterling dollar pool is contrary to our concept
of expanding multilateral trade and maintaining the financial
stability of the U.K. Pakistan’s requirements differ from
India’s in that Pakistan is primarily agrarian and its basic
industry has yet to be established. Pakistan’s need for capital
goods, therefore, is proportionately greater. This, plus its
military requirements, and the urgent desire to place their new
country on a firm over-all financial footing was the basis of
the Pakistan Government’s informal request in late 1947 for a
U.S. Government loan7 of some
2,000,000,000 [200,000,000?]. Pakistan’s
economic position, being unbalanced as between industry and
agriculture, also more clearly emphasizes the need for
interregional cooperation and especially for Indo-Pakistan
economic cooperation.
[Page 19]
In Afghanistan, also, there is the problem of financing the
essential imports of consumer goods and military stores while
proceeding with development plans. Afghan consumer goods are
normally imported largely from India and Pakistan, where they
are now being procured and balances settled through the sale of
dollars because poor transport and marketing facilities have
recently impeded the sale of Afghan products and the
accumulation of adequate rupee exchange. Present development
plans call for an increase of agricultural output, establishment
of light industries, development of natural resources and
improvement of communications and transport; several projects
have already been undertaken by an American firm which requires
dollar payments. Nearly 95% of Afghanistan’s dollar earnings is
derived from the sale of Karakul furs in the U.S., and this
fluctuates with the fur market. In 1946 they received from this
source $34,000,000; in 1947 less than $2,000,000; and in the
first half of 1948 about $29,000,000. Their main economic
requirements, therefore, are for better inter-regional economic
cooperation to provide the rupee exchange necessary to obtain
consumer goods in India and Pakistan with local currencies, and
for some U.S. financial assistance to insure completion of their
development projects. It is mainly for this latter purpose that
the Afghan Government has approached us to determine the
prospects of a U.S. loan.
Since Burma has become so embroiled in civil strife, the trend in
that country has been more toward economic disintegration and
requests for military supplies than for the means of economic
rehabilitation and development. Pending the outcome of this
conflict, therefore, an appraisal of Burma’s economic and
financial requirements, and of our interest in furnishing them,
cannot well be made. As a member of the sterling area Burma now
obtains most of its dollars from the central reserves of the
U.K. Since Burma is normally the largest world exporter of rice,
and may again become an important world source of tungsten, tin,
lead and zinc—all of which are now in short supply—Burma might
obtain additional dollars if the U.S. were to purchase these
materials.
Nepal has announced its intention to develop local industries and
agriculture, and is negotiating with American firms for an
economic survey of the country as the first step toward such
development. Nepal’s principal economic requirement is for the
dollar exchange needed to carry out this program. Currently,
Nepal is dependent on India for such limited dollar exchange as
it obtains; and Nepal now wishes to enter into an arrangement
whereby all foreign exchange arising out of the export of
Nepalese products through India would accrue to Nepal.
[Page 20]
Ceylon’s present dollar position is comparatively good, and this
country has requested several types of U.S. technical
assistance.
In accordance with our general policies of promoting an expanded
multilateral world trade, of recognizing the world-wide need for
accelerated economic development and of upholding the principles
of international cooperation, this Government desires, within
the limits of its resources, to assist the countries of South
Asia to raise their standards of living and to increase their
productive capacities. This desire is consonant with one of the
principal elements of our objectives in this area: to maintain
the orientation of these countries towards the U.S. and Western
democracies and away from the USSR. It is likewise consistent
with our interest in obtaining, within the next few years,
maximum supplies of strategic materials from South Asia, and it
reflects the belief that capital exports to these countries can
in some measure prove to be a stabilizing influence on the level
of U.S. production and employment by increasing or retaining
foreign markets for U.S. goods.
As yet we have not included the South Asian countries in that
limited group to whose needs we are giving specially favorable
consideration, because the development needs of all areas now
carry a lower priority for short supplies than do reconstruction
and rehabilitation needs. Until now we have held that private
investment should be the principal means of U.S. financial
assistance to these countries for the further development of
their economy. We have held that, when private capital is not
available, we should lend support to their applications for
loans from the International Bank or the Export-Import Bank for
individual development projects, but that our interests in South
Asia, in view of our broader commitments in other theaters, do
not warrant special treatment with respect to the supply of
capital goods or direct U.S. Government credits which require
Congressional approval. We are endeavoring, however, to assist
the South Asian countries by making available, from public and
private sources, technical assistance for the improvement and
rehabilitation of their economies.
It is present U.S. policy to permit the export of goods subject
to official quotas (none of which represents an obligation on
suppliers) in the largest possible quantities consistent with
the effective functioning of our domestic economy. The Secretary
General of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has
been informed of this policy, in answer to the recent appeal by
a majority of the Commission to make available to Asian
countries “an adequate share” of our production of capital goods
and basic materials. Furthermore, an increased world production
of essential commodities (including capital goods) is expected
to result from the rehabilitation and recovery
[Page 21]
of Europe and certain Far Eastern
countries, to which the U.S. is now contributing an
unprecedented volume of financial assistance, and such an
increase will materially help to establish the basis in South
Asia for economic progress. This progress, in turn, may result
in improved conditions that will provide foundations for stable
democratic governments, friendly to the U.S.
Meanwhile, as U.S. resources are limited, it is urgent that we
reappraise the existing financial and other means at our
disposal and explore the possibilities of utilizing additional
methods of economic assistance to the area, in order to
determine the extent and character of the aid which is consonant
with our own interests.
In formulating and carrying out any such assistance, we should
avoid adopting procedures or imposing conditions which would
afford our critics in and outside the area a basis for charging
us with attempts at “economic domination”. We should utilize to
the fullest possible extent the facilities of the U.S.
Information Service to explain to the people of South Asia the
nature of our programs and objectives.
5. present military requirements of south
asia
Out of a total population of more than 440,000,000 the total
strength of the ground forces of all the South Asian countries
has recently stood only at about 602,000 regular troops, plus
various irregular security forces. By countries these forces are
distributed approximately as follows:
|
Population |
Ground Forces |
| Afghanistan |
11,000,000 |
72,000 |
| Pakistan |
75,000,000 |
137,000 |
| India |
317,690,000 |
*310,000 |
| Burma |
15,000,000 |
†34,000 |
| Nepal |
5,600,000 |
45,000 |
| Ceylon |
6,500,000 |
4,000 |
Due to the political unrest which now pervades the area and to
the presence of militant forces within the area (Afghan tribal
forces, Indian States forces, Gurkha warrior castes, etc.),
which are not yet fully welded to the merging national
authorities, these military forces of the South Asian countries
are barely sufficient to meet existing demands for the
maintenance of internal security. It should be realized that a
collapse of law and order throughout the area, similar to that
already evident in large parts of Burma, would seriously affect
[Page 22]
our national
interests. Exports of strategic materials might be drastically
reduced or stopped altogether. Trade in general would be
curtailed, and foreign investments in South Asia would be
jeopardized. Progressive economic and political development in
the area would cease, and the stage would be set for the seizure
of power by extremist elements of the left or right. The impact
would be felt not only on our own economy and strategic
considerations, but also in the countries of the Commonwealth
and Western Europe. Law and order need not collapse if the South
Asian governments, which enjoy solid bases of popular support,
have the military means to put down local disturbances and
contain existing subversive elements and tribal groups. We
should weigh carefully the possible consequences of withholding
from these governments the minimum essential supplies of foreign
military matériel required for the maintenance of internal
security.
We should consider also the position of the South Asian countries
vis-à-vis powerful aggressors from outside the area. It is
evident that these countries, singly or jointly, could not in
the foreseeable future effectively resist a full-scale invasion
by the USSR. However, in view of the natural strategic
advantages of the area, the military strength of Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India might be built up to a point which would
enable them to contain a small-scale attack designed to seize
certain key points such as the port of Karachi and the airfields
of northern Pakistan. This would have the negative virtue of
requiring the USSR to make a major effort to achieve its
objectives. In the light of the existing commitments of the U.S.
and the U.K., and the strained relations among Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India, it would be unrealistic to propose the
necessary strengthening of the armed forces of the three South
Asian countries at present. The possibilities should, however,
be noted.
The considerations set forth in the two preceding paragraphs
notwithstanding, the present trend, owing to the lack of
replacement equipment, spare parts, etc., is toward a decrease
of either the efficiency or the strength of the military
establishments of the South Asian governments. None of the
countries in the area is yet able fully to supply its own armies
with equipment of its own manufacture. All are presently
equipped with matériel formerly obtained from British and U.S.
sources. To maintain their present strength, as their stores
become exhausted, they are now turning to the U.S. as a primary
source of supply. To the extent that the South Asian countries
seek spare parts for and replacements of matériel of U.S.
origin, their requests merit careful consideration in the light
of SANACC 360/5, approved
July 26, 1948,8 which points out the importance of
recognizing
[Page 23]
the
continuing spare part and replacement needs of countries which
have obtained U.S. matériel. Should the cost of such spare parts
and replacements be so great as to constitute a serious
diversion from the recipient country’s funds for economic
development it might be necessary, as also contemplated in
SANACC 360/5, to give
consideration to extending U.S. financial assistance to the
countries so affected.
6. requests of south asian countries for
u.s. military matériel and assistance
Requests thus far received from the countries of South Asia for
U.S. Military matériel and assistance, and the action taken
thereon, are as follows:
a. Afghanistan
For all practical purposes Afghanistan is almost totally
dependent on foreign sources for its military requirements. Up
to now the Afghan Army has obtained from the U.S. only surplus
hospital and non-combatant equipment, through the purchase for
cash of U.S. surplus property in India in 1945. In June of 1946
the Afghans approached the U.S. for other military supplies. A
further approach was made in 1947, … In April 1948 they
informally requested a U.S. loan of $100,000,000 to finance a
12-year economic development program and to provide for their
military requirements, and although this figure has since been
reduced, the request is still pending. As to their military
requirements alone, they informed our Embassy in Kabul on July
29, 1948 that for internal security they were presently in need
of approximately 24 to 36 light tanks, 120 4.2 inch mortars, 40
AT–6 type aircraft, and matériel to equip one motorized division
of 4,000 to 6,000 men. Since none of these Afghan requirements
has yet been presented to us as formal requests, no positive
action has been taken on these approaches.
b. India
At present India is able to produce large quantities of small
arms and ammunition, uniforms and leather equipment, but is
largely dependent on foreign sources for planes, tanks, ships,
heavy ordnance, etc. Of these latter categories the Indian Army
is partly equipped with U.S. lend-lease and surplus property
material. During 1948 the Indian Military Attaché, Col. Kaul,
approached the Departments of State and Army to obtain medium
bombers and other military equipment for the Indian armed
forces. He wished to order 12 B–25 Mitchell bombers for delivery
in May 1948 and 31 additional B–25’s for subsequent delivery. He
also informally indicated the interest of the Government of
India in long-term military collaboration between India and the
U.S.
At the time of Col. Kaul’s approach the Department of State was
in the final stage of reaching its determination, subsequently
approved by the President, that in view of the threat of war
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir it was not consonant
with the foreign policy of the U.S., while this issue was under
review by the UN, to authorize the sale or transfer of combat
matériel, which would
[Page 24]
increase existing military strength, to either India or
Pakistan9 pending a clarification of the situation.
At the same time the Department of State was advised by the
Department of the Air Force that no medium bombers of the type
desired by India were then available as surplus to the needs of
the U.S. military establishment. It was accordingly decided to
discourage Col. Kaul from making further requests of this
nature.
On April 2 the Deputy Foreign Minister of India, Sir Girja
Bajpai, called at the Department of State10 and
stated that, with the full knowledge and authority of Prime
Minister Nehru, he would like to propose the sending of an
Indian military mission to the U.S. at an early date to explore
the possibilities of obtaining military equipment in this
country. In making this request he gave assurances that the
principles for which the U.S. and India both stand are identical
and that India would under no circumstances align itself with
the Soviet Union in a war between that country and the U.S. Sir
Girja was informed that the proposal would be considered; but he
was reminded that, not only because of the present U.S. arms
policy with respect to, India and Pakistan but also because of
our own present arms requirements, it might not be feasible to
do very much for India.11
Recently members of the Indian Embassy, including the Indian
Military Attaché, have informally approached the State
Department to express a desire for a greater exchange of
military information between the two countries. This problem has
been partly met by: (1) having India classified upwards to the
category of countries receiving “restricted” U.S. military
information; (2) making a deliberate effort to furnish the
Indian Military Attaché here with relatively harmless but
somewhat impressive military information; and (3) urging the
U.S. Army to continue Indian officer students in U.S. Army
Service Schools.
On June 7, 1948, Mr. Chopra, First Secretary, Embassy of India,
requested informally the probable reaction of the U.S.
Government to a formal request from India to import arms and
ammunition from the U.S. to be used exclusively in the Indian
military training program.12 He stated that the Government of India
would be prepared to give formal assurance that the arms and
ammunition imported would in fact be used for training and would
under no circumstances be employed in Kashmir. The items
requested included:
| 75 mm. how |
209,000 |
rounds |
| 75 mm. gun |
100,000 |
” |
| 75 mm. gun, smoke |
46,000 |
” |
| 37 mm. HE |
150,000 |
” |
| 37 mm. Cannister |
32,000 |
” |
| 30 cal. Browning (mixed
belts) |
12,000,000 |
” |
| Grenade, rifle, practice |
17,000 |
” |
[Page 25]
The Department of the Army has determined that these quantities
are completely reasonable and that they represent on a per
capita basis approximately 75% of the amounts normally required
by U.S. troops for training purposes. In reply to this request
representatives of the Indian Embassy were informed on July 29
that the supply of this ammunition from U.S. sources could not
be approved because it would be in violation of the U.S. policy
not to supply war matériel to either India or Pakistan until the
situation in Kashmir had clarified.
On July 30, 1948 the Indian representatives inquired whether the
U.S. included spare parts for out-dated Stuart tanks among those
items which were excluded for export from the U.S. to India.
They were informed in November 1948 that the export of spare
parts for equipment of U.S. origin was not precluded.13 The Indians have stated that while the
Government of India understands the U.S. position with regard to
such temporary situations as the Kashmir problem, it was also
faced with long-range as well as short-range military planning,
and the time was coming when India, in order to evolve its
long-range planning, would have to know “where it stood” with
the U.S. Government in the over-all evaluation of what
international contribution might be made by India in the event
of further deterioration in international relations in
general.
c. Pakistan
The new Government of Pakistan, which came into being with no
munitions industry and only a modicum of equipment from Indian
stores, approached the Department of State in October–November
1947 with the request for U.S. financial aid over the next
5-year period to include, inter alia, the
following defense items:
Army—$170,000,000. To provide for a
regular army of 100,000 to consist of one armored division,
five infantry divisions partly motorized, and a small
cavalry establishment; and to provide for replacement and
remodeling of existing arms and equipment, supplies and
ammunition, equipment for ordnance factories, raw materials
and payment of personnel.
Air Force—$75,000,000. To provide for
twelve fighter squadrons (150 planes), four fighter
reconnaissance squadrons (70 planes), three bomber squadrons
(50 planes), four transport squadrons (50 planes), four
training wings (200 planes), together with necessary
replacements, ground facilities, and payment of
personnel.
Navy—$60,000,000. To provide for four
light cruisers, sixteen destroyers, four corvettes, twelve
coast guard gunboats, three submarines, 120,000 tons
miscellaneous facilities with necessary ammunition, base
equipment, etc.
It was obvious from this approach that Pakistan was thinking in
terms of the U.S. as a primary source of military strength, and
that this would involve virtual U.S. military responsibility for
the new dominion. Since no legal authority existed for granting
U.S.
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financial aid to
Pakistan for this purpose, and since the time was not considered
opportune for seeking such authority, our reply to this Pakistan
request was negative. Furthermore, it was not yet clear what
role the British were to fulfill in the military affairs of the
new dominions, nor what U.S. military policy toward South Asia
would eventually be. Of the other requests received at that time
for financial aid, however, a WAA credit of $10,000,000 was granted Pakistan for
medicine and other material for refugee relief.
Since that time we have received requests from the Pakistan
Embassy for 30—AT–6 training planes, spare parts for AT–6 planes
already possessed by the Pakistan Air Force, and for information
regarding sources in this country where the Government of
Pakistan might obtain maintenance spares for Stuart tanks,
Sherman tanks, and tracked carriers which are now possessed by
the Pakistan Army. After considerable deliberation, it was
finally determined that, provided suitable guarantees were
given, the sale of training planes and parts of the type
requested was not incompatible with the informal embargo
mentioned above in connection with India, and accordingly the
Department of State has approved export licenses for these
items. The Pakistan Embassy was informed in November 1948 that
the exports of spare parts for equipment of U.S. origin was not
precluded.
In May 1948 the British Government requested that the U.S.
approve the transfer, from British lend-lease stores to the
Government of Pakistan, of 5,198,000 rounds of .30 caliber and
1,091,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. This request was
refused because it was considered that such a transfer would
violate the informal arms embargo mentioned above.
d. Burma
Burma has no munitions industry, and the Burmese Government
recently found itself lacking adequate supplies of automatic
weapons, small arms, ammunition, communications equipment and
aircraft for its campaign against insurgent Communists. In his
telegram No. 130 of April 3, 1948,14 Ambassador Huddle informed the
Department of State that the Burmese Foreign Minister had
requested U.S. assistance to the extent of providing six fighter
bombers, 400 field wireless sets, 1,000 Thompson sub-machine
guns or Sten guns and 30 armored cars. The Ambassador suggested
that the Foreign Minister try to obtain these supplies through
the British Defense Mission before calling upon the U.S. for
aid. The Foreign Minister followed this advice and was
successful in obtaining some of this equipment, at which time,
also, we consented to the British request to retransfer to Burma
12,000 rounds of .50 caliber Lend-Lease ammunition. Since then,
however, our Military Attaché in Burma reports that on August
18, 1948, our Embassy in Rangoon was again informally approached
by the Burmese with the request that the U.S. supply the
Government of Burma immediately 10,000 carbines, 1,000 light
machine guns, 1,000 Bren guns or equivalent, 1,000 light machine
guns, and 300 heavy machine guns. The British were also being
asked at that time to supply additional arms and equipment. On
September 4, 1948, in an
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official note to our Embassy in Rangoon,15 the Government of Burma
requested to buy from the U.S. 5,000 carbines with 2,250,000
rounds of ammunition and 150 jeeps, stating that of their long
list of essential needs these items were available only from the
U.S. and that most of the other items were being supplied by the
British. The British Ambassador supported this request. Our
Embassy at Rangoon, on September 20, 1948, informed the
Government of Burma that although we approve its efforts to
quell the insurrection, we cannot supply the desired military
equipment owing to the heavy requirements of the U.S. Army and
previous commitments elsewhere. The Embassy mentioned that the
desired equipment or suitable substitutes might be available by
purchase from U.S. commercial sources, but pointed out that the
issuance of export licenses would depend upon world conditions
prevailing at the time the equipment might be ready for
shipment.
e. Nepal and Ceylon
There have been no requests by either Nepal or Ceylon for
military assistance from the U.S.
7. desirability of consultation with the
british
The U.K. does not at present possess sufficient economic or
military resources to supply South Asian countries with either
substantial amounts of the capital goods and technical skills
needed for their economic rehabilitation and development, or all
the military equipment needed for the maintenance of their
internal security. Despite this situation and a concomitant
drastic reduction of British responsibilities in the area,
British commercial and financial interests still constitute the
leading foreign element in most of the economies of South Asia,
and British advisers on military matters occupy important,
though temporary, posts in former British possessions.
Accordingly, it appears that an effective and economical U.S.
policy should take into account the position of the British and
that some form of consultation with them, on political, economic
and military matters, should precede our own decisions. We have
had informal indications from the British that they are
interested in such discussions.
Consultation on economic matters appears premature until we have
completed a re-appraisal of our ability to contribute to the
economic and financial needs of the area; it should, of course,
not leave the impression that we wish to de-limit spheres of
influence or to divide markets with the British. Meanwhile, we
should continue to keep abreast of developments affecting the
area with respect to balance of payments problems, sterling
balance releases, the effects of European recovery on South
Asian trade, prospective treaty relations with the British, and
British ability to furnish technical advice to these
countries.
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In the military sphere, we should wish to explore with the
British the extent to which they can continue to assume
responsibility for meeting the military requirements of the
South Asian area. Bearing in mind our commitments elsewhere, it
would appear to be in our interest for the British to bear as
great a share of this burden as they possibly can. Moreover, we
should wish to make certain that matériel supplied by the U.S.
and the U.K. would be complementary and related both to the
specific justifiable needs of the area for internal security and
to the broader requirements of global strategy.
8. necessity for regional approach by
u.s.
We may defeat our own purpose if by extending assistance to any
one country in this area we alienate the friendship of one or
more of the other South Asian powers. Certain of these
countries, particularly India and Pakistan, do not yet enjoy
good relations with one another. If U.S. assistance is made
available to one the others will increase their pressure for
comparable aid. In considering any program of assistance to the
area, therefore, a regional approach is necessary, keeping in
mind, of course, that internal conditions an individual
countries must always be taken into account.
On the other hand, India is the natural political and economic
center of South Asia and aid given to the peripheral countries
would have to be adapted to conditions in India.
9. desirability of regional
cooperation
Even if U.S. aid is extended to the South Asian countries on a
regional basis there remains the possibility, due to continuing
internal and inter-regional conflicts, that the combined power
potential of South Asia may never develop in the foreseeable
future if the individual countries are left to their own
devices. U.S. assistance to these countries may not contribute
to our own national interest unless it contributes to the
improvement of their internal stability and better relations
with each other. Due to the momentum of movements which are
already set in motion in South Asia, a period of internal and
interregional conflict is perhaps inevitable. Whether this will
eventually lead to greater regional cooperation or greater chaos
remains to be seen. The possibility of its leading to greater
chaos must now be accepted as a calculated risk. To minimize
this risk and thereby promote our own objectives, any plan for
U.S. assistance should be used as far as practicable as an
instrument to effect cooperation within the region.
10. joint chiefs of staff summary of
strategic considerations
Attention is invited to the Joint Chiefs of Staff summary of
strategic considerations with respect to South Asia, as set
forth in paragraph 5 of Appendix “C”. In this connection, it is
observed that the effective use of the Karachi–Lahore area in
Pakistan might well depend upon access to facilities in India as
well as Pakistan.
