891.00/4–2949: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
priority
576. Embtels 558, April 26 and 564, April 28. Prime Minister’s letter to me, while it deals at length with economic matters, it is primarily political. It is a document to which we must attach great importance, give prompt consideration and reply at an early date.
Fact that US has given vast sums to aid large areas of world, especially Turkey, has created no obligation on US to give aid to Iran. Politically, however, it has created a pressing obligation on Government of Iran towards its own people to obtain such aid.
[Page 515]Iran is of course aware of pending consideration by World Bank of requests for financial aid submitted by certain of its neighbors. It is however, our aid to Turkey, both military and economic, which has become an obsession with Iranian leaders. On this subject I have been badgered by Shah, harassed by Foreign Minister and wearied by Chief of Staff. They know that a substantial road-building program in Turkey is being financed from funds advanced for military aid and that in addition to military aid, Turkey is greatly benefitting from ECA support.
All this presents an enigma to the Iranian mind. Iran, in opinion of Iranians, is more exposed, more vulnerable, and from a strategic point of view, more important. They see in execution of American policy a discrimination against Iran which might be most dangerous to them—as though US were putting up a road sign for benefit of Russians, “detour via Iran.”
The question posed is whether Iran can hope for anything like the type of assistance given Turkey, even on a modest scale. If so, the Government of Iran can be oriented in the sense we wish, if not we may expect resumption of a period of indecision and vacillation.
For the first time the Prime Minister has appealed in writing for our direct aid. I believe it essential to our interests to respond favorably to this request:
- (1)
- It would stiffen the Iranian’s spine by making it clear we consider Iran in same category as Turkey insofar as eligibility for assistance is concerned.
- (2)
- It would put Soviets further on notice re our interest in independence of Iran.
- (3)
- It would serve to associate foreign policy of Iran with that of western democracies.
Iran is in process of allocating considerable economic resources and is committed to pledging its credit to the seven-year economic development program. Effective military aid is therefore essential to assist in supporting Iranian military requirements.
Although there is still much that can wisely be done to fill up numerous chinks in the Iranian military establishment, Iran’s capacity to absorb military aid is of course limited. We must, however, scrupulously avoid any consideration of “token aid” in dealing with Iran and proceed rather on basis of our judgment as to its capacity effectively to absorb military aid.
Moreover, the political advantages gained from military aid as outlined above must be taken most seriously into consideration.
As regards economic assistance, Prime Minister’s letter has perhaps not put forward the best possible arguments but Department will [Page 516] doubtless recall that at time of Tehran Declaration1 we gave assurances to Iranian Government that we recognized Iran’s part in the war and would grant appropriate economic assistance to Iran for post-war rehabilitation. These assurances have been frequently reemphasized but glossed over. The key position which Iran occupies makes it all the more important that we extend more substantial aid. Unless means are soon found to bring about material improvements in living conditions of people of Iran, the Soviets will find increasingly fertile ground for subversive activities.
I realize that since Iran is outside of ECA it is difficult to extend direct economic aid, but possibly, following Turkish precedent, some indirect financial support on economic side could be given within military aid and applied to such closely related projects as roads, harbors, and landing fields. This would give great impetus to Seven-Year Plan and would permit Iran to devote its immediate resources to pressing improvements in fields of agriculture, sanitation and irrigation.
Prime Minister’s letter has presented us with a most serious decision. It is one that will influence policy here for the immediate future. Wise action now may avoid the need of a costly salvage operation later; perhaps too late.
- For the text of the Declaration regarding Iran, dated December 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 413. The Declaration was made at Tehran by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin.↩