891.20 Mission/4–2049
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Satterthwaite ) to the Coordinator for Military Assistance Programs ( Berkner )1
I assume you have seen the attached telegram no. 523 of April 20 from Tehran, which replies to the Department’s telegram no. 347 of April 18, a copy of which is also attached for your convenience.
In the light of Ambassador Wiley’s views, which correspond substantially to our own, this office believes it is necessary to eliminate specific mention of Iran by name from all documents dealing with the military aid program which may become public. I assume this would include the section in the Congressional presentation book since I understand that it is anticipated this will not remain confidential.
I do not think it is necessary to eliminate the small section on Iran in the draft brief for the Secretary’s meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow, since this is to be an executive session. However, I suggest that there be inserted in that section a notation to the effect that Iran will not be specifically mentioned by name in the public presentation and that the Secretary may wish to inform the Senators of this fact together with our reasons.
These reasons may be stated as follows: Iran definitely needs a certain small amount of military aid to balance the equipment of its existing forces and enable them fully to maintain internal security. This small amount, we consider, should be provided. However, the Iranian Government desires a very much greater degree of military assistance, considering that it should be on at least the same level as Turkey. To present a program to Congress in such a way that the small amount earmarked for Iran would become apparent would have a very adverse effect on the Iranian Government and Iranian public opinion, whereas if the amount is not apparent but is lumped in with other programs or as part of a contingency fund we shall have room to maneuver in our negotiations with the Iranian authorities.
As indicated, we remain firmly convinced that provisions should be made for a limited arms program to Iran during fiscal 1950. The only change we are recommending is in the manner of public presentation. You will recall, that from the beginning this particular question has been reserved for later decision, because we anticipated just the difficulty which Ambassador Wiley has emphasized in his telegram.
- Lloyd V. Berkner, administratively, was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.↩