Office of the Historian

761.91/4–1249: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 1

secret
Washington, April 18, 1949—4 p. m.

348. Urtel 491, Apr 12:2 1921 Treaty is considered valid (that is, legally binding). It has not been denounced by either party pursuant any clause in Treaty itself, has not been terminated by mutual consent of parties, has not been superseded by subsequent treaty concluded by parties, and has not been declared terminated by competent internatl tribunal (e.g., on ground of doctrine rebus sic stantibus); Art 6 is integral part that Treaty; therefore, Art 6 is valid, not null and void.

Altho Art 6 considered valid, it is applicable (that is, operative in situation contemplated by Treaty which wld permit Sov introduction troops into Iran) only if four conditions stipulated in Art itself and first para Rothstein Itr constituting Annex 2 which is integral part 1921 Treaty, co-exist. (See page 32, OIR Report 4619, Apr. 28, 1948.3)

Dept considers none of conditions contemplated by Treaty exists at present. Iran has categorically denied (1) Persia is being made into [Page 505] “base for mil operations against Russia”, (2) “there is threat of danger to frontiers” USSR from Iran, and (3) “Persian Govt finds itself unable to avert such danger”. FonMin, on behalf of Shah, has stated (4) activity in Iran hostile to USSR by “partisans of (Czarist) regime which has been overthrown or by its supporters” is inconceivable.

Dept’s views stated above for ur background info. Definitive answers to questions, particularly those on interpretation and application 1921 Treaty, cld be reached only by agreement of parties or decision of competent internatl tribunal.

Dept views relation 1921 Treaty and UN Charter are reflected Deptel 637, July 8, 1948,4 final para stating “Dept concurs fully” with conclusions Iran Emb attorneys re Sov rights under Art 6 1921 Treaty.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to London as 1330, Moscow as 233.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Not printed; the four conditions as set forth on page 32 read as follows:

    “(1) A third country (or party) must attempt by military interference to usurp control in Iran or to establish a base in Iran for military operations against the USSR;

    “(2) There must at the same time be a threat of danger to the frontiers of the USSR;

    “(3) Preparations must have been made for a considerable armed attack upon the USSR;

    “(4) The Iranian Government must be unable to remove the danger.”

    ↩
  4. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 158.↩