Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

761.91/3–2549: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran

secret

Washington, March 30, 1949—3 p. m.

296. London’s 35, Mar 24 and 38 Mar 25.¹ Brit FonOff through Emb Wash has requested Dept views on draft tel Bevin to Le Rougetel stating IranGov wld be wise adopt Shah’s suggestions (1) offer with draw Iran case from SC provided SovGovt agrees to allow Art 6 1921 Treaty be regarded null and void; (urtel 372, Mar 25²) and, (2) agree mutual withdrawal consular Reps from each others territories.

Re (1). Brit draft states chances SovGovt agreement remote but “friendly gesture” wld have tactical advantage for Iran in that Sov refusal wld strengthen Iran’s case before SC and world opinion. Draft continues, in unlikely event Sov acceptance, Moscow wld be deprived of powerful propaganda weapon and Iran quid pro quo wld only mean giving up immed advantage opportunity obtaining SC publicity and conceding Soviets possible advantage from delay Iran getting dispute again on SC agenda.

Re (2). Draft considers Iran advantage reciprocal withdrawal all consular Reps to be overwhelming, but admits non-consular Sov estabis wld remain focus for dissident elements Iran.

Dept views re (1) conveyed to Brit Emb as fols:

1. No compelling reason exists for Iran request deletion its case from SC agenda. No question has, until now, arisen over wisdom SC remaining seized of Iran case. Sov boycott Iran case during active SC consideration, Sov refusal subsequently report withdrawal troops, Sov complicity in Azerbaijan regime late 1946, and Sov persistence in pressure against IranGovt and fomenting dissidence among Iran people, all fully justify, in our mind, Iran acquiescence in SC retention Iran case. Sov representations, propaganda attacks, and border incidents during 1948 and increased pressure 1949 make more desirable than ever SC retention Iran case at this time. Iran advantage SC retention case (Moscow’s 759, Mar 26³) is attested by Sov Amb’s strongs, rptd pressure on this subject.

2. We recognize advantage to Iran of SovGovt laying down propaganda weapon represented by Art VI 1921 Treaty, but Sov record vis-à-vis Iran shows no indication any offer such surrender cld be bona fide. If Sov intentions were friendly, they shld be demonstrated by deeds and not by promise. Even if SovGovt shld act in good faith in promising abandon Art VI, it wld be doing no more than recognizing true legal status that Art at present time, in light of annexes 1921 Treaty and prevailing UN Charter which contemplates ref SC all disputes threatening peace. In using Art VI as quid pro quo, Iran wld be bargaining for a right already possessed.⁴

3. Since two elements proposed swap are different in character and in degree, public knowledge of such deal wld not redound Iran’s credit. Its complicated nature cld not appeal to world public opinion as bona fide, reasonable offer by Iran.

4. Shah wld be ill-advised proceed with proposed offer. On contrary. Shah wld be well-advised take full advantage Iran case SC by transmitting letter UN for info only SC transmitting evidences of developments bearing upon Iran case and refuting as yet uncontested Sov assertions legal basis unilaterally introduce troops into Iran under 1921 Treaty. As US UN Dei Austin told Iran UN Del Entezam in NY last spring, Iran has obligation keep SC fully informed evidence bearing upon its case of which SC is seized. That obligation is as yet unfulfilled. Suggested Iran communication SC shld have beneficial effect upon three publics: (a) Iran Govt and people wld understand for first time they are not under shadow of Sov legal right impair Iran’s territorial integrity and, therefore, might achieve desirable self-confidence in face of Sov war of nerves; (b) SovGovt cld no longer feel that silence implies acquiescence in heretofore unrefuted Sov assertions relevance 1921 Treaty and might be deterred from action which wld evoke armed Iran resistance and, therefore, serious threat to peace: and (c) Western Democracies wld be more ready support Iran realizing, contrary current press opinion, no semblance legality underlying Sov action against Iran.

5. Sec State has made statement requested by Iran Govt rejecting categorically Sov allegation of US activity in Iran hostile to USSR and Dept remains prepared take Iran communication SC as occasion support Iran position SC is appropriate arbiter disputes threatening peace.

Dept agrees with FonOff draft re mutual withdrawal Sov and Iran consular Reps, with suggestion IranGov release relevant exchanges of notes.

Consult Brit colleague on above subjects and in ur discretion convey substance above views Shah and other appropriate Iran officials.⁵

Acheson

1. These were repeats of telegrams 1161 and 1205, respectively, to the Department; neither printed.
2. Not printed; the Shah made this suggestion to Ambassador Wiley on March 24 and the Ambassador expressed “incredulous bewilderment.” Telegram 372 also noted that for some time, the Soviet Ambassador “had been bringing strong pressure to bear on Iran Government to withdraw its ease from SC agenda.” The Department, on March 31, informed Tehran that it was “quite surprised” to learn of this information and “to deduce IranGov has reacted such persistent pressure with equanimity.” (Telegram 299) Telegrams 372 and 299 are filed under 701.91/3–2549.
3. Not printed.
4. Ambassador Wiley, on March 29, had advised that he was “a little fearful that any Iranian attempt to horse trade with Russians at this time will end [in] disfavor Iranians. Moreover by entering into discussion with Soviets subject cancellation Article 6 there may be implied recognition its validity vis-à-vis Charter UN. In other words Iran Government if it does not proceed with scrupulous care and greatest caution could contribute to Soviet efforts to build up spurious juridical case for intervention.” (Telegram 402 from Tehran, 501.BC/3–2949)
5. This telegram was repeated to London as 1096, Moscow as 193, and to the United States Delegation at the United Nations, at New York, as 196. Ambassador Wiley discussed the content of telegram 296 with the Shah, Ambassador Le Rougetel, and Foreign Minister Hekmat. He informed the Foreign Minister that “If the Iranian Government was so unwise as to enter into a discussion of Article 6 with the Soviet Government, it could only be interpreted by public opinion that indeed there was something to discuss.” After a lengthy conversation, the Foreign Minister stated he was opposed to an approach to the Soviet Union on the matter (telegram 434, April 4, 3 p. m., from Tehran, 761.91/4–449).