Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

891.011/2–349: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Somerville) to the Secretary of State

secret

Tehran, February 3, 1949—6 p. m.

113. For Ambassador Wiley. Deptel 84, February 1. Your message was transmitted to Shah today. Please see immediately preceding telegram for my conversation with Le Rougetel on subject.¹ In view of fact that Shah had taken initiative in sending word to Le Rougetel re his proposals and that latter expects to see Shah for full discussion next few days, it seemed to me best that I transmit your message through an intermediary, leaving it to Le Rougetel to have the initial discussion with Shah.²

As intermediary I chose Ebtehaj³ because I knew he had discussed same subject with you last fall at Shah’s request and because he had recently been sent to see me (on another subject) by Shah. After I had outlined to Ebtehaj considerations set forth your telegram, he said although personally disappointed at prospect of further delay he would urge Shah give favorable consideration to first securing Majlis action on Seven Year Plan⁴ and then making effort secure favorable action on Senate.

Ebtehaj saw Shah and later today informed me of conversation. Shah apparently was greatly upset at suggestion his plans be delayed. According Ebtehaj, Shah although not inclined accept validity of our arguments against early action eventually said “final concession” he could make would be: first, to “have Senate bill passed” by present Majlis and then “when Senate and new Majlis meet” to bring up question constitutional reform. When I inquired of Ebtehaj whether this would mean there would be no action on constitutional reform for some months, he said this was so. When I added it would seem from Shah’s reference to “final concession” that Shah was erroneously assuming we were permanently opposed to all his proposals for constitutional reform, Ebtehaj said he made much the same observation to Shah, but latter did not seem convinced.

Ebtehaj added he thought “a lot would depend” on way Shah’s conversation with Le Rougetel goes.

I am, of course, informing Le Rougetel fully.

Sent Department; repeated London 17.

Somerville

1. No. 112, February 3, 5 p. m., not printed.
2. The Department, on February 7, instructed Tehran to request Ambassador Le Rougetel to emphasize the full concurrence of Ambassador Wiley in his representations to the Shah (telegram 113, 891.011/2–749).
3. Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran.
4. The Policy Statement on Iran, p. 474, in the section on economic subjects, relates that “In December 1946 the Morrison–Knudson International Company, Inc. was engaged by the Government of Iran to make a survey and report on the potentialities for economic development in the country. The draft Seven–Year Plan bill, approved in Majlis committees, is based on the findings of the Morrison–Knudson report. In October 1948, Iran signed a contract with Overseas Con sultants, Inc., a group of US engineering and management planning organizations, to make a study of economic and social conditions in Iran and make additional recommendations relating to Iran’s development program.”