868.20/11–3049: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 1
275. From McGhee. In conversation with me in Athens and during Istanbul Conference Ambassador Grady has expressed his sincere and serious apprehensions that Department, in attempts to conserve funds or find additional funds for military assistance to other areas, may reduce sums for Greek program to point endangering a very real success for American foreign policy that has been achieved in Greece. As Department is fully aware, Ambassador Grady has on numerous occasions this year and last, taken the lead in proposing large-scale economies in Greek aid funds and has worked tirelessly for earliest possible reduction Greek armed forces, as well as exercising tightest control over expenditure aid funds. I believe that we should give most thorough and careful considerations to Ambassador Grady’s line of thought as follows:
“Danger of guerrilla war is not great at present. There are, however, possible developments, such as installation of a Cominform regime in Yugoslavia, which could change the picture very quickly and again subject Greece to the active dangers of Russian imperialism. In any case, it is essential that Greece possess strong if reduced striking force to protect its borders from any large-scale infiltration of 11,000–12,000 guerrillas now in neighboring northern countries and to attain objectives set out in Department’s working paper ‘to discourage renewed [Page 464] guerrilla activity and to strike effectively at any attempts by Communists to revive such activity on a large scale’.
There is also the complementary question of morale of Greek people which has in past at times been dangerously low and has upon occasion constituted a serious obstacle to success of our efforts in all fields, political and economic as well as military. Drastic action with regard to reduction of American military aid and over-hasty demobilization might well again depress morale to dangerous level. We can carry out our plans for demobilization during calendar year 1950 only if we can retain full cooperation of Papagos and GGS and assistance of some of principal political figures including the King. For example, if the leaders drag their feet on proposed demobilization, which they can do if they choose, the ECA program will be adversely affected.
Greeks are understandably preoccupied with preservation their security. They feel they have been and again will be object of Russian direct or indirect invasion as soon as, if not sooner, than Western Europe. Latter has Atlantic Pact and MAP. Greeks have only MAP and I have frequently told them that military assistance for FY 1951 will be on relatively minor scale. Furthermore, despite its best efforts UN has been unable provide anything in nature of real protection for Greece. Greeks feel strongly necessity of some form of guarantee for their borders. They are not so insistent upon this matter as some other states, but sad experience has given them more than ample cause for concern with regard to this question. At our meetings in Istanbul all have agreed that conclusion of pacts in this part of world is not wise or practicable at this time. In view of the lack of any definite assurances and demonstrated inability of UN to cope with aggression against their country, Greeks realize full well that their only real security at present lies in their own forces. These factors should be taken into account in assessing military needs of a country as exposed as is Greece.
I want army reduced as quickly and to as great degree as is practically possible. I will continue make every effort to keep expenditures Greek aid funds to minimum consistent with our objectives and to this end will carefully review planned program and reply fully to Deptel Gama 592 shortly after my return to Athens.”
Although I believe Greece represents critical test case for our ability to reduce assistance and that we must move as soon as possible to reduce the total level of aid to Greece, I am impressed with Ambassador Grady’s argument and particularly with desirability not sacrifice hard-won gains of past two years. There is further consideration that Greek army may be of advantage in light new Balkan situation which was not envisaged original PL 75 policy and which I hope can be thoroughly evaluated by JCS soonest. In general, I believe too in giving benefit of doubt to man on spot. A decision as to actual reduction should, I believe, be based on technical analysis after Grady’s reply to Gama 59 has been received. However, I believe foregoing should be kept fully in mind as basis for such evaluation.