Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

868.20/11–749: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

secret

Washington, November 22, 1949—4 p. m.

Gama 59. Re Amag 79¹ and 82,² question specific allocation for Greece FY 50 undecided and in apportioning funds Dept will take fully into account ur views and those of Van Fleet as to minimum requirements to accomplish objective of program. That objective, reviewed below, shld be underlying principle in relation recommendation for mil aid.

Grk mil aid program designed for purpose supplying and equipping Grk forces to enable them successfully cope with guerrilla warfare existing within country, in reestablishing internal security. There has been no commitment concerning Amer aid to Grk forces after guerrilla menace reduced to police proportions. In light developments thus far, and considering threat further incursions by guerrilla forces now in neighboring countries, Dept considers objective of program during remainder FY to support Grk forces in (a) continued liquidation remaining guerrillas within Greece, and (b) preparing cope with any reactivation guerrilla hostilities resulting from return of forces now abroad, based on reasonable expectations in light all existing info. In latter connection, your own evaluation possibility further guerrilla activity is requested. There is no present intention utilize Amer aid funds in supplying Grk forces in preparing meet such eventuality as an outright invasion by fon troops, or for other purposes going beyond the objective indicated.

Dept therefore feels requirements must be set forth on basis of actual needs for program purposes within foregoing objective, without reference amt theoretically earmarked for Greece in Congressional appropriation. Dept cannot agree any commitment, moral or otherwise, not to reduce funds announced if not fully justified present US objective. In this connection Dept urgently needs tele info on program data upon which estimated $160 million minimum need is based in order plan magnitude program and in light thereof justify further current commitments. This shld include (a) rations, clothing and other consumable quartermaster supplies for troops, (b) ammunition and other consumable ordnance supplies, and (c) equipment program. Data shld include general plan for nr and types manpower and organizational units, and level of supply which program is intended accomplish. Also report on level supplies on hand and in pipeline. It shld also include extent to which program provides for stockpiles for use after end FY 50.³

Pending final determination fund allocation suggest Grks be not informed that fund reduction is contemplated, although impression to contrary shld be avoided. Understandable Grks wld be more susceptible cut in forces if assurance cld be given that dollar funds which otherwise wld go into rations and supplies for surplus troops wld be put into equipment program; however cogent argument shld be that unless forces are cut Greece cannot reap appreciable benefits ECA development program.

Foregoing of course does not exclude reappraisal at later date of objective in Grk Aid program in event JCS shld recommend long range mil objectives and NSC shld approve change in position re long-range US strategic interest in Greece. Every effort will be made obtain from JCS and NSC views in light present situation before final Grk allocation will be made.

Webb

1. Not printed, but see footnote 1 to the letter of October 23 from Grady to Diomedes, p. 440.
2. Telegram Gama 58, October 28, to Athens, not printed, suggested that further reductions in military assistance to Greece could be made in view of the favorable developments within Greece—perhaps to the extent of the $20 million in assistance which had been transferred the previous year from the Turkish program to the Greek program (840.50 Recovery/10–2049). In his telegram Amag 82, November 7, from Athens, hot printed, Grady replied that both he and General Van Fleet were greatly disturbed by the suggested reduction. They feared that the reduction would dangerously cripple the plan to leave a modern and effective military force in Greece (868.20/11–749).
3. In his telegram Amag 88, December 8, from Athens, not printed, Ambassador Grady presented the detailed program data requested here (868.20/12–849).