840.20/10–2849
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Constantine Tsaldaris, Foreign Minister of Greece. |
| Vassili Dendramis, Ambassador of Greece. | |
| The Secretary. | |
| John D. Jernegan, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. |
Mr. Tsaldaris began by saying that he had not come to discuss the UN questions. He did, however, wish to thank me for having settled [Page 448] a slight misunderstanding which had arisen between the Greek and American delegations at the General Assembly in New York. This question could now be regarded as finished.
He then read to me the attached Aide-Mémoire1 and went on to explain that in presenting this short document he was merely giving expression to his belief that the time had come to renew the talks on the general question of Greek inclusion in a defense pact that had been held last spring. Now that the Atlantic Pact was in force and that Greek Army forces were about to be reduced and British troops withdrawn from Greece, he felt that it was necessary to do something to prevent undesirable developments in Greece. He was, in fact, asking the questions “What can we do?” and “How far can we go?”.
I observed that the Aide-Mémoire seemed to relate solely to psychological considerations. I had been Acting Secretary at the time that the question of American support for Greece was raised by the British early in 1947, and I had presented the situation created by this to the President. Since then, the United States and Greece had been through two and a half difficult years. The United States have not incurred all that expense and effort in order to throw away the results. We had achieved more success than I had dared to hope for. Greece had been saved from the danger in which it stood. If Greece should be in trouble again our resources would again be available to assist her.
I did not feel, I said, that this was the time to discuss a new formal treaty. The United States had recently entered two large international groupings under the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic Pact. The commitments we had assumed with respect to western Europe were completely outside our history. We had not yet had time to see how this new engagement would work out. If our military aid to Europe and our participation in the North Atlantic Pact produced a gain in the strength of the European nations themselves, then our own commitments would be correspondingly reduced; we would be placed more or less in the position of re-insurers rather than direct insurers. We would no longer be the only force available for the defense of the peace in Europe. Following such a development, we might be able to consider an expansion of our formal commitments to other nations. Until we were sure that this would be the result of the steps already taken, I said I should be most averse to a new treaty relationship for [Page 449] the United States, because failure of the European nations themselves to gain in strength might well mean that we were already over-committed and should certainly avoid additional engagements.
What I wished to emphasize, however, was that Greece should be well-pleased by the underlying situation as it now stands. I reiterated that we in the United States were not foolish people. Greece should have no doubt that if she were again to be threatened, the United States would come to her aid.
Ambassador Dendramis mentioned that he had recently been talking to General Bradley and had urged him to visit Athens. The Ambassador felt that such a visit would be very good for the morale of the Greek people. I replied that the morale of the Greek people at the present time ought to be very good.
Mr. Tsaldaris then handed me the attached memorandum dated October 25 prepared by General Kitrilakis,2 which stresses the military importance to the western powers of a Balkan bloc consisting of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The Foreign Minister asked if it would not be well for Greece to renew conversations with Turkey and progress later to an attempt to draw Yugoslavia into the group. I merely said that we were entirely in agreement as to the importance of Yugoslavia. Mr. Tsaldaris went on to argue that according to his own military experts the Western powers would be greatly menaced without the assistance of the Balkan bloc which he was suggesting and might well lose the next war through loss of the Balkans. He did not pretend himself to be a military expert and he realized that it was possible our own military people might have other ideas. But he thought we might take some preliminary steps to consider the question.
Mr. Tsaldaris went on to argue that the Greek Army, by virtue of its recent combat experience, was an extremely important element in the Balkans. He remarked that the Turkish Army might or might not be effective; no one had had the opportunity to observe its qualities for the past twenty-five years. However, the Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav armies together would provide an important force.
In conclusion, I confined myself to assuring Mr. Tsaldaris that we would be glad to consider what was best to be done at the present time with respect to the suggestions he had made.
- The Greek Embassy Aide-Mémoire under reference here, dated October 28, not printed, set forth the views of the Greek Government that the time had arrived to consider a defense pact for the areas immediately east of the North Atlantic Treaty countries (868.20/10–2849).↩
- The memorandum under reference here, prepared by Lt. Gen. Stylianos Kitrilakis, Deputy Chief of the Greek National Defense General Staff, is not printed.↩