841.2368/10–2749
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan)
| Participants: | Major General Gruenther, Joint Chiefs of Staff.1 |
| Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. | |
| John D. Jernegan, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. |
General Gruenther called with respect to the attached message received by the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington from the British Chiefs of Staff.2 He said this had been communicated to the American Joint Chiefs earlier today and had been considered by them in preliminary fashion this afternoon. The initial reaction of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had been negative, but they had arrived at no decision because it was felt they needed more time to-study the question.
General Gruenther said that the Joint Chiefs felt the British Government had not “played ball” on this matter. On October 25, he said, the Joint Staff Mission had asked for the views of our military authorities on withdrawal of British troops from Greece and had suggested three alternatives: first, to withdraw only one of the three battalions; second, [Page 446] to withdraw two; and third, to withdraw the entire force. A reply had been requested next week, and it had been agreed that the American Joint Chiefs would give their answer on Tuesday, November 1. Yet, only twenty-four hours later, the British Government had taken its decision without waiting for any reply of any kind from the American military authorities.
Mr. Hare informed General Gruenther that Sir Derick Hoyer Millar, British Minister in Washington, had advised the Department at four o’clock this afternoon that the British Government had instructed its Ambassador in Athens to inform the Greek Prime Minister of the British intention to withdraw all British troops from Greece.3 In the face of this fait accompli, the Department had responded that from a political point of view we saw no objection to the decision but had pointed out that the matter was still under consideration in the Pentagon and that the British military authorities should clear the decision with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sir Derick had replied that if the American military authorities thought it necessary, he believed the British Government would be willing to keep a portion of the British units in Greece for a longer period. He understood that the physical withdrawal of all the units would take some time in any case and thought there would be no great difficulty about postponing the departure of, say, one battalion until Spring.
General Gruenther said that, if he had called earlier in the day, he would have suggested that the Department of State refrain from any comment at all, so that the United States Government could speak with one voice on the matter. Mr. Hare recognized the desirability of this but again pointed out that we had been confronted with a fait accompli and could not have taken any action which would have prevented the British notification to the Greek authorities. Furthermore the Department had taken pains to refer to the fact that this matter was the subject of the Anglo-United States military discussion and to observe that agreement on the military level would presumably be reached through established channels. Mr. Hare asked whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to have the Department make any further communication to the British Embassy, to put it on notice that the American military authorities might have reservations on this subject. General Gruenther said he did not wish to request any such action at this time, and believed that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs should be conveyed to the British through military channels, [Page 447] if, in fact, it developed that the Joint Chiefs wished to raise objections. He did not yet know whether the final decision would be to oppose or to accept the British action. He did feel, that the question had to be studied carefully as there were “danger areas” involved. He would advise the Department if any further action on our part should be deemed necessary by the Department of Defense.4
- Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Director, The Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
- The message of October 26, not printed, stated that Foreign Secretary Bevin had agreed that steps be taken to reduce the British garrison in Greece with a view to final withdrawal without undue loss of time.↩
- Telegram 2188, October 28, from Athens, not printed, reported that when he was informed by British Ambassador Norton of the impending withdrawal on October 27, Greek Prime Minister Diomedes asked if the British Government could not at least leave fifty or so soldiers. Norton replied that it was the British intention to withdraw all troops and as soon as practicably possible. (841.2368/10–2849)↩
- In a letter of November 22, not printed, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson informed Secretary of State Acheson that it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the withdrawal of the British brigade from Greece should be accomplished by the withdrawal of not more than two battalions in the immediate future. They believed the timing of the withdrawal of the last battalion should be deferred until a later date to be dependent upon the internal situation in Greece at the time. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which Secretary Johnson concurred, had been transmitted to the British Chiefs of Staff (841.2368/11–2249). In a reply dated December 5, not printed, Under Secretary of State Webb expressed the view that it would not be necessary for the Department of State to take any action in the matter in the light of the action already taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (841.2368/11–2249).↩