868.20/10–2349
The Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (Grady) to the Greek Prime Minister (Diomedes)1
Excellency: As Your Excellency is aware, there has recently been an exchange of views between the Greek military authorities and. American advisers concerning the best method of utilizing American military aid, now that the guerrilla warfare in Greece has been reduced to insignificant proportions. The American advice has been that the Greek Army should be sharply and progressively reduced in size. In this event American military aid might be utilized in such a way that by June 1950 Greece would possess a relatively small but modern, efficient and well-equipped Army backed by an adequate number of well-trained reserve forces. It has been pointed out that if the Greek Army were to remain at its present size, the largest proportion of American military assistance would necessarily continue to be devoted to expendable items, such as food and clothing. The result of such a policy would be that in June 1950 the Greek Army would be inadequately provided with artillery, transport and the other machines of modern warfare. It seems to me apparent that the American advice is in line with the best interests of Greece. I should like to emphasize, moreover, that the amount of American aid is strictly limited and is not sufficient to maintain Greek armed forces of the present size and concurrently to provide the capital equipment needed for a modern Greek army.
[Page 441]The economic consequences of maintaining an Army of the present size are of even more importance than the purely military implications. It is unnecessary to point out to such a distinguished economist as Your Excellency the adverse effects upon Greek recovery resulting from the continued maintenance of Greek armed forces totalling more than 260,000 men. The loss of productive labor, the diversion of funds that might otherwise be utilized for rehabilitation and reconstruction, the impossibility of attaining a balanced budget under such circumstances—these are but a few of the numerous economic consequences. I should like particularly to stress another most significant consideration. In this second year of the European Recovery Program Greece is receiving the maximum dollar aid of the four year period envisaged in this program. In order fully to utilize this aid the maximum amount of drachmas must be made available for reconstruction. Indeed, this was a major premise of the rather generous aid allocated to Greece for this year by OEEC and EGA. In this connection, I feel that I should recall to Your Excellency that the current allocation of dollar aid and drawing rights to the nations participating in the European Recovery Program will be subject to review by OEEC and EGA in January 1950. Your Excellency will, I am sure, wish to take all possible steps to forestall any question being raised as to the adequacy of drachma availability. It is imperative, therefore, for the recovery of Greece that expenditures for enterprises not directly connected with the expansion of Greek production be held at a minimum. As Your Excellency is aware, the principal sector of the Greek budget in which sizeable economies can be effected is that portion devoted to military affairs. I am sure that it is equally clear to-all-concerned that no significant economies can be carried out in drachma expenditure for military purposes as long as the Greek Army remains at its present size.
I should like to review for Your Excellency in the briefest fashion the American position with regard to the size of the Greek armed forces. The initial plan for American military aid envisaged support of a Greek Army of 132,000 men. In January 1948 the American Mission for Aid to Greece agreed to the establishment of a National Defense Corps of 50,000 men in addition to the figure just mentioned. This National Defense Corps was formed to relieve the Greek National Army of static defense duties so that it might undertake the offensive operations necessary to eliminate the guerrilla menace. It was the understanding at that time that the provision of the additional 50,000 men was a temporary measure, subject to review whenever the [Page 442] occasion warranted. Operations during 1948 did not bring the conclusive results anticipated. It was therefore not possible, as had been hoped, to eliminate the National Defense Corps and thereby reduce the size of the Greek armed forces. Rather, it was decided to increase the Greek National Army by 15,000 men in the hope that Greek armed forces totalling more than 250,000, well-trained and equipped and capably led, might achieve victory in 1949.
This hope has been realized. As a result of last summer’s campaign, guerrilla warfare within Greece has been practically terminated. It is now appropriate and urgent that the altered military situation be reflected in the size of the establishments of the Greek armed forces.
I wish strongly to advise Your Excellency that the Greek Government wholeheartedly support the tentative plans which have been subject of recent discussion between the Greek military authorities and American advisers. The initial phase of this plan calls for the discharge of 68,000 in the Greek Army by December 31, 1949. This would be partially offset by the call-up of 18,000 men during November and December. There would, however, be a net reduction of 50,000 men, that is, the equivalent of the forces authorized in January 1948 for the National Defense Corps. Subsequent phases of the plan call for additional reductions in the Greek National Army and in other branches of the Greek armed forces as well.
Implementing the details of these plans is the proper concern of the Greek military authorities and the American advisers. What is required of Your Excellency and the Greek Government as a whole is the firm, frank and public affirmation of your agreement with the policy and the principle. I fully realize that there is some risk involved in reducing the size of the Greek armed forces at a time when neither the international situation or its Balkan reflection has been stabilized. On the other hand, it seems to me that it would be serving only the designs of the enemies of Greece to maintain under the present circumstances a military establishment of such size and costliness that it could not fail to result in the continuance of economic despair and discontent.
I trust, Mr. Prime Minister, that I will find you in agreement with the views outlined in this lengthy letter, and I hope that I may have your response to this communication in the very near future.
Please accept [etc.]
- In
his telegram 2160, October 24, from Athens, not printed,
Ambassador Grady reported that he was writing to Prime Minister
Diomedes in view of the reaction to Secretary of State Acheson’s
statement of October 19 (see the editorial note, p. 434) regarding the American
position on the size of the Greek armed forces. Grady also
issued a lengthy statement to the press on the matter which was
featured in the Athens press of October 27 and the text of which
was transmitted in telegram 2175, October 27, from Athens, not
printed (868.20/10–2749). In his telegram 2173, October 26, from
Athens, not printed, Grady reported having been informed that
the Greek Government and General Papagos would shortly reply
affirmatively to this letter. Papagos was in full agreement and
had so informed his government (868.20/10–2649). In his telegram
Amag 79, November 3, not
printed, Grady reported that Ms public statement, conversations
with Prime Minister Diomedes, and vigorous persuasion of the
Greek General Staff by American military authorities had
overcome Greek reluctance to take steps to reduce the strength
of the Greek Army. On October 26 Diomedes announced plans for a
net reduction of 50,000 men by December 31 in accordance with
the earlier American plan. The actual discharge would amount to
68,000 (868.20/11–349).
The Department of State on October 21 presented to the Greek Embassy an aide-mémoire strongly endorsing the reduction of the Greek Army by 50,000 by January 1950 (868.20/10–2149). Telegram 1817, October 25, to Athens, not printed, transmitted a summary of the aide-mémoire (868.20/10–2549).
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