868.20/10–349: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Acting Secretary of State
3084. From Grady. Re Gama 54.2 My thinking regarding need for limitation on number of men and size of budget for Greek Armed Forces has been set forth at considerable length in messages to Department in last year. I refer to Amag 1605, 1613, 1614, 1652, 1657, 39 and 62.3 My general line of thought remains unchanged, and I assume that austerity policy enunciated in Gama 1341 and WAR 801494 is also unchanged.
Since I testified before Congressional Committees in July, the Vitsi and Grammos battles have been successfully concluded, all the border pockets have been eliminated, the number of guerrillas within the country has been reduced to about 2500, the present threat from Yugoslavia has almost disappeared, the threat from Albania and Bulgaria seems to have declined, and the economic prospects have been strengthened by a generous ECA allocation to Greece, and by a healthful reaction to devaluation. Under the circumstances, I think it reasonable to say that we have completed the open warfare phase of the problem in Greece. This open warfare may again break out if the Soviets so will or if economic or political conditions deteriorate enough to make rebellion again attractive to a part of the population. But, whichever course events may take the best way to make Greece strong against either type of attack is: (1) to move rapidly toward the small well equipped, efficient armed force which we have planned, and (2) to strengthen the economy by relieving it of the drachmae burden of a large armed force. The struggle is now primarily political and economic, rather than military. If these conclusions are correct, I think we must now move with decision, just as we did after March 12, 1947.
To obtain the best use of American military aid funds, there must be kept in mind the need for correlation between the size of the dollar budget and the size of the Greek armed forces. Small budget cuts can safely be made, because of the cessation of active operations, but [Page 432] drastic cuts without a decrease in man strength would leave the forces unable to properly feed, clothe and train the men still on the rolls. Due to the Greek desire for a large army for nationalist purposes, and due to their reasoning that a large army will force us to give large aid, there will be no initiative and only reluctant cooperation on the part of the Greeks in decreasing strengths. Therefore, judgement in Washington that there should be drastic budget cuts should be accompanied by judgement in Washington that there be contemporaneous strength cuts. In my opinion, these cuts should be made. In this connection, very serious consideration should be given to eliminating the 50,000 men in the NDC by January 1, 1950 as originally planned.5
In the JUSMAPG appreciation of 18 June 19496 which outlined strengths and costs for each of two possible situations, assumption A was that guerrilla warfare within the country would be reduced to police proportions and confined to border areas with a continued threat of support from the north. I think the present situation conforms to assumption A, and that the plans in assumption A, with some modifications should be our guide. Under assumption A the budget of $198 million was reduced by $66 million. Apparently The Bureau of the Budget now contemplates cuts totalling $70 million or $80 million. I now think all of these cuts are too drastic and would be contrary to our best interests in Greece. The primary reason for my present opinion is the hesitation of JUSMAPG in concluding that today’s situation conforms to assumption A. I further recognize that past and present budget cuts at a time when the strengths have remained high, have reduced supplies and equipment below adequate levels. I fully agree with the Bureau of the Budget cut of $20 million, a cut which as originally planned was to be compensated for by an equivalent amount of supplies from United Kingdom.
I further agree with some further cut so that the total budget for the year would be about $160 million. This is on the low side, and it is very possible that we will have to ask for additional funds later in the year, particularly if trouble should again flare up here. This cut will come as a profound shock to the Greeks, but I think that properly presented it will have a salutary effect upon them. In [Page 433] the authorizing legislation naming $211 million, plus $50 million, we have shown that we are wholeheartedly supporting them. Now by a lesser appropriation, we must translate into action our judgement that the period of open warfare has had a successful conclusion, and we must make plain to them our judgement that a strong, small force must care for Greece’s internal problems.
The major expenses in the 6 December budget are for (1) ammunition and equipment to be expended in active operations, (2) food and clothing for a large force, (3) replacement of worn equipment, and (4) miscellaneous and administrative expenses. Number one will not be as high as contemplated if operations are not resumed. Number two can be reduced only in proportion to reductions in man strength. Number three cannot be reduced appreciably if we wish to leave the Greek forces reasonably well-equipped. Number four can be slightly reduced, due to the general improvement in the Greek situation.
A categorical answer to whether the equipment to be purchased under the 6 December budget is for a total armed force of the present strength or of about 100,000 as planned, is not possible. It is certainly insufficient to equip well a force of the present size or to equip at American standards a force of 100,000. However, if we are to leave a small reasonably well-equipped force in Greece in 1951, virtually all of the equipment is needed. If we do not supply this equipment, it will not be possible to scrap the large amounts of worn out equipment now being used with high maintenance costs.
I have not attempted to review the 6 December budget to determine, in detail which items can be cut. The 18 June determination that a saving could be made is an indication that some cuts are possible under assumptions similar to the actual situation of today. The three JUSMAPG officers who are now in Washington on budget matters can suggest areas for economy.
Despite my support of cuts in strength and budget, I wish to make it perfectly clear that I think too drastic a budget cut is not wise. For FY 1949 there was a budget of $170 million. This year in the interests of minor savings, we should not neutralize what has been accomplished. In order to insure a continuance of the present favorable situation, we must lean toward an appropriation of ample size, rather than at this time taking risks by excessive cuts.
- Ambassador Grady had stopped in Rome en route to Paris for a brief consultation visit. This telegram was sent via the facilities of the Embassy in Rome.↩
- Dated September 28, p. 428.↩
- Telegrams Amag 1605, October 16, 1948, Amag 1613, October 22, 1948, Amag 1614, undated, Amag 1652, November 22, 1948, Amag 1657, December 7, 1948, all from Athens, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, pp. 160, 168, 170, 187, and 210, respectively. Telegrams Amag 39, April 7 and Amag 62, June 28, both from Athens, are printed ante, pp. 291 and 360.↩
- Neither of these November 1948 messages is printed.↩
- In his telegram Amag 75, October 15, from Athens, Ambassador Grady reported that further review had resulted in full agreement of all American authorities in Greece that the Greek Army should be reduced by 50,000 men by January 1950. Considerations leading to the decision included the assumed continued decline of guerrilla activity, the need for the reduction of governmental spending, and the realization that American military aid must be saved for the long-range maintenance of a smaller Greek army. (868.20/10–1549)↩
- The Van Fleet appreciation under reference here is summarized in telegram Amag 62, June 28, from Athens, p. 360.↩