868.00/9–1649: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State
priority
1854. Deptel 1503 September 10. As GA session approaches Greeks beginning to fear they may have much to lose and little, if anything, to gain. It is this feeling and not over-confidence which makes them fear formal conciliation talks. They are particularly anxious re Big Four discussions fearing compromise which might provide opportunity for Russians to intervene in Greek internal affairs such as elections and treatment guerrillas and thus continue through political means unrest and disorder that will require expenditure American aid largely for non-productive purposes.
Greeks are not unduly optimistic. Such optimism as exists here consists in feeling, as pointed out mytel 1804, September 101 that military victory has been achieved so far as it is within Greece’s power. Even this tapering off as result recent raid by Petritis Guerrilla band which caused over ten thousand resettled refugees to flee back to Yannina. Excellent work by ECA welfare section resulted in return of these people to land within short time but lesson has not been lost on Greek public. Greeks certainly are not over-optimistic concerning chances of international action to prevent return of guerrillas from Albania and Bulgaria. Quite the contrary. See Embtel 1835, September 14.1
I had hour’s talk with Pipinelis before US departure and lengthy conversation yesterday with Tsaldaris. It was unnecessary to raise specific points Deptel 1503 as both were familiar with and apprehensive of Department’s current proposals as result messages received from Dendramis. I assume officials of Department and our delegation will have ample opportunity discuss these and related matters with Tsaldaris and Pipinelis during GA. It should be remembered that [Page 420] Pipinelis memorandum which forms basis for Greek amnesty and internal conciliation measures scheduled shortly to become law was designed to prevent international intervention such Greek internal affairs as treatment guerrillas. (Embdes 640, September 62)
I believe Foreign Minister and other Greek leaders realize necessity for Greece to present itself in best possible light before world public opinion as represented in GA. They are therefore prepared to announce prior to GA consideration of Greek case their plans for guerrilla rehabilitation, suspension of executions and elections. They are not prepared, however, to commit themselves in advance to adopt measures they consider dangerous to their national security such as re-legalization KKE and admission of Russian right to mix in Greek internal affairs in order to lay basis for possible deal with USSR.
My views on specific points raised in Deptel 1503, September 10 are:
Item 1. This covered by Pipinelis plan, formal announcement of which should be forthcoming within few days.
Item 2. Pipinelis plan will provide opportunity for gradual rehabilitation such former guerrillas as can and do surrender as well as those now in Greek hands. It is impossible for government to guarantee employment and other benefits for ex-bandits beyond its capability to do so for refugees and other loyal elements reduced to present straits by bandit activities.
Item 3. Greeks would strongly oppose UN guidance on guerrillas rehabilitation program, but might accept if UN were to contribute material financial assistance this purpose. I support Greek position this matter but would endorse plan provided UN Committee excluded Russians and was assured entrance Albania and Bulgaria to determine wishes of guerrillas and to escort to Greece those guerrillas who wished to leave and to register remainder as relinquishing Greek nationality.
Item 4. Greeks favor holding elections soon as practicable and I will urge Greeks to make early announcement their intention this respect. I continue to be strongly opposed plebiscite on re-legalization KKE which would probably be boycotted even by small minority favoring KKE with resultant contribution to Monarcho-Fascist myth and likening of vote to totalitarian plebiscite. In any case Greeks would not for a moment even consider it.
Item 5. International supervision of elections (which Department has opposed heretofore) would make whole subject of re-legalization KKE voting privileges ex-guerrillas, et cetera, matter for international discussion and negotiation of sort that must be avoided if Greece is to achieve some semblance of order. We might counter demands [Page 421] for this action by proposing similar action in Albania or other satellite states, particularly ex-enemy countries. We must steadfastly assume that Greece has the right and ability to run her own affairs.
Item 6. Establishment of frontier commission is kind of practicable international action which I feel we should support. I trust that plans for such commissions include provisions for TIN officials or other nonpartisan arbiters since commissions consisting only of Balkanites might well be little more than mutual accusation societies. However, Greeks should not be pressed on this point until nature of commission much clearer.
Item 7. I also endorse proposal for Greeks to reiterate willingness conclude bilateral agreements with its northern neighbors including establishment frontier conventions and resumption normal diplomatic relations. Greeks would, however, in my opinion, be justified in demanding effective guarantees cessation Albanian and Bulgarian aid to guerrillas and return of Greek children.
In general, we should concentrate on securing strong GA recommendations that provide some hope of interfering with, if not certain to bar return of guerrillas from Albania and Bulgaria. This connection I consider proposed UNSCOB recommendations include several points such as eight and nine (Combal 486, September 113) that might prove useful in providing protection for Greece. Similarly I would favor that consultation between Greece and northern neighbors be under UN rather than Big Four auspices unless concrete indications are available of alteration USSR attitude. Greek Government in any case strongly opposed to intervention Big Four.
I am conferring with British Ambassador but considering my views expressed above and those contained London telegram 3715, September 15, I feel we have no basis joint discussion with Greeks at present.
In conclusion, I suggest we adhere to our policy of non-interference in Greek internal affairs and that we concentrate our efforts on heart of problem, viz., Albania and Bulgaria. In this connection I commend to Department’s attention Moscow Embassy’s admirable telegram 2320, September 15.
Drew has read this telegram and concurs generally but prefers withhold detailed comment until he arrives US.
Sent Department 1854; repeated London 77, Paris 93, Belgrade 74, Sofia 51; Department pass Moscow 28.
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed; it transmitted the text of a memorandum, dated August 12, 1949, setting forth the recommendations of Greek Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Pipinelis regarding amnesty to the Greek guerrillas and their active supporters. Pipinelis had informed the Embassy in Athens that his memorandum had been approved by King Paul, Prime Minister Diomedes, General Papagos, and the Greek Coordination Council. (868.00/9–649)↩
- Not printed; it transmitted the draft text of the Supplementary Report of the Special Committee on the Balkans. Points 8 and 9 recommended that the General Assembly provide for appropriate machinery to further a settlement between Greece and its northern neighbors and call upon the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to cooperate with the appropriate international bodies in the verification of assertions that Greek guerrillas entering their territory were being disarmed. In the final version of the Supplementary Report, dated September 16 (see the editorial note, supra), these points, somewhat revised, appeared as items 9 and 6, respectively.↩