501.BB Balkan/8–3949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)
| Participants: | The Greek Ambassador, V. Dendramis |
| Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary—G | |
| John D. Jernegan, Chief, GTI |
The Ambassador called at his request for an exchange of views prior to his departure this afternoon for consultation in Paris with Greek Foreign Minister Tsaldaris. He was especially interested in learning our position on the suggestion made by the Greek Government that UNSCOB or the Assembly should recommend consultation among UN members to determine means of eliminating the Albanian threat to Greek independence and integrity. With respect to this particular point, I told the Ambassador that at the present time, at least, we were not prepared to accept the suggestion because we could not see where it would lead. It would place us in the position of being forced to sit down at a table with other nations without having any course of action to propose. Past experience has shown that in international gatherings the other nations always look to the United States to take [Page 390] the necessary action. In the present instance we did not see exactly what action we might take. However, I did not altogether exclude the possibility that we might change our views, and I told the Ambassador that it was something we could discuss again after his return from Paris.
Ambassador Dendramis then asked if there was anything else I could tell him regarding our plans for the Assembly. I said we had been working on this for some time and had a number of thoughts but had not yet finalized them sufficiently for me to discuss them today. The Ambassador asked whether we did not expect a resumption of discussions with the Russians, possibly among the Big Four, in continuation of my talks with Gromyko last spring. I replied that it was quite possible that there would be consultations among the powers during the Assembly session, although they might not have any direct relation to the Gromyko talks. The Ambassador said he thought it important that certain prior conditions be laid down, namely, that there be no discussion of Greek internal affairs, no discussion of territorial claims, and no representation at the Assembly of the Greek guerrillas. I said it might be difficult, in a discussion of frontier problems, to avoid territorial claims altogether. However, a distinction might be drawn between discussing a matter and negotiating it. If one of the parties should bring up a question, it might be impossible to ignore it even though one might not be prepared to enter into negotiations.
Mr. Jernegan remarked that he thought the way to deal with any approach to internal Greek affairs would be for the Greek Government to make clear its position in advance of such questions. Then all that would be necessary during consultations at the Assembly would be to refer to this position.
With respect to the question of guerrilla representation, both the Ambassador and I recalled that the last General Assembly had rejected the proposal. We did not go into this matter further.
After Mr. Jernegan had mentioned that we hoped to send some instructions to Ambassador Grady containing our ideas on certain points on which we would like to reach agreement with the Greek Government before the Assembly, Mr. Dendramis urged that we defer any such instructions until after he had returned from his visit to Paris. He expected that this would be in about a week. I said that we would hold up our instructions until his return.
The Ambassador suggested that we might consider breaking up UNSCOB into separate committees to deal with Albanian-Greek, Bulgarian-Greek and Yugoslav-Greek affairs. I replied that I thought there might be a good deal of merit in this suggestion but that we [Page 391] might find it desirable to have international committees to handle affairs with Albania and Bulgaria but leave Yugoslav-Greek relations to a body on which only Yugoslavia and Greece would be represented.
After I was called away, Mr. Jernegan continued the discussion with the Ambassador and explained that the working level officers of the Department thought it desirable for the American and Greek Governments and, if possible, also the French and British Governments, to agree beforehand on the position to be taken on any consultations at the Assembly, whether these were formal or informal. Among the elements of this position might be the question of elections to be held in Greece, the treatment which the Greek Government would offer to the guerrillas after they had surrendered, and our attitude toward any renewal of the Soviet proposal for a mixed international commission to control the northern frontier of Greece. He said that there would probably be other points still which we would wish to consider. One way of handling the procedure in the Assembly itself might be for the political committee to call upon the Big Four to consult with each other and with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to arrive at a settlement. The Four would be directed to report back to the committee. If the ensuing consultations failed to produce results, there would probably be a majority and minority report by the subcommittee to the political committee. We would then work for a new resolution in the Assembly which would expressly condemn Albania. At that time we might also propose the setting up of the separate committees which the Ambassador had suggested to take the place of UNSCOB. It was our thought, however, that UNSCOB should not itself recommend this change but rather should include in its supplementary report a very general recommendation that there be continued UN machinery to deal with the problem. This would permit flexibility in the Assembly while at the same time avoiding any appearance that UNSCOB was itself admitting failure and recommending its own dissolution.
The Ambassador asked whether we did not think it a good idea to press Yugoslavia to conclude now a frontier agreement with Greece of the sort proposed by the Evatt Conciliation Committee. Mr. Jernegan said he believed Ambassador Cannon had standing instructions to raise this question whenever he saw an appropriate moment. So far as he knew, the Ambassador had not yet done so and he assumed this indicated that Mr. Cannon did not think it would serve a useful purpose. On such a question we would feel obliged to defer to his judgment. Furthermore, while Mr. Jernegan agreed that the conclusion of such an agreement would be desirable, the important thing was that the Yugoslavs should act correctly, whether or not their actions were based on any formal document.
[Page 392]Referring to the announced creation of a “Free Albanian Committee”, Ambassador Dendramis expressed some fear that the Committee’s declared intention of working for the preservation of the integrity of Albania might cause difficulty in Greece in view of the Greek claim to northern Epirus. He also thought it might cause trouble in Yugoslavia, since Albania had a territorial claim against that country. He also recalled the informal undertaking of the Italian Government, made at our request, to warn the Albanian Government against aiding the Greek guerrillas. He wondered if there was not a danger in such measures that Italy would again seek to assert a predominant influence in Albania. He believed it desirable that neither Italy nor Yugoslavia nor Greece should exercise undue influence in Albania. Mr. Jernegan said that he agreed and believed that this was the view of the Department of State. He did not think, however, that an approach such as that we had suggested to the Italians carried with it any real danger of Italian preponderance.
As he was leaving, the Ambassador asked Mr. Jernegan’s opinion as to whether it would not be desirable for the Secretary and Mr. Tsaldaris to establish the general Greek position in their opening-speeches to the Assembly without waiting for the matter to come up on the agenda of the First Committee. He thought such early statements might lay the foundation for subsequent informal discussions “in the corridors”, whereas action in the First Committee might be delayed for some time. Mr. Jernegan said that he thought the suggestion warranted careful consideration.
It was understood that the Ambassador would call again at the Department immediately upon his return from Paris.