Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

7438.75/8–549

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Leonard J. Cromie of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] August 5, 1949.

Participants:	I. Lord Jellicoe, British Embassy
	Mr. Cromie, GTI
	Miss Synder, GTI
	II. M. Winckler, French Embassy
	Mr. Campbell,1 SE
	Mr. Cromie, GTI

(a) Problem: From recent conversations in Athens with Messrs. Tsaldaris and Pipinelis, the British and French have some fear that the Greeks may be planning an imminent invasion of Albania. They wish to determine the American attitude with respect to Greek military operations in Albania and also what measures the United States would take if the Greeks, notwithstanding American advice, did enter Albania. They suggest that the United States, Great Britain and France should arrive at an agreed common position on these matters and make it known to the Greeks.

(b) Action Required: Intra-Departmental consultations. (Lord Jellicoe and M. Winckler were informed of the steps taken by the United States to discourage the Greek military operations in Albania.)

(c) Action Assigned to: Messrs. Campbell, EUR; Mr. Cromie, NEA.

Lord Jellicoe called on Mr. Cromie at 3:30 p. m. at his request and showed Mr. Cromie a telegram just received by the British Embassy from the British Chargé d’Affaires at Athens.²

In this telegram the British Chargé said that, in the course of a conversation with Mr. Tsaldaris, the latter had brought up the subject of Greco-Albanian relations. Mr. Tsaldaris said he had been informed of plans for the establishment of an Albanian exiles political committee in either Rome or Paris and that he had been asked to avoid any Greek declaration which might be a handicap to the work of this committee.³ This, Mr. Tsaldaris said, was satisfactory to him, since Greece had no political designs on Albania. However, Mr. Tsaldaris was much concerned lest Italy regain its former ascendency over Albania and earnestly hoped therefore that the headquarters of the Albanian exiles committee’s activities would be in Paris rather than in Rome.

Mr. Tsaldaris then went on to tell the British Chargé in a very casual manner that Albanian aid to the guerrillas was of course an intolerable burden for Greece. However, he assured the Chargé that “if the Greek Army went into Albania it would be purely on military grounds rather than to achieve any political objective”.

The British Chargé reported that he reacted strongly to this matter-of-fact announcement that the Greek Army might be contemplating such action and warned Tsaldaris against any Greek military ventures in Albania. He felt, however, that he had made no impression on Tsaldaris and he therefore went out and repeated the same warning to Pipinelis and the Minister of War. The British Chargé concluded the telegram by stating that present Greek troop dispositions, while justified for an attack against Vitsi, could equally well provide the basis for a take-off into Albania. He fears that we cannot dismiss this latter possibility.

Mr. Cromie informed Lord Jellicoe of the repeated warnings we have given Greece on the subject of any rash military ventures in Albania.

II

M. Winckler called on Mr. Campbell at 4:30 p. m. by appointment at his request.

He said that Mr. Pipinelis had recently summoned the French Ambassador in Athens and told him that the Greek Army would be faced with a dilemma upon reaching the Albanian frontier after the successful conclusion of the Vitsi campaign. If the Army were to stop at the frontier, serious internal difficulties would ensue in Greece, since the Greek people would not understand why the Greek Army should not pursue the guerrillas into traditionally enemy territory. The Government would be overthrown and the morale of the Army would be undermined since, Mr. Pipinelis said, the “Army people” were strongly in favor of military intervention in Albania. On the other hand, Mr. Pipinelis recognized that military intervention by Greece in Albania would create a “difficult international situation”.

Mr. Pipinelis said he wished to know what the French attitude would be on this question and also, in general, what the Great Powers propose to do to “recall Albania to the respect of international law”. He said that the United States “did not appear to oppose Greek military intervention in Albania” and that the United States “would welcome a change of regime in Albania.”

In response to M. Winckler’s inquiry as to whether this correctly represented the American point of view, Mr. Cromie told him that while it was quite true that the United States would welcome a change of regime in Albania, the Greeks had been repeatedly warned by us to undertake no military operations there; they had been told by Ambassador Grady that if they invaded Albania in force they might get into serious difficulties with the Albanian Army, in which case we could not guarantee them either diplomatic or military support. M. Winckler then said that the Quai d’Orsay wished to know what action the United States would take if, despite American advice, the Greeks invaded Albania.

Mr. Campbell and Mr. Cromie replied that this had not been thought out, that we undoubtedly could not remain indifferent to a violation by Greece of its obligations under the Charter, and that we would let him have a more definite answer after further consultations in the Department.

M. Winckler said that French intelligence reports from Belgrade indicated that Tito was closely watching Albanian developments, that he had recently released from detention large numbers of anti-Hoxha Albanians, and that he was preparing to set up an Albanian government of his own. The French Minister in Tirana reported that the Albanian authorities are seriously worried by the threats from both Tito and the Greeks and are considering a renewed démarche to the United States in an effort to obtain American recognition of Albania and an American guarantee of Albania’s present frontiers. Political opposition to the Hoxha regime is mounting, though it is still disorganized and ineffective, and the economic situation is desperate. Russia is actually providing Albania with very little in the way of economic assistance and it is unlikely that Albania will be able to carry on on the present basis through the winter. Finally, it is the estimate of the French Minister at Tirana that the Albanian army would disintegrate if it came into conflict with the Greek Army or any other foreign force.

M. Winckler concluded his remarks by pointing out that many people in the present Hoxha regime are young, French-educated opportunists. Now that the wind is blowing against the USSR in the Balkans, he suggested that many of them could easily be induced to re-orient their policy, although obviously some of the top leaders such as Hoxha himself are too committed to do so.

Mr. Cromie informed M. Winckler that Ambassador Grady doubts that the responsible Greek officials are really contemplating an invasion of Albania and he gave him some of the background on this matter. Mr. Cromie speculated that, in approaching the three powers separately with regard to a Greek invasion of Albania, Tsaldaris and Pipinelis probably have little hope of obtaining a favorable response. Of course they would be delighted if France, the UK and the US told them to go ahead and to count on western military and diplomatic backing. However, in the event of a negative reply, which has in fact already been made by the US and UK, Tsaldaris and Pipinelis are at least cleared of responsibility for opposing this Greek military move vis-à-vis the Greek military authorities and the Greek people.⁴

M. Winckler commented that this corresponded to the Quai d’Orsay’s own analysis of the reasons for the Tsaldaris–Pipinelis démarches.

1. John C. Campbell, Acting Chief, Division of Southeast European Affairs.
2. Ponsonby M. Crosthwaite, Counselor of the British Embassy in Greece.
3. For documentation regarding the establishment of a Free Albania Committee in August 1949, see vol. v, pp. 854 ff.
4. Telegram 1241, August 6, to Athens, not printed, reported that the Department had been informed of the recent conversations by British and French officials with Tsaldaris and Pipinelis. It was suggested by the Department that Tsaldaris and Pipinelis were attempting to plant rumors calculated to frighten the Albanian regime into ceasing guerrilla aid and to clear themselves of personal responsibility for opposing a move against Albania desired by Greek military authorities and by the Greek public. The Embassy in Athens was instructed to make it unmistakably clear once again to Greek authorities that the United States opposed any rash Greek military action such as an attempted encirclement of Greek guerrillas through Albanian territory or the mass pursuit of guerrillas into Albania. (768.75/8–649)