Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Balkan/7–2749

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leonard J. Cromie of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] July 27, 1949.

Participants:	H. E. Vassili Dendramis, Greek Ambassador
	Mr. McGhee, NEA1
	Ambassador Grady2
	Mr. Cromie, GTI

(a) Problem: Greek Relations with Albania and Yugoslavia, etc.

(b) Action Required: Discussion in Departmental Working Group preparing U.S. Position on Greek Case

(c) Action Assigned to: GTI

Ambassador Dendramis called at 4:30 p. m. by appointment at his request.

The Ambassador inquired whether the Department had as yet formulated any specific instructions for Mr. Drew with regard to the UNSCOB recommendations. He recalled that the Greeks had urged that the UNSCOB report emphasize the special role of Albania in the aggression against Greece and establish the basis for a GA recommendation which would specifically condemn Albania as the principal “troublemaker” in the Balkans and recommend that the members of the UN concert as to ways and means of eliminating the threat to the peace created by Albania. It was the Greek feeling that such a recommendation would provide a basis for possible “further action” by the US and the UK against Albania.

Ambassador Grady interjected that he had discussed the problem of controlling future Albanian aid to the guerrillas with Generals Van Fleet and Jenkins³ and also, with Mr. Tsaldaris in the presence of Admiral Sherman.⁴ It was our feeling that Yugoslavia was now out of the picture and that Bulgarian aid to the guerrillas had never mattered much on account of the terrain. That left Albania, and it was the opinion of the top American military men in Greece that if the Greeks made a slashing attack in the Vitsi area and achieved a smashing victory there, the Greek Army would subsequently be able to seal the Albanian border. Ambassador Grady said that we have provided the Greeks with new and very powerful weapons for their Vitsi offensive, and that Admiral Sherman had pointed out that if the guerrillas were cut to pieces in the Vitsi they would have little heart to return to Greece even if some did manage to escape to Albania.

Ambassador Grady agreed that UNSCOB and the GA should take a strong position on Albania and felt that the Albanian role would be underlined in the factual part of the UNSCOB report. However, he failed to see what practical effect UN condemnation of Albania would have there. Russia and the Albanians pay no attention to condemnations. We can’t land troops in Albania or blockade its coasts. The Greeks cannot expect us to take overt or positive steps which would lead to World War III.

Mr. McGhee concurred. Mr. Cromie commented that there would be considerable reluctance in the Department to sponsor or endorse an UNSCOB or GA recommendation which would be vague in character or constitute an empty threat. If we sponsored an UNSCOB or GA recommendation asking UN members to concert on measures for removing the Albanian threat, we might properly be asked what measures we envisaged. There were, practically speaking, none.

Ambassador Dendramis commented that State Department legal experts would always be able to find legal justification for such measures as we might wish to take in Albania.

Ambassador Dendramis then inquired whether Ambassador Cannon in Belgrade had carried out or commented on the Department’s recent telegraphic instruction⁵ authorizing him to sound out the Yugoslavs on the reestablishment of commercial relations with Greece and reopening of the Yugoslav Free Zone at Salonika and Belgrade-Salonika rail communications. Mr. Cromie replied that there had been no reaction as yet from Belgrade on this instruction.

Ambassador Grady commented that Mr. Pipinelis was optimistic on the outlook for Greco-Yugoslav rapprochement. Ambassador Grady shared this view, finding the recent Yugoslav-Greek meeting on the Skočivir bombing incident to be a good sign even though it led to no tangible results. If the Greeks would just be a little patient, Yugoslavia and Greece would, in the nature of things, be bound to become closer.

Mr. McGhee said that the Greek policy of patience was paying off and he earnestly hoped that any rash actions would be avoided. We are doing all we can to improve Greek relations with both Yugoslavia and Albania. We thought, for example, that Tito’s political and strategic position was reasonably sound, but that he needed economic help and we were providing that help. Mr. McGhee recalled that no formal reply had ever been made by the Department to the Greek note of April 1⁶ proposing certain plans for action in Albania in the event that Tito’s survival should be seriously threatened by the Cominform. Commenting on these proposals, Mr. McGhee continued by saying that both the United States and Greece recognize Albania as a sovereign and independent State. As members of the United Nations, both countries must also refrain from any action with respect to Albania which would be a violation of the Charter. Because of the Greek North Epirus claim, any military action which Greece might take in Albania would be misinterpreted and provide a field day for Russian propaganda. The proper way to handle this claim is through the CFM and not by sending troops into Albania.

Ambassador Dendramis interjected that the Greeks did not propose to use force in connection with Albania. There had merely been some irresponsible articles along this line by a retired General. The Greeks, he said, would take no action whatever in this connection without American approval. What they were really thinking of, he continued, was eventual action by the US and the UK looking towards the establishment of “international control” over Northern Epirus.

Ambassador Grady commented that many middle-ranking officers in the Greek Army, and not only a retired General, were tempted by the advantages of entering Albania in connection with the forthcoming Vitsi campaign.⁷ The newspaper Acropolis had also been sponsoring the idea. General Papagos, however, has no such plans, for he understands that, in entering Albania, the Greek Army might well be entering a trap and become involved with the Albanian Army.

Returning to the subject of the Greek memorandum of April 1, which implied the Greek need of a larger Army, Mr. McGhee said it must be understood that the present basis of our military aid to Greece was to enable Greece to maintain an Army adequate to restore internal order. At a time when we are having difficulties obtaining appropriations for this purpose, it would be out of the question to change the basis of our military aid to Greece and ask for more funds for a larger Greek Army for some other pupose. Our policy aims only at quelling the guerrilla movement.

Ambassador Dendramis suggested that this was the policy only “for the moment.”

Mr. McGhee stated that it would be a hard policy to change. Any precautionary military moves in Greece, such as a seemingly unwarranted increase in the Greek Army, might precipitate the war which we are trying to avoid.

Ambassador Grady concurred and again emphasized that our whole policy in Greece aims at getting rid of the guerrillas and not at making Greece part of a cordon sanitaire around Russia.

Ambassador Dendramis [said] that this would be a subject for later discussions, perhaps in connection with a Mediterranean Pact.

Mr. McGhee terminated the discussion by remarking that it would be necessary to go slowly on a Mediterranean Pact. The Senate had just ratified the Atlantic Pact and MAP was now up for congressional debate. All these things take time. There is a limit to the rapidity with which the American Congress and public can assimilate these new departures in American policy.

1. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and African Affairs.
2. Ambassador Grady returned to Washington on July 25 for consultation.
3. Maj. Gen. Reuben A. Jenkins, Deputy Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group.
4. Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Commander of the Sixth Task Fleet, U.S. Navy, operating in the Mediterranean area, visited Athens, July 21–25, during which time he made several official visits.
5. Telegram 372, July 14, to Belgrade, p. 369.
6. The memorandum under reference is not printed, but see the memorandum of conversation by Cromie, April 1, p. 287.
7. Telegram 1321, Combal 447, July 8, from Athens, not printed, reported that during a conversation with Drew on July 7, Pipinelis recalled that a proposal advanced by Greek military authorities to move into Albania to crush the Greek guerrillas had been hotly debated in the Greek Council of State in late 1948. Pipinelis had opposed such an invasion in 1948, but he wondered what he would decide if again faced by such a proposal (501.BB Balkan/7–849). In his telegram 1445, Combal 458, July 25, from Athens, not printed, Drew reported that the agitation in the press and in official Greek quarters to neutralize Albania by direct action was assuming serious proportions (501.BB Balkan/7–2549).